Chemtrail Central
Login
Member List
Image Database
Chemtrail Forum
Active Topics
Who's Online
Search
Research
Flight Explorer
Unidentifiable
FAQs
Phenomena
Disinformation
Silver Orbs
Transcripts
News Archive
Channelings
Etcetera
PSAs
Media
Vote


Chemtrail Central
Search   FAQs   Messages   Members   Profile
ENERGY EXPERIMENTS HARM WHALES

Post new topic Reply to topic
Chemtrail Central > CT Science

Author Thread
billder





Joined: 02 Feb 2002
Posts: 319
Location: pasco county fl
ENERGY EXPERIMENTS HARM WHALES PostWed Nov 23, 2005 5:39 pm  Reply with quote  

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

Jon M. Van Dyke

William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Emily A. Gardner

Graduate Ocean Policy Program, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Joseph R. Morgan

Department of Geography, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Elisabeth Mann Borgese devoted her professional life to promoting aware-

ness about the ocean and building regimes to protect fragile marine ecosys-

tems. This article examines a new acoustic military use of the ocean, which

potentially threatens all ocean creatures, and explains how existing princi-

ples of international law and treaty regimes apply to this activity.

Professor Van Dyke worked with Elisabeth at the Center for the Study

of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California in 1969–1970, where

she introduced him to the emerging efforts to develop a global regime to

govern ocean resources and stimulated his early interest in this topic by invit-

ing him to the 1970 Pacem in Maribus meeting in Malta. Dr. Morgan worked

closely with Elisabeth as co-editor of the Ocean Yearbook for Volumes 7–14,

and Ms. Gardner was assistant editor of the Yearbook for Volume 12. Research

support for this paper was provided by the Ocean Mammal Institute.

INTRODUCTION

On 15 July 2002, the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) ex-

empted the U.S. Navy’s Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) program from

the requirements of the Marine Mammal Protection Act after determining

that its operation would have a “negligible impact” on any species.

1

NMFS

thus authorized the Navy to use two ships to transmit low frequency active

sonar in about 75 percent of the world’s oceans (exempting the polar ex-

1. K. R. Weiss, “Sonar Approved Despite Possible Risks to Whales,” Honolulu

Advertiser, 16 July 2002; M. Kaufman, “Navy Cleared to Use a Sonar Despite Fears

of Injuring Whales,” Washington Post, 16 July 2002, http://www.commondreams.

org/headlines02/0716-06.htm (accessed 19 July 2002).

2004 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Ocean Yearbook 18: 330–363

330

Page 2

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

331

tremes). Ten weeks later, in late September 2002, 15 Cuvier’s beaked whales

beached on the Canary Islands at the same time the U.S. destroyer Mahan

was maneuvering in the area with ships from nine other members of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

2

Autopsies of the whales revealed brain

damage consistent with an acoustic impact.

3

This mass stranding followed

similar incidents near the Bahamas in March 2000 and Greece in 1996, and

in the Canaries between 1985 and 1989, which are described later and which

were followed by another incident in the Haro Strait near Vancouver Island.

4

The NMFS approval of the Navy’s use of LFAS was challenged by the

Natural Resources Defense Council and other organizations in 2002, lead-

ing to a determination by Federal Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. LaPorte

that NMFS had violated federal law in a number of respects, but that the

Navy should be permitted to continue with some limited testing because of

the strong national security interest involved.

5

On August 26, 2003, Judge

2. Nine Cuvier’s beaked whales were found dead on 24–25 September 2002

on the Canary Islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote. Six beached whales were

pushed back into the sea, and another two were seen floating lifeless in coastal

waters. Ships from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal,

Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States were conducting a multina-

tional exercise known as Neo Tapon 2002 designed to practice securing the Strait

of Gibraltar. The Cuvier’s beaked whale is a toothed cetacean that ranges from 5

to 8 meters in length. J. Socolovsky, “Investigation Points to NATO Exercise in Mass

Whale Beaching,” Associated Press, 10 October 2002, posted at the Web site of the

Environmental News Network, http:/www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2002/10/

10102002/ap_4866.

3. Ibid. (quoting a researcher as saying that the “the only cause which we can-

not rule out . . . is acoustic impact”).

4. See text at (n. 18, 21 and 24–7 below). On 5 May 2003, the U.S. Navy’s

guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup tested mid-range sonar for five hours in the Haro

Strait near Vancouver Island, sending out pings louder than 200 dB, which caused

a pod of 22 killer whales and a minke whale to stop their feeding and form into a

tight group as far from the sound as possible and then flee the region. The dead

carcasses of eight harbor porpoises washed ashore in the days after this test, and

subsequent investigations indicated that they had suffered severe trauma to their

brains. Tracy Vedder, “This Is Another Smoking Gun,” KOMO TV, 8 August 2003,

http://www.komotv.com/news/printstory.asp?id=26542 (accessed 28 August 2003);

Robert McClure, “Tests on Marine Mammals to Look for Sonar Link to Injuries,”

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12 July 2003, http://www.seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/

130609_sonar12.html (accessed 28 August 2003); Peggy Anderson, “Did Navy Tests

Kill Porpoises?” CBSNEWS.com, 23 July 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/

2003/07/23/tech/main564700.shtml (accessed 28 August 2003).

5. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Evans, No. C-02-3805-EDL

(N.D.Cal., Opinion and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgement, 26 Au-

gust 2003); Judge LaPorte’s earlier Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction was issued 31 October 2002 and published at 232

F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Cal. 2002). Judge LaPorte ruled that NMFS had violated the

Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 USC Chapter 31, the National Environ-

mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC secs. 4321 et seq., and the Endangered Species

Page 3

332

Living Resources

LaPorte issued a permanent injunction blocking the broad permit issued

by NMFS, holding that it had violated several federal statutes and explaining

that “the extremely loud and far traveling naval sonar system” maintains its

“sound pressure level of approximately 140 dB more than 400 miles from

the [transmitting] vessel” and covers broad areas because it “bounces from

the ocean bottom to the surface and back again.”

6

She stressed that NMFS

and the Navy had ignored relevant studies, such as one prepared by Great

Britain’s Defense Research Agency, which reported that fish exposed to

LFAS “suffered internal injuries at 160 dB, eye damage at 170 dB, auditory

damage at 180 dB, and transient stunning at 190 dB.”

7

The injunction re-

quires the Navy to extend its coastal buffer zone from 12 to at least 43 nauti-

cal miles offshore (except in certain limited areas where coastal training is

required), to use aerial surveys or observational vessels to monitor for nearby

species when operating close to shore, and also to avoid areas of the deep

ocean where marine mammals and other endangered species such as sea

turtles are migrating, breeding, feeding or clustering. The court’s opinion

instructs the parties to meet together to agree on limited areas where the

Navy’s testing can continue.

8

Act of 1973, 16 USC Chapter 35.

In her October 2002 opinion, Magistrate Judge LaPorte had explained that:

“It is undisputed that marine mammals, many of whom depend on sensitive hearing

for essential activities like finding food and mates and avoiding predators, and some

of whom are endangered species, will at a minimum be harassed by the extremely

loud and far traveling LFA sonar.” 232 F.Supp.2d at 1053. Although Magistrate Judge

LaPorte found that the Navy’s activities violated three federal statutes designed to

protect the marine environment, she accepted the testimony of the NMFS experts

regarding the impact of LFAS on marine mammals over the sharply conflicting testi-

mony presented by the plaintiff’s experts. Judge LaPorte wrote that: “The law is

clear . . . that when qualified experts on both sides reach carefully reasoned but

different conclusions, the Court must defer to the agency’s experts. . .” Order of

26 August 2003, slip op. at 49; also at 232 F.Supp.2d at 1017. Other courts dealing

with ocean environmental issues have taken a more skeptical view of the scientific

opinions offered by federal agencies. See, for example, Natural Resources Defense

Counsel v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (explaining that courts “do

not hear cases merely to rubber stamp agency actions” and criticizing the agency’s

scientific conclusions as ones that could only be correct in “Superman Comics’ Bi-

zarro world, where reality is turned upside down”); Greenpeace v. National Marine

Fisheries Service, 106 F.Supp.2d 1066 (W.D.Wash. 2000) (where the court treated

the views of the two sides’ experts as having equal credibility and issued the injunc-

tion sought by plaintiffs despite the contrary testimony of the agency’s experts).

6. Ibid., Order of 26 August 2003, slip op. at 3, 11.

7. Ibid., slip op. at 40 (citing a 1994 study by Dr. Turnpenny entitled “The

Effects on Fish and Other Marine Mammals of High-Level Underwater Sound”).

8. After the court’s October 2002 order issuing a preliminary injunction, 232

F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Cal. 2002), the parties reached an agreement allowing the

Navy to test its sonar in an area of the Western Pacific extending from Saipan in the

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, to Japan’s Bonin Islands, south of

Tokyo. D. Kravets, “U.S. Navy Agrees to Temporarily Limit Testing of New Sonar

Page 4

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

333

About the same time, U.S. Magistrate Judge James Larson, also in

Northern California, issued a temporary restraining order blocking geogra-

phers from the National Science Foundation, Columbia University, and

the Georgia Institute of Technology from “using an array of twenty airguns

to fire extremely high energy acoustic bursts into the ocean to generate

geophysical data in the Gulf of California” with sound blasts “as high as 263

decibels (dB) at the source,” which had apparently killed “[a]t least two

Cuvier beaked whales (Ziphius cavirostris), a species particularly susceptible

to acoustic trauma.”

9

Judge Larson noted that: “These levels are significantly

higher than 180 dB, which is acknowledged by the Government to cause

significant injury to marine mammals.”

10

In January 2003, U.S. District Judge Samuel Conti of the Northern Dis-

trict of California made an additional ruling against sonar use, blocking ex-

periments (authorized by NMFS) that were to be conducted by Woods Hole

Oceanographic Institution scientist Dr. Peter Tyack to determine the effect

of the sound on the gray whales migrating along the West Coast of Califor-

nia to their winter grounds along the coast of Mexico.

11

Judge Conti ruled

that because the permits involved “major amendments” to the original proj-

ect, which had generated “public controversy,” it was necessary to conduct

a proper environmental impact assessment under the National Environmen-

tal Policy Act before undertaking the experiments. In the process of “balanc-

ing” the “harms” to determine whether to issue an injunction, Judge Conti

noted that the population of gray whales had been dropping since 1984

(from 21,942 individuals to 17,414) and that “Dr. Tyack’s proposed experi-

ments might inflict unacceptable levels of harm on the gray whales.”

12

Because of the new acoustic technologies created by the Navy and other

researchers, the creatures living in the world’s oceans are now facing a new

form of pollution, justified by the Navy as militarily necessary, but with enor-

mous and untested destructive potential. The controversy surrounding the

use of sonar and other acoustic devices in the oceans is certain to continue

into the future, and will trigger challenges by other nations and nongovern-

mental organizations. The three cases described earlier indicate that proper

enforcement of U.S. environmental laws may protect the marine environ-

ment from the dangers posed by LFAS. But if these laws should prove to be

inadequate, or if Congress should exempt LFAS from U.S. environmental

System Amid Marine Life Concerns,” Associated Press (18 November 2002), http://

www.planetsave.com/ViewStory.asp?ID=3299 (accessed 2 March 2003).

9. Center for Biological Diversity v. National Science Foundation, No. C02-

5065 JL, 2002 WL 31548073 (N.D. Cal., Temporary Restraining Order, 30 October

2002), slip op. at 2–3.

10. Ibid., p. 3.

11. Hawaii County Green Party v. Evans, No. C-03-0078-SC (N.D.Cal., Order

Granting Permanent Injunction, 24 January 2003).

12. Ibid., slip op. at 24.

Page 5

334

Living Resources

laws that would otherwise govern,

13

other countries and groups concerned

about the impact of this technology on their marine resources, and the

ocean environment generally, will be obliged to utilize international law

principles and tribunals to limit the use of low frequency active sonar by the

navies and scientists of the United States and other countries. The sections

that follow examine the scientific information now available about the im-

pact of LFAS on the marine environment, address the military and scientific

arguments in favor of its use, and analyze possible international strategies

that might be pursued to challenge it.

THE EFFECTS OF LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR

ON MARINE BIOTA

The ocean has always been a noisy place. For billions of years, natural sounds

produced by wind, waves, precipitation, ice, seismic events, and marine or-

ganisms defined the ocean’s acoustic milieu. The auditory sensitivities of

marine organisms surely evolved in the presence of these sounds and over

time species became specially adapted to deal with the ambient sounds of

the ocean environment.

14

During the last 2 centuries, humans have significantly added to the

ocean’s array of sounds with the introduction of machine-driven commercial

and military ships and the active exploitation of the hydrocarbons in the

ocean floor. Only recently has much consideration been given to the impacts

these sounds could be having on the life forms that inhabit the sea. A par-

ticular concern has arisen for marine mammals, many of which use sound

as their primary sense, to communicate, to navigate, and to detect predators

and prey.

The U.S. Navy’s Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS)

Low Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) will employ very loud low-frequency

sounds (less than 500 Hz with intensity levels as great as 230 dB re 1µPa at

1 m

15

), posing a significant threat to the safety and welfare of marine mam-

13. The U.S. Navy received, for instance, a congressional exemption from the

requirements of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 to permit it to continue live-

fire military training exercises on the island of Farallon de Medinilla, near Saipan,

in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. D. DePledge, “Navy Freed

from Bird Protection Act,” Honolulu Advertiser, 14 November 2002, at A11, col. 4.

See also J. McQuaid, “Fight Brews Over Environmental Law; Bush Officials Consider

Policy to Exempt Oceans,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans), 16 August 2002, p. 5.

14. National Research Council, Committee on Low-Frequency Sound and Ma-

rine Mammals, Low-Frequency Sound and Marine Mammals: Current Knowledge

and Research Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994), p. 2.

15. Although the Navy refuses to release the maximum source level of SUR-

TASS LFAS, claiming it to be classified information, reports indicate the maximum

source level to be 230 dB re 1 µPa. See “Quiet please. Whales navigating,” The

Page 6

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

335

mals, and possibly to other forms of marine life as well. The transmitted

sound will be about 215 dB at its source, arrayed in a manner to have “an

effective source level” of 230–240 dB. According to the Navy’s environmen-

tal impact statement (EIS), the sound dispersion would vary somewhat ac-

cording to the geography and environment but would generally be at the

180 dB level 1 km from the source, at 173 dB 2 km from the source, about

165 dB 40 nautical miles (M) from the source, at the 150–160 dB level up

to 100 M from the source, and some 140 dB 400 M from the source vessel.

16

(Decibel levels are logarithmic in nature, so that a sound of 180 dB is 10

times as intense as one of 170 dB.) The sounds are not transmitted uniformly

in all directions from the source, but travel in a beam that is a few hundred

feet in width, which tends to expand as it leaves its source.

17

These sounds

are the loudest ever put into the world’s oceans by humans, with the possible

exception of underground explosions. They are designed to travel great dis-

tances and are audible by humans in the water 1000 km away without any

signal processing.

The threat of this active sonar to marine mammals first became evident

in 1996 when an unusual stranding event took place involving 12 Cuvier’s

beaked whales in the Mediterranean Sea near Greece that coincided tempo-

rally and geographically with “sound detecting system trials” of LFAS by the

NATO research vessel Alliance. The whales were exposed to sound transmit-

ted from at least 25 km away, which was determined to have reached them

at the 150–160 dB re 1 µPa at 1 m level after 238 short four-second pings

of sound were released, and which caused severe tissue damage to their ear

cavities.

18

Cuvier’s beaked whales are a deep-diving pelagic species that rarely

strands. Only seven cases of more than four individuals stranding have been

recorded since 1963.

19

One commentator concluded that the probability

that the mass stranding was not related to LFAS testing was less than 0.07

percent.

20

Moreover, three mass strandings involving similar species were

also associated with military maneuvers in the Canary Islands between 1985

and 1989, and in 1983

21

sperm whales in the southeast Caribbean became

Economist (7 March 1998): 85 and A. Frantis, “Does military testing strand whales?”

Nature 352 (5 March 1998): 29.

16. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, No. C-02-3805 EDL, 2002

WL 31445165 (N.D.Cal., Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Pre-

liminary Injunction, 31 October, 2002), slip op. at 12, 28.

17. Ibid., at 28.

18. See generally, Joint Interim Report Bahamas Marine Mammal Stranding

Event of 15–16 March 2000. U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Secretary of the Navy.

December 2001, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot_res/overview/Interim_Bahamas_

Report.pdf (accessed 28 August 2003).

19. Frantzis (n. 15 above).

20. Ibid.

21. M. P. Simmonds and L. F. Lopez-Jurado, “Whales and the military,” Nature

351 (6 June 1991): 448.

Page 7

336

Living Resources

“unusually silent and dispersed” when exposed to intense military sonar

from submarines operating in the area.

22

Because of the way sound is measured and the different speed that

sound travels through water, as compared to land, it is estimated that “under-

water sound pressure levels numerically are about 61.5 dB greater than

sound pressure levels in air for an equal intensity.”

23

In other words, sound

measured at 131 dB in water would have the same pressure impact as

sound measured at 70 dB on land (60 dB on land is the sound generated

by freeway traffic). Continuous exposure above 85 dB (on land) is likely to

degrade the hearing of most humans. “Deafening” noise (on land) begins

at 110 dB, with 120 dB measuring a hard rock band, 130 dB being the point

at which pain is registered, and 140 dB being the point adjacent to a jet

engine. The 180 dB (in water) figure said by the Navy to be “safe” for ceta-

ceans would thus affect them at about the same extent as human hearing

would be affected by standing next to a hard rock band at a rock concert,

if we can assume that the hearing system of cetaceans is roughly comparable

to ours.

Following the 1996 experience of the atypical mass stranding of beaked

whales in the Mediterranean, efforts have been made to collect the ears of

stranded animals that coincided with the nearby use of LFAS and other so-

nar devices. In March 2000, 17 whales of four different species, including

Cuvier’s beaked whales, two minke whales, and a dolphin stranded in the

Bahamas in March 2000 as a result of tactical mid-frequency sonar trans-

mitted from U.S. Navy vessels. The whales were exposed to sounds transmit-

ted at the 223–235 dB re 1 µPa at 1 m level, with pings transmitted every

24 seconds over a 16-hour period, which were thought to have reached the

whales at the 165 dB level.

24

(LFAS transmissions will be of longer duration

and have more energy; its pings will last between 6 and 100 seconds and

will be repeated every 6 to 15 minutes). Scientists found hemorrhaging

around the brain and ear bones of the beached cetaceans, injuries consistent

with exposure to extremely loud sounds. Eight of the stranded whales died,

and other whales probably sank to the sea floor before they had a chance

to strand.

25

The Navy has admitted that the Bahamas stranding and related

22. W. A. Watkins, K. E. Moore, and P. Tyack, “Sperm whale acoustic behaviors

in the Southeast Caribbean,” Cetology 49 (1985): 6.

23. R. C. Gisiner, “Proceedings, Workshop on the Effects of Anthropogenic

Noise in the Marine Environment, 10–12 February 1998” (Marine Mammal Science

Program, Office of Naval Research, 1988), p. 24.

24. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, No. C-02-3805 EDL, 2002 WL

31445165 (N.D.Cal., Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Prelimi-

nary Injunction, 31 October 2002), slip op. at 5 (citing the Navy task force’s analysis

of the incident).

25. Those whales whose ability to navigate was most severely damaged by the

sonar would have died before they were able to make it to the nearest beach.

Page 8

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

337

deaths “were most likely caused by its [mid-range] sonar transmissions,”

26

but contends that LFA sonar will affect whales differently. The Navy claims

that mid-range sonar can be heard over shorter distances by many marine

mammals, while LFA sonar can travel several hundred miles but is audible

to fewer species.

27

Because the Navy intends to deploy SURTASS LFAS globally, an Over-

seas Environmental Impact Statement and an Environmental Impact State-

ment (OEIS/EIS) was required under the authority of the National Environ-

mental Policy Act, prior to the Navy’s use of the technology. As part of the

process of preparing the OEIS/EIS, the Navy sponsored a three-phase ma-

rine mammal research program (MMRP) to determine how representative

marine mammals responded to LFAS transmissions. Phase I of the program

focused on blue and fin whales and was conducted off San Nicolas Island

in southern California from 5 September through 21 October 1997. Phase

II focused on migrating gray whales off central California and was con-

ducted from 8 through 27 January 1998. Phase III was conducted off the

northwest coast of the Big Island of Hawaii from 26 February through 31

March 1998 and focused on male humpback whales. An environmental as-

sessment was prepared prior to each phase of this research.

Results from each of the three phases of the LFAS MMRP indicated

that the technology did have an effect on each of the representative marine

mammal groups tested. The results of Phase I, in which fin and blue whales

were exposed to less than full-scale LFAS sound transmissions, indicated a

decrease in vocal behavior by approximately 50 percent in blue whales and

approximately 30 percent in fin whales.

28

The findings from Phase II, in

which gray whales migrating nearshore were exposed to LFAS source levels

of 185 dB re 1 µPa at 1 m, and 170 dB re 1 µPa at 1 m (both substantially

lower than the actual source level that will be utilized by the Navy),

demonstrated an obvious avoidance response to the LFAS signal, particu-

larly at the higher source level of 185 dB where whales deviated 1 km from

the source.

29

The extent of deviation from the source was less at the lower

26. Center for Biological Diversity v. National Science Foundation, No. C02-

5065, 2002 WL 31548073 (N.D.Cal., Temporary Restraining Order, 30 October

2002), slip op. at 8.

27. “Navy Deployment of Sonar Protested,” Honolulu Advertiser, 6 September

2001, p. A6.

28. C. W. Clark, P. Tyack, and W. T. Ellison, “Quicklook, Low-Frequency Sound

Scientific Research Program, Phase I: Responses of Blue and Fin Whales to

SURTASS LFA, Southern California Bight, 5 September B 21 October, 1997” (27 Feb-

ruary 1998), pp. 30–1, Figure 28.

29. P. Tyack and C. Clark, “Quicklook Phase II, Playback of Low-Frequency

Sound to Gray Whales Migrating Past the Central California Coast, January 1998”

(23 June 1998), pp. 22–5, Figures 7–9. Gray whales migrating further offshore did

not display the same response.

Page 9

338

Living Resources

source levels tested, but apparent nonetheless.

30

In addition, observations

of sea otters near the LFAS Phase II playback site suggested a reduction in

the rate of foraging success of about 11 percent and an increase in dive

times by about 11 percent when all dives during acoustic playback were

pooled.

31

Similar to Phase I, the results of Phase III indicated a reduction

of vocal activity in male humpback whales exposed to less than full-scale

LFAS signals.

32

Of 17 male humpback whales tested, 10 individuals stopped

singing when exposed to received levels of the LFAS signal ranging from

121 to 151 dB re 1 µPa.

33

Four of the whales that stopped singing joined

other whales during the transmissions, suggesting they may be trying to

maintain normal social interactions or bonding for protection.

34

The evi-

dence suggested that the humpback whales avoided the LFAS sound source

in addition to stopping their singing.

35

The biological significance of these changes in behavior and distribu-

tion in response to the LFAS signal cannot be summarily dismissed.

Singing and migration are linked to courtship and mating activities. Disrup-

tion of these behaviors could potentially impact the reproductive success of

individuals, and ultimately the size of a population. Thus, the possibility that

the LFAS signal could have long-term adverse effects on marine mammal

populations cannot be ruled out, particularly in the case of small popula-

tions. A U.S. Navy press release following Phases I and II of LFAS MMRP

stated that although “behavioral responses were observed, none raised con-

cern about the potential harm to animals during the playback experi-

ments.”

36

This statement is insensitive to the potential long-term impacts

the disruption of courtship and migratory activities could have on a marine

mammal population. If such disruptions were widespread throughout a par-

ticular habitat, they could have a greater impact on a population overall

than that of a few individuals being harmed as a result of exposure to the

full-scale sound source.

It is also important to emphasize that none of the three phases of the

LFAS MMRP exposed animals to the sound source at the level the Navy

actually plans to utilize. Scientists leading the MMRP explained that less-

than-full-scale sound signals were used because it was critical to evaluate

how animals thought to be particularly sensitive would respond to sonar at

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. C. Clark and P. Tyack, “Quicklook, Low-Frequency Sound Scientific Re-

search Program, Phase III: Responses of Humpback Whales to SURTASS LFA off

the Kona Coast, Big Island, Hawaii” (31 August, 1998), p. 24, figure 15.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36.. “Navy and Scientific Community Conduct Low Frequency Sound Re-

search,” United States Navy Pacific Fleet Public Affairs Office (March 4, 1998).

Page 10

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

339

received levels potentially well below those thought to pose a risk of harm,

and that the best way to evaluate the risk of behavioral disruption is by exper-

iments that carefully control the sound level.

37

Given that all three groups of

marine mammals tested displayed behavioral and/or distributional changes

upon exposure to less-than-full-scale LFAS, it is highly probable that they

will have additional and more dramatic responses to the full-scale sound

source, and that other species will be affected as well. In fact, the Navy has

assumed that 95 percent of the whales would be at risk of experiencing a

biologically significant behavioural reaction if exposed to the LFAS at 180

dB, that 70 percent to 75 percent would be at risk of being “taken” if exposed

to 173 dB, and that 50 percent would be at risk if exposed to 165 dB.

38

The mass strandings in the Bahamas, the Canaries, and the Mediterra-

nean coupled with the results of the MMRP establish that LFAS and other

forms of active sonar are harmful to marine mammals. Because the MMRP

focused on such a small sampling of species it is not possible to rule out

indirect effects on marine mammal populations resulting from adverse ef-

fects of LFAS on their species of prey. Laboratory evidence strongly suggests

that high intensity sounds may affect the egg viability and growth rates of

fish and invertebrates.

39

It is important to recognize that adverse effects expe-

rienced at one level of the marine food chain may have repercussions

throughout the chain as the delicate balance of predators and prey becomes

disrupted. The LFAS MMRP, which involved three separate studies, lasted

only 6 to 8 weeks in duration, and examined the effects on five species to

less than full-scale LFAS signals, was insufficient to rule out adverse impacts

from exposure to full-scale transmissions to the species tested or to other

components of the ecosystem. It has been suggested, because the MMRP

exposed whales to sounds that were much lower intensity than full-scale

LFAS transmissions, that the research was designed to yield results indicating

that the technology had no significant impact on marine mammals.

In any event, the National Marine Fisheries Service did exempt the

LFAS system from the Marine Mammal Protection Act in July 2002, after

determining it would have a “negligible impact” on any species.

40

This con-

clusion is directly contrary to the results of the MMRP, which showed that

37. P. Tyack, “Comments on Low-Frequency Playback Experiments to Singing

Humpback Whales in Hawaiian Waters in Phase III of the LFA Marine Mammal

Research Program” (MARMAM, 9 June 1998).

38. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, No. C-02-3805 EDL, 2002 WL

31445165 (N.D.Cal., Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Prelimi-

nary Injunction, 31 October 2002), slip op. at 4, 49–50 (quoting from Declaration

of Dr. Kurt Fristrup).

39. National Research Council, Committee on Low-Frequency Sound and Ma-

rine Mammals (n. 14 above), pp. 53–4.

40. Dept. of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS Letter of Authorization, http://

www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Home/Dept (accessed 8 September 2002).

Page 11

340

Living Resources

LFAS brought about behavioral and distributional changes in all species

tested, and the 2000 incident in the Bahamas in which the Navy acknowl-

edged that mid-range sonar caused the death of at least eight whales.

As a condition of receiving its exemption, the Navy agreed not to trans-

mit LFAS from immediate coastal areas, but the sound will undoubtedly

reach these areas and will be very loud in some locations. In its Environmen-

tal Impact Statement, the Navy stated that its transmissions would be limited

to “below 180 dB within 22 km (12 M) of any coastlines and offshore biologi-

cally important areas.” On its Web site, the Navy says that “The HF/M3 sonar

[which is designed to be used as a preventative measure] will provide a very

high probability that no marine mammal will be exposed to high sound

levels in the LFA mitigation zone (at or above 180 dB).”

41

The effects of

received sound levels above 151 dB on marine life have not been studied

at all, by the LFAS MMRP or in any other test, and many scientists contend

that transmissions above the 120 dB level are likely to cause negative

effects on marine mammals and other creatures. The October 2002 federal

court ruling required the Navy, in particular, to expand the areas that would

be protected from its sonar.

42

Available evidence suggests that the NMFS

decision to exempt the LFAS system from the Marine Mammal Protection

Act should be revisited and that international legal mechanisms should be

explored to better protect marine mammals and their environment from

the use of LFAS and other forms of military sonar.

THE NAVY’S JUSTIFICATIONS

One of the U.S. Navy’s principal missions is to detect and, when necessary,

destroy enemy submarines. During the Cold War, the enemy submarines of

concern were primarily nuclear powered and nuclear armed. Now, they are

chiefly diesel-electric craft. Nuclear submarines can be detected by passive

sonar, because of their relatively noisy propulsion machinery. The United

States established a system of hydrophones placed on the sea floor con-

nected to cables that terminated at shore stations. In the Pacific, this lis-

tening system was called Oceanographic System Pacific and for many years

the “cover story,” that the stations, Naval Facilities (NAVFACS), were en-

gaged in scientific research based on oceanography, was effective. When

the true nature of the system became known—the secret simply could not be

maintained—the specific locations of the hydrophone arrays still remained

secret.

41. See http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Highlights/stage.htm (accessed 8 Sep-

tember, 2002).

42. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, No. C-02-3805 EDL, 2002 WL

31445165 (N.D.Cal., Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Prelimi-

nary Injunction, 31 October 2002), slip op. at 54.

Page 12

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

341

The virtues of this passive sonar system were that long-range detections

became possible whenever the Soviet submarines were too noisy for their

own safety. Sound ranges are influenced by absorption of the sound in sea-

water, refraction or bending of the sound caused by changes in seawater

temperature, and spreading of the sound as it proceeds from its source to

the detecting hydrophones. The system of passive bottom-laid hydrophone

arrays could determine bearings or directions, but not ranges. Two or more

arrays detecting the target were needed to get an approximate location or

fix. Even then, the location as determined was not exact and was effective-

ly an area rather than a point. Follow-up activity by long-range surveillance

aircraft was needed to “localize” the enemy submarine, and finally surface

ships—destroyers or frigates—were vectored to the site to deliver what

might be the final blow. The use of this system was practiced frequently by

the combined passive sonar system, and a command or headquarters center

was needed to put the information together. The Commander Oceano-

graphic System Pacific was located initially at San Francisco, California

(later moved to Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i) and the NAVFACS were on the U.S.

west coast, at Barbers Point, Hawai’i, and in Adak, Alaska.

Commander Oceanographic System Pacific was disestablished in 1995

for reasons not disclosed. The Cold War, of course, had been over for half

a decade and the threat of a nuclear attack from submarines had been

greatly diminished. In addition, the Russian submarines had become quieter

and detection ranges determined by the passive sonar were diminished.

What is the submarine threat today? Diesel-electric submarines are now

much quieter than they were previously. The need to spend long periods

of time on the surface to charge batteries, a procedure that makes the sub

susceptible to visual detection, has changed. Even by the end of World War

II, efforts were made by German subs to reduce or even eliminate time on

the surface by means of a snorkel.

43

At present, snorkeling time is on the

order of a few minutes, and can be carried out at night. Modern “enemy”

boats

44

can thus escape detection from passive sonar used by the “black

boxes” on the ocean floor, and the U.S. Navy decided that long-range, very

high-powered, low-frequency active sonar is needed. As explained earlier,

this active sonar requires the generation of a powerful sound source that

bounces off the enemy ship and is returned to the source vehicle. Surface

ships operating as part of the modern SURTASS LFAS can carry and

43. The snorkel is a tube that is extended vertically from a submerged subma-

rine, enabling the submarine to obtain sufficient air to operate its diesel engines

while remaining submerged at a relatively shallow depth to avoid visual detection.

Use of the term snorkel as a verb, that is, to snorkel or snorkeling is common with

submarine personnel.

44. Submariners refer to their craft as “boats.” This is an exception to common

nautical terminology, which would classify them as “ships” because of their size and

importance.

Page 13

342

Living Resources

monitor hydrophone arrays and generate the active sound source, and

thereby increase the capability to detect enemy vessels.

Diesel-electric (conventional) submarines are operated by many coun-

tries bordering the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and important

smaller bodies of water such as the South China Sea and the Sea of

Japan/East Sea. These submarines are particularly effective in straits where

numerous sea-lanes converge and surface ships are in transit. Many carry

torpedoes and long-range cruise missiles and are of the ex-Soviet Kilo class

or have similarly effective designs. Some of the important sea-lanes the

United States relies upon for its national security lie near or along important

straits, which have become potential “choke points.” Many of these choke

points such as the Suez and Panama Canals, the Malacca-Singapore Straits,

and the Straits of Florida are vulnerable to disruption by surface ships and

submarines.

The U.S. Navy has reported that “there are 224 submarines operated

by non-allied nations, and the submarines prowling the world’s oceans today

are much quieter and more deadly than ever before.”

45

To assess numerically

the danger to U.S. and allied navies now that the Cold War is over, we have

consulted the authoritative Jane’s Fighting Ships.

46

Midget subs are omitted

from our list because of their obvious inability to attack U.S. ships, but all

others are listed—whether operated by potential enemies or by coun-

tries presumed to be friendly. To provide a general assessment of the capa-

bilities of the subs, the following classification is used: SS is the general classi-

fication for submarines and the other designations are in effect modifiers: N

stands for nuclear; B stands for ballistic missile; G stands for guided missile; K

stands for killer (i.e., subs configured for hunter-killer operations).

Australia—6 SSK

Canada—4 SSK

Chile—5 SSK

China—121 with 8 more under construction. The numbers include 1

SSBN, 1 SSB, 7 SSN, 6 SSG, and 106 SS

Colombia—2 patrol subs (SS that are not modernized or improved)

Cuba—1 Foxtrot class (SSK)

Denmark—5 coastal subs with an additional 4 under construction (SS)

Ecuador—2 type 209 class subs (SSK)

Egypt—4 patrol subs with an additional 2 under construction

45. See http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/WhyNeed/stage.htm (accessed 9 June

2002); see also Department of Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, Memorandum for

Interested Members of Congress—Record of Decision for the Surveillance Towed

Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) Sonar, 17 July 2002.

46. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2002–2003 (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s Informa-

tion Group, Sentinel House, 2002).

Page 14

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

343

France—2 SSBN with an additional 4 either under construction or

planned, 6 SS

Germany—14 patrol subs with an additional 4 under construction (SS)

Greece—8 patrol subs with an additional 3 under construction (SS)

India—1 SSN under construction, 17 patrol subs (SS)

Indonesia—2 SSK

Iran—3 Kilo class (SSK)

Japan—23 SSK

Malaysia—3 SS

Netherlands—4 SSK

North Korea—22 SS and 22 classified as “Coastal” and presumed to be

unimproved models with limited capability

Norway—10 SSK with an additional 4 under construction

Pakistan—7 SSK with an additional 2 under construction

Poland—3 SSK

Portugal—3 SSK

Russia—17 SSBN with an additional 1 under construction, 7 SSGN with

an additional 1 under construction, 17 SSN with an additional 3

under construction, 14 SSK with an additional 2 SSK under con-

struction.

Singapore—4 SSK

Taiwan—10 (4SS, 6 SSK)

United Kingdom—4 SSBN, 12 conventional attack submarines with five

more SSK under construction

Venezuela—2 SSK

Simple quantitative data cannot, of course, completely assess the threat. We

are at present unable to judge the skills of the submarine crews, the state

of maintenance of the boats, or, most importantly, whether the countries

can be considered to be potential enemies or allies. North Korea would

certainly be in the potential enemy category. In view of our current relations

with China, we cannot be certain about the danger of Chinese subs, but it

would be foolish to discount it. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are cer-

tainly not enemies, but their important location guarding the Strait of Ma-

lacca puts them in the category of countries of interest.

The Navy has a responsibility to try to detect potential enemy subma-

rines, but in view of the recognized threat to marine life posed by its low

frequency active sonar, passive sonar alternatives should continue to be

developed and utilized wherever possible.

47

The use of active sonar, espe-

47. The Executive Summary of the Navy EIS for SURTASS LFA Sonar at ES-

6 states this idea generally as “(Restricted Operation—the Navy’s preferred alterna-

tive) the use of this system would include geographic restrictions and monitoring

to prevent injury to potentially affected species.”

Page 15

344

Living Resources

cially in light of the documented damage it causes, can be justified only

where the threat from a potential enemy submarine is clearly demonstrated,

immediate, and severe.

DOES THE USE OF LOW FREQUENCY ACTIVE SONAR VIOLATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The U.S. Navy’s current and projected plans to use LFAS do appear to violate

international law, particularly the duty of all states to protect the marine

environment from pollution, the duty to act with precaution (and to under-

take environmental assessments before starting new activities), and the duty

to cooperate with other affected countries.

International law is relevant because LFAS will impact areas outside

the areas under the jurisdiction of the United States and the NATO coun-

tries using this technology, and also because it will impact migratory and

straddling species that are in waters under U.S./NATO jurisdiction for part

of their life-cycle and outside these waters for other phases of their lives.

RELEVANT TREATY REGIMES

The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention

48

Under Article 192 of the Law of the Sea Convention, all countries have “the

obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.” This principle

is obligatory even for countries that have not ratified the Convention, like

the United States, because it has become a binding norm of customary

international law.

49

Article 65 of the Convention has particular relevance to

the threats posed to marine mammals, because it requires countries to “co-

48. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,

entered into force 16 November 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), Interna-

tional Legal Materials 21 (1982) at 1261.

49. As of 24 February 2003, 142 countries had ratified the Law of the Sea Conven-

tion. UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological List of

Ratifications, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_. . .

(accessed 1 March 2003). A few important countries like the United States and Canada

had not ratified the Convention as of that date, but they both have been giving serious

consideration to ratification. The United States has frequently acknowledged that the

provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention, except those governing exploitation of

deep seabed minerals, reflect existing norms of customary international law. See, for

example, Ocean Policy Statement by the President, 10 March 1983, accompanying Proc-

lamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983)(“the Convention . . . contains provisions

with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime

law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all States”).

Page 16

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

345

operate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case

of cetaceans . . . in particular [to] work through the appropriate interna-

tional organizations for their conservation, management and study.”

The unusually loud sounds emitted in the LFAS process would certainly

be considered “pollution,” which is defined in Article 1(1)(4) of the Conven-

tion as:

the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy

into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely

to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,

hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including

fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for

use of sea water and reduction of amenities. (Emphasis added).

Sound is a “form of energy manifested by small pressure and/or particle

velocity variations in a continuous medium.”

50

“While the definition [of

“pollution” in the Law of the Sea Convention] was . . . not drafted with

acoustic pollution in mind, the inclusion of ‘energy’ implies that noise can

be a form of pollution under the terms of the LOS Convention.”

51

Article 194(1) is quite clear that countries must do everything possible

“to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment

from any source.” “States are required, therefore, to take preventive mea-

sures based on existing knowledge to avoid pollution, rather than to take

remedial measures once it has occurred, and to apply a precautionary ap-

proach when scientific certainty about the harmful effects is not (yet) avail-

able.”

52

Article 194(5) makes it clear that these duties, in particular, require

countries to adopt measures “to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosys-

tems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species

and other forms of marine life.”

Article 196 requires countries to “take all measures necessary to prevent,

reduce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the

use of technologies under their jurisdiction or control.” Articles 204–206

require the preparation and dissemination of environmental impact assess-

ments.

53

Although the U.S. Navy did prepare an EIS, the scientific tests it

relied upon, as explained earlier, were woefully inadequate and, even so,

50. W. J. Richardson et al., Marine Mammals and Noise (San Diego: Academic

Press, 1995), p. 544.

51. H. M. Dotinga and A. G. Oude Elferink, “Acoustic pollution in the oceans:

The search for legal standards,” Ocean Development and International Law 31 (2000):

151, 158.

52. Ibid., at 161.

53. See also Law of the Sea Convention (n. 48 above), Article 165(2)(d) (also

requiring environmental impact assessments for activities exploiting the resources

of the deep seabed).

Page 17

346

Living Resources

demonstrated that LFAS will have negative impacts on marine mammals. In

addition, the Navy’s EIS was not made available to other countries during

its preparation for their comments and input.

The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of

Wild Animals

54

Article III(4) of this treaty requires parties that are “Range States” to “en-

deavour” “(b) to prevent, remove, compensate for or minimize, as appro-

priate, the adverse effects of activities or obstacles that seriously impede or

prevent the migration of the species; and (c) to the extent feasible and ap-

propriate, to prevent, reduce or control factors that are endangering or are

likely to further endanger the species . . .” The United States is not one of

the 81 parties to this treaty,

55

and it has relatively weak enforcement provis-

ions, saying only in Article XIII that disputes should be resolved through

negotiation and that, if negotiations are unsuccessful, countries “may, by

mutual consent, submit the dispute to arbitration . . .” Nonetheless, its sub-

stantive provisions can be viewed as reflective of the consensus of interna-

tional views on this subject, and as supporting customary international law

norms requiring countries to protect wild migratory species.

The Biodiversity Convention

56

This treaty confirms in Article 3 the principle that emerged from the 1972

Stockholm

57

and 1992 Rio Declarations

58

that “States have . . . the responsibil-

ity to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause

damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of

national jurisdiction.” The treaty also contains general provisions saying

54. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,

Bonn, 1979, reprinted in D. Hunter, J. Salzman, and D. Zaelke, International Environ-

mental Law and Policy—Treaty Supplement, 2002 Edition (New York: Foundation Press,

2002), p. 320.

55. Convention on Migratory Species, http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/cms_

banner.html (accessed 1 March 2003).

56. Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, preamble, UNEP/Bio.

Div/CONF/L.2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-20, International Legal Materials 31 (1992) at

818, 822–3.

57. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-

ment (Stockholm Declaration), UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14, 7, International Legal

Materials 11 (1972) at 1416, 1420.

58. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, UN Doc.

A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1(1992), International Legal Materials 31 (1992) at 874.

Page 18

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

347

that countries, should, when feasible, promote and protect biological diver-

sity.

The Biodiversity Convention utilizes what some have called a “purer

form” of the precautionary principle, stating in its preamble that “where

there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack

of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing

measures to avoid or minimize such a threat. . .”

59

In addition, Article

14(1)(a) requires contracting parties to undertake “environmental impact

assessment[s] of its proposed projects that are likely to have significant ad-

verse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing

such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such

procedures.”

The Biodiversity Treaty has a dispute settlement provision saying that

disputes should be resolved through conciliation unless the parties agree to

compulsory submission to an arbitral panel or to the International Court

of Justice. This treaty has achieved almost-universal acceptance, with 187

ratifications.

60

The United States signed this treaty in 1993, but the U.S. Sen-

ate refused to ratify it in 1994.

The International Whaling Convention

61

This Convention’s text does not say anything directly about acoustic im-

pacts on whales, or indeed about pollution of the habitats of whales. But

Article V does authorize the contracting parties to “adopt regulations with

respect to the conservation . . . of whale resources, fixing . . . (c) open and

closed waters, including the designation of sanctuary areas . . . ” Various

committees have examined the acoustic issues, and the 1999 Report of the

Scientific Committee “stated that noise-producing activities (such as seismic

surveys or sonar operations) should not be conducted in critical habitats at

certain times of the year, which could greatly reduce exposing mothers and

calves or breeding animals to high sound levels. It supported measures to

mitigate adverse effects of noise wherever possible and stressed the need for

further research.”

62

59. S. McCaffrey, “Biotechnology: Some issues of general international law,”

Transnational Law 14 (2001): 91, 97.

60. Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.biodiv.org/

world/parties.asp (accessed 1 March 2003).

61. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December

1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 10 U.S.T. 952.

62. Dotinga and Oude Elferink (n. 51 above), p. 169 (citing IWC/51/4, para.

11.4.1 and Annex H, para. 7.1).

Page 19

348

Living Resources

Regional Cetacean Agreements

Two regional agreements designed to address small cetaceans have been

adopted pursuant to the 1979 Bonn Convention on Migratory Species.

63

The Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and

North Sea of 17 March 1992 (ASCOBANS)

64

has been ratified by all eight

countries in the region. The Conservation and Management Plan provides

that the parties shall work toward “the prevention of other significant distur-

bance, especially of an acoustic nature” of the species involved, and various

meetings and studies have been undertaken to address this issue.

65

The

Agreement on the Conservation of the Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediter-

ranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS)

66

has now been

ratified by seven nations and signed by eight others. A number of the con-

tracting parties to these two treaties are also members of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO).

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Duty to Avoid Causing Harm to Shared Resources and the

Common Heritage

Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment

67

affirmed the responsibility of States “to ensure that activities within their

jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the environment of other

states or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”

68

The introduc-

63. See text accompanying n. 54 and 55 above.

64. Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North

Seas, 17 March 1992, http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/summaries/ascobans.htm

(accessed 1 March 2003).

65. Dotinga and Oude Elferink (n. 51 above), pp. 169–70.

66. Agreement on the Conservation of the Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediter-

ranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS), 24 November 1996,

http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/summaries/accobams.htm (accessed 1 March 2003).

67. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-

ment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14, 7, International Legal Materials 11 (1972) at 1416,

1420. See generally L. Sohn, “The Stockholm declaration on the human environ-

ment,” Harvard Journal of International Law 15 (1973): 423, and M. Akehurst, “Inter-

national liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by

international law,” New York Journal of International Law (1985): 3.

68. See also Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration (n. 58 above), and Re-

statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987), Section 601. Philippe Sands in

Principles of International Environmental Law, vol. I (1995), p. 186 concludes that taken

together Principle 21 and Principle 2 “establish the basic obligation underlying envi-

ronmental law and the source of its further elaboration in rules of greater specific-

ity.” The International Court of Justice has referred to “every State’s obligation not

to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other

Page 20

Whales, Submarines, and Active Sonar

349

tion of acoustic pollution into the ocean, which causes damage to marine

mammals and other marine species in the exclusive economic zones of other

nations and in the high seas beyond national jurisdiction, would certainly

violate this norm of customary international law.

The Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle, or “precautionary approach” as some coun-

tries and commentators prefer to call it, has evolved into a norm with real

content.

69

It mandates that studies precede action, and that interdisciplinary

environmental impact assessments be written and distributed, with public

input.

70

It shifts the burden to those that would undertake a new develop-

ment or use of an environmental resource, replacing the old approach that

States,” Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, and this

central principle is also relied upon in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int’l Arb.

Awards 1905, 1938 (1941), holding that “no State has the right to use or permit the

use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory

of another.”

69. The essence of this norm was articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration as

“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific

certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to

prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration (n. 58 above), at 879. For de-

tailed analysis of the precautionary principle, see, for example, D. Freestone, “The

Precautionary Principle,” in International Law and Global Climate Change, ed. R.

Churchill and D. Freestone (London: Graham & Trotman/M. Nijhoff, 1991), p. 21;

E. Hey, “The precautionary concept in environmental policy and law: Institutionaliz-

ing caution,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 4 (1992): 303; J. E.

Hickey, Jr., and V. R. Walker, “Refining the precautionary principle in international

law,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal 14 (1995): 423; G. D. Fullem, Comment,

“The precautionary principle: Environmental protection in the face of scientific un-

certainty,” Willamette Law Review 31 (1995): 495; J. M. Macdonald, “Appreciating

the precautionary principle as an ethical evolution in ocean management,” Ocean

Development and International Law 26 (1995): 255; J. M. Van Dyke, “Applying the pre-

cautionary principle to ocean shipments of radioactive materials,” Ocean Development

and International Law 27 (1996): 379; J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, “The Status of

the Precautionary Principle in International Law” in The Precautionary Principle and

International Law: The Challenge of Implementation, ed. D. Freestone and E. Hey (The

Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 29; M. Territo, “The precautionary prin-

ciple in marine fisheries conservation and the U.S. Sustainable Fisheries Act of

1996,” Vermont Law Review 24 (2000): 1351; R. Unger, “Brandishing the precaution-

ary principle through the Alien Tort Claims Act,” New York University Environmental

Law Journal 9 (2001): 638; V. R. Walker, “Some dangers of taking precautions with-

out adopting the precautionary principle,” Environmental Law Reporter 31 (2001):

10040.

70. For a listing of international agreements requiring environmental assess-

ments, see D. Hunter, J. Salzman, and D. Zaelke, International Environmental Law and

Policy (New York: Foundation Press, 1998), pp. 366–70.

Page 21

350

Living Resources

had imposed the burden on the environmentalists who challenged such ac-

tivity.

71

It requires those countries and companies that want to undertake

new developments to engage in scientific studies to determine the effect of

their initiatives, and also to consider less intrusive approaches. It accords

respect to ecosystems and living creatures for their own sake, without

requiring that they prove themselves to be useful or to have marketplace

value. It rejects the idea that risks and costs can be transferred from one

region to another, or from this generation to future ones, and it requires

that risks and costs be internalized in order to force decision makers to en-

gage in a fair and sober analysis before deciding to proceed with a project.

And ultimately it requires that we proceed slowly in the face of uncertainty,

constantly testing and monitoring the effects of our activities.

The precautionary principle has become the foundation of a number

of important recent treaties designed to manage fishing resources and to

protect the marine environment, including the 1995 Migratory and Strad-

dling Stocks Agreement

72

and the 2000 Honolulu Convention,

73

and it has

also been recognized in regional and national decisions. The European

courts have led the way in applying the precautionary principle,

74

and Euro-

71. Ibid., p. 360.

72. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation

and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 8 Septem-

ber 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF.164/37, International Legal Materials 34 (1995): 1542.

73. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migra-

tory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Honolulu, 4 September

2000, (accessed 26 March 2001); see generally V. Botet, “Filling in one of the last

pieces of the ocean: Regulating Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,”

Virginia Journal of International Law 41(2001): 787.

74. The most significant decision of the European Court of Justice occurred

in 1998, when the Court upheld the European Commission’s decision to ban all

bovine animals and all beef and veal products from the United Kingdom, based on

the EC’s judgment that all risks of transmission from bovine spongiform encepha-

lopathy (mad cow disease) could not be excluded. The Queen v. Ministry of Agricul-

ture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners of Customs & Excise, ex parte National

Farmer’s Union, David Burnett and Sons Ltd., R.S. Case C-147-96, [1998] E.C.R. I-

2211. In response to the argument of the English National Farmers’ Union that this

decision violated the principle of proportionality, the Court acknowledged that the

principle of proportionality required that the least onerous alternative be chosen,

but ruled also that “[w]here there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of

risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having

to wait until the reality and seriousness of the risks become fully apparent.” Ibid.,

para. 63. The Court repeated this statement in United Kingdom v. Commission of

the European Communities, Case C-180/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2265, para. 99. In an-

other important decision, the Court of First Instance in Europe rejected a challenge

to a decision that had withdrawn an antibiotic from the list of aut
 View user's profile Visit poster's website Send private message

Post new topic Reply to topic
Forum Jump:
Jump to:  

All times are GMT.
The time now is Thu May 24, 2012 6:50 pm


  Display posts from previous:      



Conspiracy List | Arcade Webmaster | Escape Games


© 21st Century Thermonuclear Productions
All Rights Reserved, All Wrongs Revenged, Novus Ordo Seclorum