Topic: New HAARP whistle blower|
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281 posts, Mar 2003
posted 08-19-2003 10:55 AM
On this forum we are not dummies, we can read and understand patents
Eastlunds, Keorts and Elliott patents, who you told me on the phone has got his math wrong and his frequecny calculations are wrong also. What we want to know is how it interacts with chemtrails and who are the people pushing the buttons and who else as the technology and is fighting this invisible war. We want to know how to protect ourselves from ELF/EMF etc....not an insulting dummies guide, after all what is more insulting to our inteligence that the logo on the HAARP digisonde
Further your joke to set of a hurricane as an example of your portable HAARP technology....WAS THAT JUST A FOOLISH JOKE?
Put up or shut up, don't make us out to be foolish dummies eagerly awaiting a book that tells us what we already know.
[Edited 1 times, lastly by suckingeggs on 08-19-2003]
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 11:15 AM
Try not redirect people by making statements that are based on emotion and lack of fact. It only leads to confusion and hate.
Eastlund is a fine scientist and has almost retired. His son is in charge of the business and they are using de-classified data to build and promote his work. I am still an active member and yes I am on the team to build a new HAARP station. Eastlund is finished. The dummies comment is not directed at anyone, but if you are insecure with your intellect then so be it!
Your demands fall upon deaf ears. I will do as I say in my timeframe not yours. Compile your questions and pass it on to the one that will pass it to me. You will not force me to compromise my postion and remember I co-designed HAARP. Your futile attempts to flush me out are to avail. I am in charge of me not you!. I am the one that will publish a report titled: HAARP FOR DUMMIES". It will be for free! And I will take my time until complete. Its the best I can do for the group to help solve these problems.
And I suugest you use your energies for peace and harmony than to throw stones.
I wonder if you contribute to the chemtrails by flushing solvents down the drain to the ocean to be later absorbed and sprinkle down in the rain on your skin and plants, etc. Ask yourself what do you do for the environment? Or is it easier to point fingers at someone when your own house is on fire!
281 posts, Mar 2003
posted 08-19-2003 11:53 AM
Do the words ZOROASTRIANISM mean anything to you being a Magi and all?
Thank you Mr Thomas ;-)
[Edited 1 times, lastly by suckingeggs on 08-19-2003]
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 11:57 AM
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 12:16 PM
I find you quite interesting. After pulling your file on the database I find that you have differnt profiles and can move like a shadow. You expose others and milk both sides. Judging from your background I am surprised that you spend so much time attempting to control this board. You do need to get a better firewall because you are still exposed and your computer needs to be updated with the lastet fixes. hackers can still get inside. Anyway I am not spamming just floating around like you, looking at the various posts you posts around this board. If you were more experienced the CIA could use a double agent like you!
ice behaving badly
2457 posts, Dec 2000
posted 08-19-2003 12:22 PM
There you go SPAMMING again Dr. Judah Ben-Hur. Do you have a comprehension problem? Consider this fair warning...
281 posts, Mar 2003
posted 08-19-2003 12:38 PM
"The Ark of the Covenant was a most interesting weapons system but could only be used by those who were in favor with God." Dr Judah Ben Hur
One of the most interesting issues with Chemtrails and HAARP is how they were
discovered and invented. Many persons have difficulty understanding the very
long term thinking that went into the needs and principles for chemtrails and
titanium, HAARP and plate stress management, and how these related to the old
religious icon symbolism's. We will take this moment to look at how these
The DOE uses the studies of massive volcanic events to look at planet
extinction events and how atomic bombs can cause nuclear winters. In a nuclear
winter effect, what kills of the population is the onset of massive health plagues.
It was the fear of this that kept the cold war between Russia and the US
from happening. The study of these effects inspired the naming of HAARP and the
special technique to mediate these catastrophic effects.
Volcano studies kicked off some of these investigations and inventions. In
the old times there are many stories of things like virgins being sacrificed to
the volcano Gods. Volcanos posed serious threats to life all through time.
In the hard times of massive volcanic releases many feared for their lives,
prayed to their Gods for relief, and many died. Volcanos appeared to impose a
drastic natural order for the planet with huge explosions periodically that
came to kill off large numbers of animals and humans on the planet. These were
stories of climate change, from the origins of man and civilization, and often
before the times of written language.
Volcanos have always attracted interest, some gave them God like connotation
to explain what happened. Some persons climbed these burning mountains to see
what was happening, to try to find God, or seek relief from the dangers.
Volcanoes highly affected animals and their poisoning often triggered health
plagues that came to kill cities years after such events. These issues and
problems were captured in what is called an alchemical symbolic icon methods. These
became some of the counterpoints of religion and some of the most Holy of
I had an interest in volcanoes and have been on several active volcanos.
Volcanos smell bad from all the sulfur and other acid emissions. There are acid
puddles all over the place and piles of yellow colored sulfur and white
compounds of fluoride. You can collect these things and if you happen to pour the
sulfur acids onto the white materials, one can get an extremely poison gas
called HF. It would appear that persons that climbed these active mountains would
have found this effect.
I had noticed early on that the story and Noah's Ark involved the largest
land mass volcano in the world, which is Mt. Ararat. The account of Noah and his
messages about care for the animals was inherent in volcanic effects. The
stage was now set for cracking the secrets of the information from these old
Icons of religion. The real secrets of the Ark were being uncovered.
I had always wondered about the story of Moses and the Burning Bush and
thought this might well be connected to volcanic eruptions setting things on fire.
Moses did some strange things with mists to get free of the Egyptians. These
two bits of association began to add up slowly. The DOE gas diffusion plants
also have problems with acid mists from hydrogen fluoride, which is a
component of volcanic releases. This same mist can be made from combining two easily
found chemicals around volcanos.
If one looks at volcanos, these turn out to be huge sources of hydrogen
fluoride, HF. In an eruption, what the ash does not kill, the HF run off into the
water supplies would. HF run off into streams and rivers at long distances to
kill animals, and damage the health of others and longer distances. Then it
became clear there was a connection between these two stories about Noah and
Moses. It appeared it was these times of great strife and impacts to human
well being that inspired many of religion's greatest alchemical icons. It was a
pictorial code, of sorts, used to keep record and teach illiterate masses in
In the old world those that knew the science often kept this science in a
form of alchemical icon. In these old times there was no real written language
and pictures and symbols recorded the most important things. The icons were
accompanied by verbal stories to enlighten the public. Some stories become
overly embellished. What these icons kept was something that they wanted veiled
from the general public. Part of the icons was something that needed to be
told and part was something that needed to be veiled in secrecy.
Massive volcanic eruptions, like that of Krakatoa, or others that involve the
energy release of 4 billion Hiroshima bombs in oceans caused massive climate
change problems. The Sun disappears for weeks, in some cases, and it can
literally rain for 40 days and nights. These poisons that volcanos released were
always connected with massive disease outbreaks that devastated the planet,
killing off 3/4 of the earth's population.
Around DOE plants we obtained more clues. At the Rocky Flats plant in
Colorado the workers that opened the doors to the HF shed would tell that the birds
would literally fall out of the sky when they flew over this areas toxic
releases. Then we recalled Noah using birds to test for when it was safe to go out
again. Then we recall things like Teflon cookware vapors killed pet birds in
homes. More of the religion icon puzzle fell into place.
With these bits and pieces in mind, we moved on up to the Icon for Mary and
her standing on the snake to influence the symbol of toxic's from the Earth
entering the food chain needing to be controlled. It was all coming together,
each little piece fitting better and better. Mary was related to the Throne of
David and from a very affluent family. They had wealth and access to science,
this was the aristocratic class. Mary wanted to promote her child as the one
who received the knowledge of the greater gifts of these sciences and the
inner secrets of the icons. This information was better connected in these
times, as a volcanic eruption in 43 BC has just happened.
It was the knowledge of these volcanic effects that gave Jesus his great
powers to heal people. The area that Jesus lived in was at the center of three of
Earth's greatest fault zones, and this caused much of the area to be affected
by fluoride in the well water. Some areas were contaminated and others were
not, as it depended on the geologic features. The case of the person beside
the well being healed by Jesus would likely have been connected with a well
having fluoride problems setting up the case for illness like what we call
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome today.
The story of Sodom and Gomorra also was quickly connected then. Many
earthquakes involve something called soil liquefaction and this effect along this
fault zone would explain well how these cities disappeared beneath the Dead Sea.
The poisons from the activity of this fault zone would have poisoned the
local well waters and caused problems with violence and sex. It would have been
an early version of Hell. The problems would have been so severe that persons
would have to turn and walk away.
The stories about turning to stone even fell into place as the fluorides and
metals from these fault zones put minerals into the body that turn to stone
internally and retain for long long times, affecting health and causing death.
The turning to stone effect happens today from environmental pollutants
causing health effects like CFS and cancers.
It was clear that religions came from the study of these effects. The Jewish
were the keepers of these histories, and it was the center piece of their
religion. They used this to attain wealth and power. One of the inner secrets
of the Ark was how to make the poison mists and this appears to be what Moses
had learned on the mountain. The story of Moses having his beard turn white
after being on the Mountain, is one about the volcanic toxic effects damaging
the hair follicles. Exposure to the chemical called hydrogen fluoride causes
rapid aging to happen. Moses used this inner secret of the Ark to make the Jews
free from Egypt.
Moses became the first to use chemical warfare agent made with fluorine.
Moses used this alchemical secret to make mists that went in the houses and
poisoned people. Moses became a national security threat to the Egyptians. One
can even see the snake symbolism used in the stories about how he confronted the
Egyptians and his staff turned into a snake. Staff's were symbols of power
in these times and snakes the symbol for poisons. Moses would be called a
national security issue these days and a terrorist. This technique and how to do
it in those times became a highly protected secret. The technique was the
inner secret of the Ark and the Ark of the Covenant.
The secret was not kept well and others learned how to do these tactics and
the stories of how the Romans would siege cities and bury things next to the
city walls and cover them to force gases thru the walls became how wars were
won. This is how the Romans took over the Jewish cities and came to rule. The
power of the Ark was a two sided sword, one of benevolence intended to protect
man and animals and the other a weapon for war and power.
Even the symbolism for David and Goliath became clear, as the power of the
Ark could be called using the secret of the white powder from the volcanoes with
the acid water to make HF, which could fell evil giants looking for one
sighted money with one little stone . The Ark secret was what gave David the
superior power to wage wars. Notice how the icon story is careful to protect the
real methods used.
As this war technique developed, simple walled cities no longer were
effective and the use of moats came into use to avoid the poison gas thru the walls
war methods. In these times the alchemical Merlin's became the scientists that
knew the Ark secrets. In these times, the use of swords for wars became
useless and we see the stories of Isle of Avalon and King Arthur tossing away
Excalibur. We also see that Mary came to Avalon and the area of Glastonberry. And
that the Ark was stored at the Glastonburry Abby for a time. The story of
the Mists of Avalon was about how the secrets of the Ark were passed to these
The special secrets also came to be how the Queens of England came into the
power to rule. They were direct hand downs from the throne of David and the
power of the Ark and the Ark of the Covenant. The power of the Ark was a
special white sand from volcanos that had the power to overcome swords and stone
walls. The symbol for religion in England became the Queen.
Meanwhile, the symbol of religion for the Catholics became Mary. The symbol
for religion of the Christian churches became Jesus. And the Jewish kept
theirs as Moses and others. Meanwhile the religion of Islam was born of a more
recent time of volcanic strife around the 535 AD explosion of Krakatoa. The
Islam and Moslem teachings show a great deal of hatred toward the Jews,
apparently connected to their old methods involving the Ark and the old Jewish Ideals
that they were God's Chosen People and superior to everyone. This difference
has sponsored long term Holy Wars, which are at the root of problems today.
The problems of Christian Churches in the US to properly teach these most
Holy of the messages in the bible is at the root of the differences and the
causes for terrorism. When one follows the biblical icons and knows about the old
worlds problems with climate change then one meets God and the teachings of
the Bible first hand. In the DOE, Jim Phelps is considered to be once removed
from God. He is also directly related to the Throne of David and the European
Welf and Guelph families. His family shield sports the symbol of the wolf.
An interesting Icon involving the Phelps connection to Christ can be seen in
a church called Christ Church on St. Simon's Island, Ga. Here a person named
Anson Phelps built a church using the old world icon symbolism methods. There
is a German stained glass window, with the grave of Anson Phelps closest and
just outside. The dedication stained glass window of the church has a
depiction of Anson Phelps done in the same style as the German depiction of Christ.
The church is built in the shape of the cross and it was built by shipbuilders
like an upside-down boat, with an Ark connotation. This church is connected
to the birthplace of Methodism via John Wesley.
Today, the Methodist church is the most highly involved in the cover up of
the real truths behind what formed these old religions and how they are taught
today. Because of this, the Methodist Church is one of the most corrupted in
the world today. It has in its ranks G. Bush (43) with membership at Highland
Park UMC in Dallas, Tx. Bush uses this church to help foist his corrupted CIA
control methods on the American public. The Church Street UMC in Knoxville,
Tn. is also an extremely corrupted church and involved in keeping Jim Phelps
from exposing the truth about the deeper meaning and inspirations of the
Biblical Scriptures and the issues of chemtrails and HAARP. This church has long
standing connections to HPUMC and Bush. Both these churches will likely face
RICO Act charges. These churches are highly involved in promoting information
fraud to their members and the communities at large.
It was via Jim Phelps' knowledge of these relevant issues on Global Climate
change and old world warfare that the HAARP and chemtrail methods were
conceived or invented. HAARP's vibrational effect was named after the Angels and
their music from the Heavens. Chemtrails are about the same old methods of
moderating the dangers of volcanoes and the poison acid plumes they emit, which can
destroy the world from time to time. HAARP and chemtrails both act to offset
terminal events from volcanos.
The invention of JP-8 jet fuel formula was also an inadvertant Icon for Jim
Phelps and used Jim Phelps' invention of metallic alcohols to the jet fuel
formula as a de-icing agent to promote clouds forming to cool the Earth. The use
of titanium dioxide as a colorant in food introduced this pharmacutical effect
to cut the rise of AIDS in the US, while the US Govt. knowingly allowed the
continent of Africa to die.
The US Govt. is now involved in the misuse of the secrets and powers of the
Ark, and in volation of long standing principles of right and wrong. In
violation of the very views of Christ and Mary. This makes for G Bush (43) as the
anti-christ leading an entire nation down the road to Hell, in his quest for
global power and money. This is the basis for the terrorism sponsored by the
Arab religion factions in the very same way these factions began from the
issues of the Ark behind Judism founding Islam.
Other things that helped the discoveries along involved Jim Phelps' father
becoming sick from working at the Y-12 nuclear weapons factory, and having to
take early retirement. Jim Phelps was looking for the toxic's that made his
father sick and noticed that nerve gas exposures and HF cause tremors and that
mercury exposures do the same thing. He quickly connected that both these
chemicals build up in the body and even get into the brain.
It became most apparent that these chemicals can build and cause progressive
tremors in persons exposed. The Y-12 nuclear weapons plant is one of the
worst mercury spills in the US and the ground literally oozes with mercury and
emits mercury vapor. The Y-12 plant also emitted lots of HF vapors from its
"salt shop" uranium processing. The daily occupational exposures to these most
dangerous of elements made his father sick. The DOE currently acts to cover
these problems up, because the very same pattern is out of control in the US
population causing all kinds of illnesses.
The synergism between mercury and fluorine were quickly found with the
discovery of the G--protein effects that triggered nerve channel conduction and
twitching. The G-protein effect from the fluoride-mercury complex was one of the
worst in the nervous system. This then quickly lead to the discovery that
fluoride-mercury is also tied to shutting down the immune system and the antigen
presentation cell processes connected to CFS, vaccine problems in Africa
connected to fluoride-mercury, and the very cause for AIDS.
Looking at how the nerve gases work lead to the ideas for blocking agents
using PB, which is a nervous system seeking hormone using bromine to block the
G-protein sites which nerve gases would destroy. The bromine is a temporary
effect that would clear being used to overcome the permanent binding from
fluoride-metal complexes. This was the invention of the PB anti-nerve gas agent. A
quick look for metals that did not form destructive fluoride metal complexes
affecting G-protein cells sites discovered titanium. Titanium dioxide was
considered highly nontoxic and could be used to counter rising fluoride health
effects in the environment. Jim Phelps found two agents that could be used to
overcome the power of the Ark.
It was these discoveries that founded the chemtrail methods to address the
problems of animals getting sick and transferring their illness to man causing
health epidemics. This is how the massive Manhattan Project like methods of
Chemtrails and HAARP evolved from the original problems of the Manhattan
Project. The plants code names in Oak Ridge are all connected to these same effects.
The Y-12 plant is named after Yahweh and the twelve disciples of Christ, the
X-10 plant is named after God and the Ten Commandments, and the K-25 plant was
named after the problems with containment of fluorine gas in a process that
used the Kellex process and consumed 25 percent of the Manhattan Projects
funding. Those who worked with the secret agent fluorine at K-25 became sick from
the fluoride effects, as they unwittingly were around the inner secrets of the
Ark. Again, these are more of the icon like symbolism's used in national
Even the name of the top security clearance for having access to these
materials and information is related. The US ally in W.W.II was GB and the Queen,
whose throne and family is linked to the Throne of David and the secrets of the
Ark. The famous DOE "Q" clearance comes from these inner secrets of the
power to rule of the Queen.
These bits of information that you have just read are the simple foundations
of the religious predictions for the revelations. We are in a time in the US
where only lies are put forth by our Govt., and the people kept uninformed by
the Mil / Ind Network and its' religion allies. These are sad times where
the Govt. is seeking to take the people hostage, and freedom is leaving the
country. We can't allow this to continue.
We are living the End-Times prophicy, but if we can overcome the demon forces
in place, we can be delivered from this Evil into a promissed land. These
are the ideals behind the Rapture, when all the facts are laid down for the
masses. The truth will set the world free, provide for understanding between
nationalism differences between nations and between religions. The knowledge
here sets the people free and allows for the people to become one again.
To make this happen, all we need is "a few Good Men," Good persons, to step
forward and help expose and confront the evils. We need a country based on
truth, not one lie heaped on another that is going to case the country to fail.
Who is protecting who from what and why is it that you are protecting the Pentagon if you are willing to help us poor little sheeple???
Lulu, before you ban him let him answer to this information please
[Edited 1 times, lastly by suckingeggs on 08-19-2003]
475 posts, Dec 2002
posted 08-19-2003 01:10 PM
It is absolutely inappropriate if we don't ban people like PHX Pilot (to whose defence Lulu sprang most vigorously) to be banning Dr. Judah Ben Hur. What on earth is meant by this statement.
ice behaving badly
2457 posts, Dec 2000
posted 08-19-2003 01:19 PM
SPAMMING this site was how erasuredude managed to delete the majority of Chemtrail Central Halva. Fortunately, Thermit was able to rectify what was lost. Ask Thermit if he appretiates SPAMMING here...better yet, ask Dr. Judah Ben-Hur why he continues to SPAM after being asked politely not to!
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 01:55 PM
After careful research on this board I see that you post in several topics, is that not what I did? Is that spamming or informing or do we need to follow LULU? Or is LULU losing control and LULU should be banned?
I am attempting to ad data to help and you seem to wish me to go away because you cannot control me or expose what you desire. I can go someplace else and turn the control back over to you or let the control rest with the people not you. You seem to debunk your own creation, which tells me that your trustfulness is questionable and should be evaluated by the masses. If you wish control you will not get it from me and you will not ban me from the Internet, maybe this board and maybe not! You should have more consideration with your flock.
Now to answer another question: Yes I protect the DOD and other agencies because I get paid to. But I have decided to expose with respect the infractions that have been and will be committed against us all.
I challenge you LULU and others to call me and put to rest any doubt. If you cannot even do that then your influence on this board should be dissolved and you should banish yourself!
Judging by your attitudes and sophomoric responses do you think I would hand you a loaded gun?
[Edited 1 times, lastly by gaiacomm on 08-19-2003]
ice behaving badly
2457 posts, Dec 2000
posted 08-19-2003 02:23 PM
Dr. Judah Ben-Hur, after asking you twice already, to not SPAM and post identical posts in more than one thread, why do you continue to do so? That is not very respectful. And why have you not addressed suckingeggs comments?
281 posts, Mar 2003
posted 08-19-2003 02:30 PM
Unfortunately I cannot check from the Uk, but is the Dr on a premium rate number? He seems very keen to have telephone conversations, yet says little of any importance
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 02:51 PM
I have unlimited access by phone around the world. No restrictions.
Ask the question again!
By the way I have had over 30 calls and over 200 emails in the past 3 hours!
I may consider opening my own haarp board so people can post without fear!
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 02:56 PM
After reviewing the calls and emails from posters total: 35 calls now and 286 emails in 3hours I may consider starting a new board for haarp and chemtrails so people can post without fear of rejection of their sincere desires to KNOW! Most of them are asking for seperation into a new board! What do you think?
A forum of free speech and not slander and doubt where posters can be FREE!
[Edited 1 times, lastly by gaiacomm on 08-19-2003]
ice behaving badly
2457 posts, Dec 2000
posted 08-19-2003 03:08 PM
Most of them are asking for seperation into a new board! What do you think?
I think this is a good idea Dr. Judah Ben-Hur. Please drop us the link when the board is up and running, at least we will get the information then right? not just empty promises?? And I think you should learn how to spell separation LOL
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 06:23 PM
This document outlines the theory of a project that mere publication of which might conceivably cause irreversible changes throughout the socioeconomic community. Recipients of this document must therefore understand the grave potential for scientific and cultural shock that could result for premature dissemination or thoughtless use of the information provided. It is vial that this document not be made public without careful groundwork. A thorough educational program must precede its implementation. Preparation and conditioning of the data must be a precursor to any disclosure. Further, because of the confidential and proprietary nature of this document, the above warning does not in anyway modify the recipients responsibility to protect the contents from any disclosure without written permission from Judah Ben-Hur, inventor. This document is submitted under a confidential relationship. The recipient, by accepting this document, assumes full responsibility for its protection from unauthorized disclosure in any manner.
Until proper protection has been guaranteed on an International level, the balance of information required to actively develop and deploy this system will be withheld until that time. Reference: Title 35, USC code section 181-188.
“Always tell the truth so that there is nothing to remember.” - Dr. Judah Ben-Hur
This paper has been inspired by several entities. Firstly, the authors would like to thank Ryszard Struzak, member if the ITU radio regulations board. This system accommodates his “Evaluation of the OCHA (DRB) Project on Emergency Telecommunications with and in the Field,” presented to the United Nations in July of 2000. Secondly, Larry W. Roeder, executive director of Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN), for making his business plan for the GDIN available to the public. Thirdly, Hans Zimmerman of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for his work on “Telecommunications in the Service of Humanitarian Assistance” as appeared in the International Civil Defense Journal in April 1998. Fourthly, the Commission of the European Communities for their proposals concerning electric communication networks and services and privacy protection in the electronic sector. Finally, the International Medical Corps and other relief agencies worldwide and their personnel who work to help victims of complex humanitarian emergencies.
The Art of Global Wireless Communications
This dissertation is written to all who want to know and understand the truth of electromagnetism. Let us consider the whales of the earth and how they communicate with each other. The whales broadcast at frequencies that many consider undecipherable, but in fact, that is not true. Only a handful of scientists truly understand the art of the communication of whales. Whales are excellent communicators and are pure in the ways they speak to one another from one side of the earth to another. Their ionosphere is water. Our ionosphere is the air we breathe. Similar to the whales, humans will soon be able to communicate through the earth, as well as around it, by creating a new technology that expands our communication abilities. We are at the dawn of this new day in telecommunications capacities, the background and theoretical background of which will be explained in this paper.
A basic understanding of the properties of the earth and its surroundings is paramount to understanding radio propagation over distances. Certain assumptions must be made by the reader in order to fully understand the complex nature of ionospheric physics.
The electrical conductivity of air is very low at low altitudes. However, it increases rapidly with distance form earth’s surface and is found to be greater by a factor of several million by the time altitudes of a few tens of kilometers are the beginning of the ionosphere is reached. The lower atmosphere may be looked upon as a thin dielectric (opposing forces) bounded by good conductors. This defines a spherical wave-guide in which radio waves belonging to different frequency bands can propagate. The upper frequency limit of the wave-guide channel is determined by the dispersive properties of the ionosphere, which eventually becomes transparent as the frequency is increased by a few megahertz. There is no lower frequency limit, i.e. the earth’s ionosphere wave-guide can support the propagation of radio waves of frequencies as low as desired, right down to direct current. The absence of a lower critical frequency can readily be understood by recalling that the wave-guide has no lateral boundaries, enabling a constant potential difference to exist across it.
A direct current (DC) potential difference of natural origin does in fact exist. It amounts to a few hundred kilovolts and produces a vertical electro static field whose magnitude near the earth’s surface is of the order of 100 volts per minute (v/m). Slow diurnal variations observed in the electric field are in good agreement. The changes in the level of global lightning discharge activity can be interpreted in terms of the charging and discharging of the spherical capacitor formed by the earth and the ionosphere.
The term capacitor is usually employed in studies of quasistatic electrical phenomena for which the characteristic wavelength is much greater than the earth’s radius. If however the wavelength of electromagnetic waves is comparable with the linear dimensions of the earth, the term resonator should be used.
Electromagnetic waves of extremely low frequency can be excited in the earth’s ionospheric cavity by two types of natural sources: terrestrial and cosmic. A third unnatural type, mechanical, can also achieve this. In the extremely low frequency band (ELF), electromagnetic energy is largely produced by the radiation from vertical lightening discharges (cloud to ground charges as well as within clouds). A lightening discharge is a powerful electric discharge of short duration and commonly a few kilometers long. Most frequently, such discharges are known to form in cumulonimbus cloud formations, but they can also appear under different conditions, namely snow or sandstorms, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and nuclear explosions.
The earth is one of the planets that have a strong internal magnetic field. In the absence of any external drivers, the geomagnetic field can be approximated by a dipole field with an axis tilted about 11 degrees by the spin axis. The forcing by the solar wind is able to modify this field, creating a cavity called the magnetosphere. This cavity shelters the surface of the planet from the high-energy particles of the solar wind. The outer boundary of the magnetosphere is the magnetopause. In front of the dayside of the magnetopause, another boundary, called the bow shock, is formed because the solar wind is supersonic. The region between the bow shock and the magnetopause is called the magneto sheath. At low altitude limit, the magnetosphere ends at the ionosphere. The magnetosphere is filled with plasma that originates from both the ionosphere and the solar wind. Solar wind, and the magnetic field it carries, modifies the form of the magnetosphere by pulsing it in the dayside and creating a long magneto tail in the night side. Therefore, the distance of the magnetopause form the earth is only about 10 times the earth’s radius. In the dayside, while the tail is more than ten times longer. The magnetic field in the tail points toward the earth in the northern half and away in the southern half.
ELF radiation, arriving from outer space through the ionosphere may also act as a source for electro magnetic waves in the earth’s ionsopheric cavity. The other type of oscillation excited in space and reaching the earth through the ionosphere are Very Low Frequency (VLF) waves. The oscillations mentioned above are produced in the earth’s magnetosphere that consists of the following regions: the front of the shock waves separating the magnetosphere from cosmic space which is filled with the particles constituting the solar winds, the intermediate region filled with highly turbulent plasma, the magnetopause, which is the boundary of the geomagnetic field, the inner region referred to as the magnetosphere proper, and the tail of the magnetosphere containing the neutral sheet.
The most important aspect of the earth is that it behaves as an enormous magnet. The English physician and natural philosopher, William Gilbert, was the first to demonstrate this similarity in about 1600. The north magnetic pole is presently located off the western coast of Bathurst Island in the Canadian Northwest Territories (1290 km northwest of Hudson Bay). The south magnetic pole is presently situated at the edge of the Antarctic continent in Adelie Land (about 1930 km northeast of Little America). The magnetic field points down toward the surface if the earth in the northern Hemisphere and away from it in the southern hemisphere. The difference between the dipole axis and the geographic axis is one of the reasons why there are so many different coordinate systems needed to describe locations in space around the earth.
This geometry is supported by the existence of a cross-tail current, which is the neutral sheet. The main product of the solar wind-magnetosphere coupling is the large-scale magnetospheric convection electric field. In addition, solar wind pressure pulses affect the magnetosperic cavity. The energy that is transported from the solar wind into the magnetosphere creates geomagnetic activity and drives different kinds of geomagnetic pulsations.
The magnetosphere is a driven hydro magnetic system whose internal dynamics are controlled by the input solar wind energy through magnetic field merging. It is formed by the interaction of the earth’s magnetic field and the solar wind, which is the supersonic, superalfvenic and magnetized plasma expansion of the solar corona. Measurements in the magnetosphere have shown that the spectral density of ELF oscillations at frequencies near 10 Hz. are greater by almost an order of magnitude than the mean spectral density of noise observed in the earth’s ionospheric cavity in the same frequency band.
Global Wireless Communication is an area of application of ELF waves. The advantages of radio communication at extremely low frequencies are reasonably obvious. They include, above all, the attenuation (about 1 dB per 1000 km at a frequency of 110 Hz. F=100 Hz). The high signal stability achieved during the propagation in the earth ionosphere wave-guide. The large skin layer depth allows radio communication to be established with targets not merely on the earth’s surface, but also at various depths below. This means that ELF waves are the only means of communication with immersed submarines or the whales.
Understanding the nature of ELF waves eliminates any disadvantages that have been previously thought of their use. The efficiency of the antenna (to be discussed later in the explanation of the original design) is excellent; the rate of transmission of information is high and negligible atmospheric interference. Atmospheric interference is attenuated in exactly the same way as the useful signal during propagation in the ocean. The signal- noise ratio and all other characteristics of the communication line are therefore independent of the depth of submersion. The output power of a transmitter must be increased to maintain radio communication at great depths whether at the ocean or the core of the earth. The frequency dependence of attenuation in the earth ionosphere wave guide channel must be known before one can choose the optimum wavelength and the other parameters of the radio communication length. The solution of this problem cannot rely on theoretical calculations alone because the results of such calculations depend on the chosen model of the ionosphere. If we combine, all the data obtained by different scientists with the aid of Schumann resonance and through the analysis of atmospherics, we can examine the frequency dependence of attenuation over the entire VLF/ELF band.
Terrestrial high frequency communications rely on reflections from the ionized layers in the upper atmosphere. The ionosphere distorts earth-space links and ionospheric perturbations can affect all types of telecommunications.
The physical properties of free space electromagnetic waves and how the atmosphere influences the propagation of electromagnetic waves must be considered before further advancement. Propagation of waves in free space is different from that in cable or wave-guides. With respect to signal propagation, these latter are one-dimensional systems and a wave does not loose energy as it travels except due to absorption or scattering. In three dimensions, waves radiate spherically. As they travel, the surface area they occupy increases as the square of the distance that it travels.
Since energy is conserved, the energy per unit surface area must decrease as the square of the distance. Thus, the power of free space waves obeys an inverse square law. For each doubling of the distance between the source and the receiver a 6 dB, loss is experienced. This loss has been eradicated by understanding the matrix of radio waves in free space for this technology. When waves traveling in free space are obstructed, new waves result from the interaction. There are four types of interaction: reflection (when a wave meets a plain object and the wave is reflected back without distortion), refraction (when a wave encounters a medium with a different wave speed and the direction and speed of the wave occurs), and diffraction (when the wave encounters an edge and the wave has the ability to turn the corner Dependent upon the frequency [the higher the frequency, the less diffraction]), and scattering (the catch all description of wave interactions that are too complex to describe as any of the previous three). The result of scattering is to remove radiation of the wave and re-radiate it over a wide range of directions. Scattering is also strongly frequency dependent and will usually increase with frequency.
From the point of view of wave propagation, there are two layers. The troposphere is the lowest layer of the atmosphere. It extends from the surface to a height of 50 km and contains all the earth’s weather, liquid water, most of the water vapor, most of the gaseous atmosphere and most of the pollution. The ionosphere extends from the top of the troposphere into outer space. It consists of oxygen molecules that are ionized by the action of the sun. During the day the quantity of ions rise, and the ions recombine at night to form uncharged oxygen molecules. The ionization of the atmosphere converts the ionosphere into plasma, an electrically neutral gas of positive and negative charges. Plasma has a wave speed that is a strong function of frequency. To a low frequency wave, the ionosphere behaves as a mirror; waves are simply reflected, thus permitting a mode of propagation in which the wave bounces forwards and backwards between the ionosphere and the earth.
The use of digital computers has made highly secure communication a normal occurrence. It is much easier to encrypt than it is to decipher information. The principle is the same as a combination lock; with a computer, the combinations of the digits can be very large. The most commonly used encryption algorithms block ciphers. This means that the algorithm splits the plain text (the message to be encrypted) Into fixed size blocks, which are subjected to various functions to produce a block of cipher text. The most common functions are permutations based one expansion, compression, and straight shuffling transformations.
In a straight permutation, the bits of an n bit block are simply reordered. In expansion, as well as being reordered, the group of n bits is converted to m bits (m > n) with some bits being duplicated. In compression, the n bit block is converted to a p bit block (p < n) with some of the original bits unused.
The most widely used form (we use DES) of encryption is defined by the National Bureau of Standards and is known as the data encryption standard (DES). The DES is a block cipher, splitting the data stream into 64 bit blocks that are enciphered separately. A unique key of 56 bits is then used to perform a succession of trans position and substitutions operation. A 56-bit key has 7.2 * 1016 possible combinations. Assuming a powerful computer could attempt 108 combinations per second, it would still take over 20 years to break the code. If the code is changed three times per year, there is little possibility if it is being broken unless the code breaker has additional information.
The DES converts 64 bits of plain text into 64 bits of cipher texts. The receiver uses the same key to decipher the cipher text into plain text. The difficulty with this method is that each block is independent. This permits an interceptor in possession of the key to introduce additional blocks without the recipient being aware of this fact. In addition, the same plane text will generate the same cipher text; a fact of great value for someone attempting to break the code. These disadvantages are removed by chaining. Chaining describes the process of EOR-ING the plain text of one block with the cipher text of the previous block. In this way it is not possible to introduce blocks in a transparent fashion and repetitions of the same plain text generates different cipher text.
Modulation will be utilized to take a message-bearing signal and superimpose it upon a carrier signal for transmission. For of ease of transmission, carrier signals are generally high frequencies for several reasons: for easy low loss and low dispersion propagation as electromagnetic waves so that they may be simultaneously transmitted with out interference from other signals so as to be able to multiplex (to combine multiple signals fir transmission at the same time). Extensive investigation of propagation characteristics has been accomplished.
[Edited 1 times, lastly by gaiacomm on 08-19-2003]
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 06:36 PM
TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY WITHOUT WIRES
By Nikola Tesla as communicated to the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Electrical World and Engineer, March 5, 1904
It is impossible to resist your courteous request extended on an occasion of such moment in the life of your journal. Your letter has vivified the memory of our beginning friendship, of the first imperfect attempts and undeserved successes, of kindnesses and misunderstandings. It has brought painfully to my mind the greatness of early expectations, the quick flight of time, and alas! The smallness of realizations. The following lines which, but for your initiative, might not have been given to the world for a long time yet, are an offering in the friendly spirit of old, and my best wishes for your future success accompany them.
Towards the close of 1898 a systematic research, carried on for a number of years with the object of perfecting a method of transmission of electrical energy through the natural medium, led me to recognize three important necessities: First, to develop a transmitter of great power; second, to perfect means for individualizing and isolating the energy transmitted; and, third, to ascertain the laws of propagation of currents through the earth and the atmosphere. Various reasons, not the least of which was the help proffered by my friend Leonard E. Curtis and the Colorado Springs Electric Company, determined me to select for my experimental investigations the large plateau, two thousand meters above sea-level, in the vicinity of that delightful resort, which I reached late in May, 1899. I had not been there but a few days when I congratulated myself on the happy choice and I began the task, for which I had long trained myself, with a grateful sense and full of inspiring hope. The perfect purity of the air, the unequaled beauty of the sky, the imposing sight of a high mountain range, the quiet and restfulness of the place--all around contributed to make the conditions for scientific observations ideal. To this was added the exhilarating influence of a glorious climate and a singular sharpening of the senses. In those regions, the organs undergo perceptible physical changes. The eyes assume an extraordinary limpidity, improving vision; the ears dry out and become more susceptible to sound. Objects can be clearly distinguished there at distances such that I prefer to have them told by someone else, and I have heard--this I can venture to vouch for--the claps of thunder seven and eight hundred kilometers away. I might have done better still, had it not been tedious to wait for the sounds to arrive, in definite intervals, as heralded precisely by an electrical indicating apparatus--nearly an hour before.
In the middle of June, while preparations for other work were going on, I arranged one of my receiving transformers with the view of determining in a novel manner, experimentally, the electric potential of the globe and studying its periodic and casual fluctuations. This formed part of a plan carefully mapped out in advance. A highly sensitive, self-restorative device, controlling a recording instrument, was included in the secondary circuit, while the primary was connected to the ground and an elevated terminal of adjustable capacity. The variations of potential gave rise to electric surgings in the primary; these generated secondary currents, which in turn affected the sensitive device and recorder in proportion to their intensity. The earth was found to be, literally, alive with electrical vibrations, and soon I was deeply absorbed in the interesting investigation. No better opportunities for such observations as I intended to make could be found anywhere. Colorado is a country famous for the natural displays of electric force. In that dry and rarefied atmosphere, the sun's rays beat the objects with fierce intensity. I raised steam, to a dangerous pressure, in barrels filled with concentrated salt solution, and the tin-foil coatings of some of my elevated terminals shriveled up in the fiery blaze. An experimental high-tension transformer, carelessly exposed to the rays of the setting sun, had most of its insulating compound melted out and was rendered useless. Aided by the dryness and rarefaction of the air, the water evaporates as in a boiler, and static electricity is developed in abundance. Lightning discharges are, accordingly, very frequent and sometimes of inconceivable violence. On one occasion, approximately twelve thousand discharges occurred in two hours and all in a radius of certainly less than fifty kilometers from the laboratory. Many of them resembled gigantic trees of fire with the trunks up or down. I never saw fireballs, but as compensation for my disappointment, I succeeded later in determining the mode of their formation and producing them artificially.
In the latter part of the same month I noticed several times that my instruments were affected stronger by discharges taking place at great distances than by those near by. This puzzled me very much. What was the cause? A number of observations proved that it could not be due to the differences in the intensity of the individual discharges, and I readily ascertained that the phenomenon was not the result of a varying relation between the periods of my receiving circuits and those of the terrestrial disturbances. One night, as I was walking home with an assistant, meditating over these experiences, I was suddenly staggered by a thought. Years ago, when I wrote a chapter of my lecture before the Franklin Institute and the National Electric Light Association, it had presented itself to me, but I dismissed it as absurd and impossible. I banished it again. Nevertheless, my instinct was aroused and somehow I felt that I was nearing a great revelation.
It was on the third of July--the date I shall never forget--when I obtained the first decisive experimental evidence of a truth of overwhelming importance for the advancement of humanity. A dense mass of strongly charged clouds gathered in the west and towards the evening a violent storm broke loose which, after spending much of its fury in the mountains, was driven away with great velocity over the plains. Heavy and long persisting arcs formed almost in regular time intervals. My observations were now greatly facilitated and rendered more accurate by the experiences already gained. I was able to handle my instruments quickly and I was prepared. The recording apparatus being properly adjusted, its indications became fainter and fainter with the increasing distance of the storm, until they ceased altogether. I was watching in eager expectation. Surely enough, in a little while the indications again began, grew stronger and stronger and, after passing through a maximum, gradually decreased and ceased once more. Many times, in regularly recurring intervals, the same actions were repeated until the storm, which, as evident from simple computations, was moving with nearly constant speed, had retreated to a distance of about three hundred kilometers. Nor did these strange actions stop then, but continued to manifest themselves with undiminished force. Subsequently, my assistant, Mr. Fritz Lowenstein, also made similar observations and shortly afterward several admirable opportunities presented themselves which brought out, still more forcibly, and unmistakably, the true nature of the wonderful phenomenon. No doubt, whatever remained: I was observing stationary waves.
As the source of disturbances moved away, the receiving circuit came successively upon their nodes and loops. Impossible as it seemed, this planet, despite its vast extent, behaved like a conductor of limited dimensions. The tremendous significance of this fact in the transmission of energy by my system had already become quite clear to me. Not only was it practicable to send telegraphic messages to any distance without wires, as I recognized long ago, but also to impress upon the entire globe the faint modulations of the human voice, far more still, to transmit power, in unlimited amounts, to any terrestrial distance and almost without loss.
With these stupendous possibilities in sight, and the experimental evidence before me that their realization was henceforth merely a question of expert knowledge, patience and skill, I attacked vigorously the development of my magnifying transmitter, now, however, not so much with the original intention of producing one of great power, as with the object of learning how to construct the best one. This is, essentially, a circuit of very high self-induction and small resistance, which in its arrangement, mode of excitation and action, may be said to be the diametrical opposite of a transmitting circuit typical of telegraphy by Hertzian or electromagnetic radiations. It is difficult to form an adequate idea of the marvelous power of this unique appliance, by the aid of which the globe will be transformed. The electromagnetic radiations being reduced to an insignificant quantity, and proper conditions of resonance maintained, the circuit acts like an immense pendulum, storing indefinitely the energy of the primary exciting impulses and impressions upon the earth of the primary exciting impulses and impressions upon the earth and its conducting atmosphere uniform harmonic oscillations of intensities which, as actual tests have shown, may be pushed so far as to surpass those attained in the natural displays of static electricity.
Simultaneously with these endeavors, the means of individualization and isolation were gradually improved. Great importance was attached to this, for it was found that simple tuning was not sufficient to meet the vigorous practical requirements. The fundamental idea of employing a number of distinctive elements, co-operatively associated, for the purpose of isolating energy transmitted, I trace directly to my perusal of Spencer's clear and suggestive exposition of the human nerve mechanism. The influence of this principle on the transmission of intelligence, and electrical energy in general, cannot as yet be estimated, for the art is still in the embryonic stage; but many thousands of simultaneous telegraphic and telephonic messages, through one single conducting channel, natural or artificial, and without serious mutual interference, are certainly practicable, while millions are possible. On the other hand, any desired degree of individualization may be secured by the use of a great number of co-operative elements and arbitrary variation of their distinctive features and order of succession. For obvious reasons, the principle will also be valuable in the extension of the distance of transmission.
Progress though of necessity slow was steady and sure, for the objects aimed at were in a direction of my constant study and exercise. It is, therefore, not astonishing that before the end of 1899 I completed the task undertaken and reached the results which I have announced in my article in the Century Magazine of June, 1900, every word of which was carefully weighed.
Much has already been done towards making my system commercially available, in the transmission of energy in small amounts for specific purposes, as well as on an industrial scale. The results attained by me have made my scheme of intelligence transmission, for which the name of "World Telegraphy" has been suggested, easily realizable. It constitutes, I believe, in its principle of operation, means employed and capacities of application, a radical and fruitful departure from what has been done heretofore. I have no doubt that it will prove very efficient in enlightening the masses, particularly in still uncivilized countries and less accessible regions, and that it will add materially to general safety, comfort and convenience, and maintenance of peaceful relations. It involves the employment of a number of plants, all of which are capable of transmitting individualized signals to the uttermost confines of the earth. Each of them will be preferably located near some important center of civilization and the news it receives through any channel will be flashed to all points of the globe. A cheap and simple device, which might be carried in one's pocket, may then be set up somewhere on sea or land, and it will record the world's news or such special messages as may be intended for it. Thus, the entire earth will be converted into a huge brain, as it were, capable of response in every one of its parts. Since a single plant of but one hundred horse-power can operate hundreds of millions of instruments, the system will have a virtually infinite working capacity, and it must needs immensely facilitate and cheapen the transmission of intelligence.
The first of these central plants would have been already completed had it not been for unforeseen delays, which, fortunately, have nothing to do with its purely technical features. However, this loss of time, while vexatious, may, after all, prove to be a blessing in disguise. The best design of which I know has been adopted and the transmitter will emit a wave complex of total maximum activity of ten million horsepower, one per cent. Of which is amply sufficient to "girdle the globe." This enormous rate of energy delivery. Approximately twice that of the combined falls of Niagara, is obtainable only by the use of certain artifices, which I shall make known in due course.
For a large part of the work which I have done so far I am indebted to the noble generosity of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, which was all the more welcome and stimulating, as it was extended at a time when those, who have since promised most, were the greatest of doubters. I have also to thank my friend, Stanford White, for much unselfish and valuable assistance. This work is now far advanced, and though the results may be tardy, they are sure to come.
Meanwhile, the transmission of energy on an industrial scale is not being neglected. The Canadian Niagara Power Company has offered me a splendid inducement, and next to achieving success for the sake of the art, it will give me the greatest satisfaction to make their concession financially profitable to them. In this first power plant, which I have been designing for a long time, I propose to distribute ten thousand horsepower under a tension of one hundred million volts, which I am now able to produce and handle with safety.
This energy will be collected all over the globe preferably in small amounts, ranging from a fraction of one to a few horse-power. One its chief uses will be the illumination of isolated homes. It takes very little power to light a dwelling with vacuum tubes operated by high-frequency currents and in each instance a terminal a little above the roof will be sufficient. Another valuable application will be the driving of clocks and other such apparatus. These clocks will be exceedingly simple, will require absolutely no attention and will indicate rigorously correct time. The idea of impressing upon the earth American time is fascinating and very likely to become popular. There are innumerable devices of all kinds which are either now employed or can be supplied, and by operating them in this manner I may be able to offer a great convenience to whole world with a plant of no more than ten thousand horse-power. The introduction of this system will give opportunities for invention and manufacture such as have never presented themselves before.
Knowing the far-reaching importance of this first attempt and its effect upon future development, I shall proceed slowly and carefully. Experience has taught me not to assign a term to enterprises the consummation of which is not wholly dependent on my own abilities and exertions. However, I am hopeful that these great realizations are not far off, and I know that when this first work is completed they will follow with mathematical certitude.
When the great truth accidentally revealed and experimentally confirmed is fully recognized, that this planet, with all its appalling immensity, is to electric currents virtually no more than a small metal ball and that by this fact many possibilities, each baffling imagination and of incalculable consequence, are rendered absolutely sure of accomplishment; when the first plant is inaugurated and it is shown that a telegraphic message, almost as secret and non-interferable as a thought, can be transmitted to any terrestrial distance, the sound of the human voice, with all its intonations and inflections, faithfully and instantly reproduced at any other point of the globe, the energy of a waterfall made available for supplying light, heat or motive power, anywhere-on sea, or land, or high in the air-humanity will be like an ant heap stirred up with a stick: See the excitement coming!
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:07 PM
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I INTRODUCTION Quantum Theory, in physics, description of the particles that make up matter and how they interact with each other and with energy. Quantum theory explains in principle how to calculate what will happen in any experiment involving physical or biological systems, and how to understand how our world works. The name “quantum theory” comes from the fact that the theory describes the matter and energy in the universe in terms of single indivisible units called quanta (singular quantum). Quantum theory is different from classical physics. Classical physics is an approximation of the set of rules and equations in quantum theory. Classical physics accurately describes the behavior of matter and energy in the everyday universe. For example, classical physics explains the motion of a car accelerating or of a ball flying through the air. Quantum theory, on the other hand, can accurately describe the behavior of the universe on a much smaller scale, that of atoms and smaller particles. The rules of classical physics do not explain the behavior of matter and energy on this small scale. Quantum theory is more general than classical physics, and in principle, it could be used to predict the behavior of any physical, chemical, or biological system. However, explaining the behavior of the everyday world with quantum theory is too complicated to be practical.
Quantum theory not only specifies new rules for describing the universe but also introduces new ways of thinking about matter and energy. The tiny particles that quantum theory describes do not have defined locations, speeds, and paths like objects described by classical physics. Instead, quantum theory describes positions and other properties of particles in terms of the chances that the property will have a certain value. For example, it allows scientists to calculate how likely it is that a particle will be in a certain position at a certain time.
Quantum description of particles allows scientists to understand how particles combine to form atoms. Quantum description of atoms helps scientists understand the chemical and physical properties of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. Quantum theory enabled scientists to understand the conditions of the early universe, how the Sun shines, and how atoms and molecules determine the characteristics of the material that they make up. Without quantum theory, scientists could not have developed nuclear energy or the electric circuits that provide the basis for computers.
Quantum theory describes all of the fundamental forces—except gravitation—that physicists have found in nature. The forces that quantum theory describes are the electrical, the magnetic, the weak, and the strong. Physicists often refer to these forces as interactions, because the forces control the way particles interact with each other. Interactions also affect spontaneous changes in isolated particles.
II WAVES AND PARTICLES
One of the striking differences between quantum theory and classical physics is that quantum theory describes energy and matter both as waves and as particles. The type of energy physicists study most often with quantum theory is light. Classical physics considers light to be only a wave, and it treats matter strictly as particles. Quantum theory acknowledges that both light and matter can behave like waves and like particles.
It is important to understand how scientists describe the properties of waves in order to understand how waves fit into quantum theory. A familiar type of wave occurs when a rope is tied to a solid object and someone moves the free end up and down. Waves travel along the rope. The highest points on the rope are called the crests of the waves. The lowest points are called troughs. One full wave consists of a crest and trough. The distance from crest to crest or from trough to trough—or from any point on one wave to the identical point on the next wave—is called the wavelength. The frequency of the waves is the number of waves per second that pass by a given point along the rope.
If waves traveling down the rope hit the stationary end and bounce back, like water waves bouncing against a wall, two waves on the rope may meet each other, hitting the same place on the rope at the same time. These two waves will interfere, or combine (see Interference). If the two waves exactly line up—that is, if the crests and troughs of the waves line up—the waves interfere constructively. This means that the trough of the combined wave is deeper and the crest is higher than those of the waves before they combined. If the two waves are offset by exactly half of a wavelength, the trough of one wave lines up with the crest of the other. This alignment creates destructive interference—the two waves cancel each other out and a momentary flat spot appears on the rope. See also Wave Motion.
A Light as a Wave and as a Particle
Like classical physics, quantum theory sometimes describes light as a wave, because light behaves like a wave in many situations. Light is not a vibration of a solid substance, such as a rope. Instead, a light wave is made up of a vibration in the intensity of the electric and magnetic fields that surround any electrically charged object.
Like the waves moving along a rope, light waves travel and carry energy. The amount of energy depends on the frequency of the light waves: the higher the frequency, the higher the energy. The frequency of a light wave is also related to the color of the light. For example, blue light has a higher frequency than that of red light. Therefore, a beam of blue light has more energy than an equally intense beam of red light has.
Unlike classical physics, quantum theory also describes light as a particle. Scientists revealed this aspect of light behavior in several experiments performed during the early 20th century. In one experiment, physicists discovered an interaction between light and particles in a metal. They called this interaction the photoelectric effect. In the photoelectric effect, a beam of light shining on a piece of metal makes the metal emit electrons. The light adds energy to the metal’s electrons, giving them enough energy to break free from the metal. If light was made strictly of waves, each electron in the metal could absorb many continuous waves of light and gain more and more energy. Increasing the intensity of the light, or adding more light waves, would add more energy to the emitted electrons. Shining a more and more intense beam of light on the metal would make the metal emit electrons with more and more energy.
Scientists found, however, that shining a more intense beam of light on the metal just made the metal emit more electrons. Each of these electrons had the same energy as that of electrons emitted with low intensity light. The electrons could not be interacting with waves, because adding more waves did not add more energy to the electrons. Instead, each electron had to be interacting with just a small piece of the light beam. These pieces were like little packets of light energy, or particles of light. The size, or energy, of each packet depended only on the frequency, or color, of the light—not on the intensity of the light. A more intense beam of light just had more packets of light energy, but each packet contained the same amount of energy. Individual electrons could absorb one packet of light energy and break free from the metal. Increasing the intensity of the light added more packets of energy to the beam and enabled a greater number of electrons to break free—but each of these emitted electrons had the same amount of energy. Scientists could only change the energy of the emitted electrons by changing the frequency, or color, of the beam. Changing from red light to blue light, for example, increased the energy of each packet of light. In this case, each emitted electron absorbed a bigger packet of light energy and had more energy after it broke free of the metal. Using these results, physicists developed a model of light as a particle, and they called these light particles photons.
In 1922 American physicist Arthur Compton discovered another interaction, now called the Compton effect, that reveals the particle nature of light. In the Compton effect, light collides with an electron. The collision knocks the electron off course and changes the frequency, and therefore energy, of the light. The light affects the electron in the same way a particle with momentum would: It bumps the electron and changes the electron’s path. The light is also affected by the collision as though it were a particle, in that its energy and momentum changes.
Momentum is a quantity that can be defined for all particles. For light particles, or photons, momentum depends on the frequency, or color, of the photon, which in turn depends on the photon’s energy. The energy of a photon is equal to a constant number, called Planck’s constant, times the frequency of the photon. Planck’s constant is named for German physicist Max Planck, who first proposed the relationship between energy and frequency. The accepted value of Planck’s constant is 6.626 × 10-34 joule-second. This number is very small—written out, it is a decimal point followed by 33 zeroes, followed by the digits 6626. The energy of a single photon is therefore very small.
The dual nature of light seems puzzling because we have no everyday experience with wave-particle duality. Waves are everyday phenomena; we are all familiar with waves on a body of water or on a vibrating rope. Particles, too, are everyday objects—baseballs, cars, buildings, and even people can be thought of as particles. But to our senses, there are no everyday objects that are both waves and particles. Scientists increasingly find that the rules that apply to the world we see are only approximations of the rules that govern the unseen world of light and subatomic particles.
B Matter as Waves and Particles
In 1923 French physicist Louis de Broglie suggested that all particles—not just photons—have both wave and particle properties. He calculated that every particle has a wavelength (represented by ë, the Greek letter lambda) equal to Planck’s constant (h) divided by the momentum (p) of the particle: ë = h/p. Electrons, atoms, and all other particles have de Broglie wavelengths. The momentum of an object depends on its speed and mass, so the faster and heavier an object is, the larger its momentum (p) will be. Because Planck’s constant (h) is an extremely tiny number, the de Broglie wavelength (h/p) of any visible object is exceedingly small. In fact, the de Broglie wavelength of anything much larger than an atom is smaller than the size of one of its atoms. For example, the de Broglie wavelength of a baseball moving at 150 km/h (90 mph) is 1.1 × 10-34 m (3.6 × 10-34 ft). The diameter of a hydrogen atom (the simplest and smallest atom) is about 5 × 10-11 m (about 2 × 10-10 ft), more than 100 billion trillion times larger than the de Broglie wavelength of the baseball. The de Broglie wavelengths of everyday objects are so tiny that the wave nature of these objects does not affect their visible behavior, so their wave-particle duality is undetectable to us.
De Broglie wavelengths become important when the mass, and therefore momentum, of particles is very small. Particles the size of atoms and electrons have demonstrable wavelike properties. One of the most dramatic and interesting demonstrations of the wave behavior of electrons comes from the double-slit experiment. This experiment consists of a barrier set between a source of electrons and an electron detector. The barrier contains two slits, each about the width of the de Broglie wavelength of an electron. On this small scale, the wave nature of electrons becomes evident, as described in the following paragraphs.
Scientists can determine whether the electrons are behaving like waves or like particles by comparing the results of double-slit experiments with those of similar experiments performed with visible waves and particles. To establish how visible waves behave in a double-slit apparatus, physicists can replace the electron source with a device that creates waves in a tank of water. The slits in the barrier are about as wide as the wavelength of the water waves. In this experiment, the waves spread out spherically from the source until they hit the barrier. The waves pass through the slits and spread out again, producing two new wave fronts with centers as far apart as the slits are. These two new sets of waves interfere with each other as they travel toward the detector at the far end of the tank.
The waves interfere constructively in some places (adding together) and destructively in others (canceling each other out). The most intense waves—that is, those formed by the most constructive interference—hit the detector at the spot opposite the midpoint between the two slits. These strong waves form a peak of intensity on the detector. On either side of this peak, the waves destructively interfere and cancel each other out, creating a low point in intensity. Further out from these low points, the waves are weaker, but they constructively interfere again and create two more peaks of intensity, smaller than the large peak in the middle. The intensity then drops again as the waves destructively interfere. The intensity of the waves forms a symmetrical pattern on the detector, with a large peak directly across from the midpoint between the slits and alternating low points and smaller and smaller peaks on either side.
To see how particles behave in the double-slit experiment, physicists replace the water with marbles. The barrier slits are about the width of a marble, as the point of this experiment is to allow particles (in this case, marbles) to pass through the barrier. The marbles are put in motion and pass through the barrier, striking the detector at the far end of the apparatus. The results show that the marbles do not interfere with each other or with themselves like waves do. Instead, the marbles strike the detector most frequently in the two points directly opposite each slit.
When physicists perform the double-slit experiment with electrons, the detection pattern matches that produced by the waves, not the marbles. These results show that electrons do have wave properties. However, if scientists run the experiment using a barrier whose slits are much wider than the de Broglie wavelength of the electrons, the pattern resembles the one produced by the marbles. This shows that tiny particles such as electrons behave as waves in some circumstances and as particles in others.
C Uncertainty Principle Before the development of quantum theory, physicists assumed that, with perfect equipment in perfect conditions, measuring any physical quantity as accurately as desired was possible. Quantum mechanical equations show that accurate measurement of both the position and the momentum of a particle at the same time is impossible. This rule is called Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle after German physicist Werner Heisenberg, who derived it from other rules of quantum theory. The uncertainty principle means that as physicists measure a particle’s position with more and more accuracy, the momentum of the particle becomes less and less precise, or more and more uncertain, and vice versa.
Heisenberg formally stated his principle by describing the relationship between the uncertainty in the measurement of a particle’s position and the uncertainty in the measurement of its momentum. Heisenberg said that the uncertainty in position (represented by Äx) times the uncertainty in momentum (represented by Äp must be greater than a constant number equal to Planck’s constant (h) divided by 4p (p is a constant approximately equal to 3.14). Mathematically, the uncertainty principle can be written as Äx Äp > h / 4p. This relationship means that as a scientist measures a particle’s position more and more accurately—so the uncertainty in its position becomes very small—the uncertainty in its momentum must become large to compensate and make this expression true. Likewise, if the uncertainty in momentum, Äp, becomes small, Äx must become large to make the expression true.
One way to understand the uncertainty principle is to consider the dual wave-particle nature of light and matter. Physicists can measure the position and momentum of an atom by bouncing light off of the atom. If they treat the light as a wave, they have to consider a property of waves called diffraction when measuring the atom’s position. Diffraction occurs when waves encounter an object—the waves bend around the object instead of traveling in a straight line. If the length of the waves is much shorter than the size of the object, the bending of the waves just at the edges of the object is not a problem. Most of the waves bounce back and give an accurate measurement of the object’s position. If the length of the waves is close to the size of the object, however, most of the waves diffract, making the measurement of the object’s position fuzzy. Physicists must bounce shorter and shorter waves off an atom to measure its position more accurately. Using shorter wavelengths of light, however, increases the uncertainty in the measurement of the atom’s momentum.
Light carries energy and momentum, because of its particle nature (described in the Compton effect). Photons that strike the atom being measured will change the atom’s energy and momentum. The fact that measuring an object also affects the object is an important principle in quantum theory. Normally the affect is so small it does not matter, but on the small scale of atoms, it becomes important. The bump to the atom increases the uncertainty in the measurement of the atom’s momentum. Light with more energy and momentum will knock the atom harder and create more uncertainty. The momentum of light is equal to Plank’s constant divided by the light’s wavelength, or p = h/ë. Physicists can increase the wavelength to decrease the light’s momentum and measure the atom’s momentum more accurately. Because of diffraction, however, increasing the light’s wavelength increases the uncertainty in the measurement of the atom’s position. Physicists most often use the uncertainty principle that describes the relationship between position and momentum, but a similar and important uncertainty relationship also exists between the measurement of energy and the measurement of time.
III PROBABILITY AND WAVE FUNCTIONS
Quantum theory gives exact answers to many questions, but it can only give probabilities for some values. A probability is the likelihood of an answer being a certain value. Probability is often represented by a graph, with the highest point on the graph representing the most likely value and the lowest representing the least likely value. For example, the graph that shows the likelihood of finding the electron of a hydrogen atom at a certain distance from the nucleus looks like the following:
The nucleus of the atom is at the left of the graph. The probability of finding the electron very near the nucleus is very low. The probability reaches a definite peak, marking the spot at which the electron is most likely to be.
Scientists use a mathematical expression called a wave function to describe the characteristics of a particle that are related to time and space—such as position and velocity. The wave function helps determine the probability of these aspects being certain values. The wave function of a particle is not the same as the wave suggested by wave-particle duality. A wave function is strictly a mathematical way of expressing the characteristics of a particle. Physicists usually represent these types of wave functions with the Greek letter psi, Ø. The wave function of the electron in a hydrogen atom is:
The symbol p and the letter e in this equation represent constant numbers derived from mathematics. The letter a is also a constant number called the Bohr radius for the hydrogen atom. The square of a wave function, or a wave function multiplied by itself, is equal to the probability density of the particle that the wave function describes. The probability density of a particle gives the likelihood of finding the particle at a certain point.
The wave function described above does not depend on time. An isolated hydrogen atom does not change over time, so leaving time out of the atom’s wave function is acceptable. For particles in systems that change over time, physicists use wave functions that depend on time. This lets them calculate how the system and the particle’s properties change over time. Physicists represent a time-dependent wave function with Ø(t), where t represents time.
The wave function for a single atom can only reveal the probability that an atom will have a certain set of characteristics at a certain time. Physicists call the set of characteristics describing an atom the state of the atom. The wave function cannot describe the actual state of the atom, just the probability that the atom will be in a certain state.
The wave functions of individual particles can be added together to create a wave function for a system, so quantum theory allows physicists to examine many particles at once. The rules of probability state that probabilities and actual values match better and better as the number of particles (or dice thrown, or coins tossed, whatever the probability refers to) increases. Therefore, if physicists consider a large group of atoms, the wave function for the group of atoms provides information that is more definite and useful than that provided by the wave function of a single atom.
An example of a wave function for a single atom is one that describes an atom that has absorbed some energy. The energy has boosted the atom’s electrons to a higher energy level, and the atom is said to be in an excited state. It can return to its normal ground state (or lowest energy state) by emitting energy in the form of a photon. Scientists call the wave function of the initial exited state Øi (with “i” indicating it is the initial state) and the wave function of the final ground state Øf (with “f” representing the final state). To describe the atom’s state over time, they multiply Øi by some function, a(t), that decreases with time, because the chances of the atom being in this excited state decrease with time. They multiply Øf by some function, b(t), that increases with time, because the chances of the atom being in this state increase with time. The physicist completing the calculation chooses a(t) and b(t) based on the characteristics of the system. The complete wave equation for the transition is the following:
Ø = a(t) Øi + b(t) Øf.
At any time, the rules of probability state that the probability of finding a single atom in either state is found by multiplying the coefficient of its wave function (a(t) or b(t)) by itself. For one atom, this does not give a very satisfactory answer. Even though the physicist knows the probability of finding the atom in one state or the other, whether or not reality will match probability is still far from certain. This idea is similar to rolling a pair of dice. There is a 1 in 6 chance that the roll will add up to seven, which is the most likely sum. Each roll is random, however, and not connected to the rolls before it. It would not be surprising if ten rolls of the dice failed to yield a sum of seven. However, the actual number of times that seven appears matches probability better as the number of rolls increases. For one million or one billion rolls of the dice, one of every six rolls would almost certainly add up to seven.
Similarly, for a large number of atoms, the probabilities become approximate percentages of atoms in each state, and these percentages become more accurate as the number of atoms observed increases. For example, if the square of a(t) at a certain time is 0.2, then in a very large sample of atoms, 20 percent (0.2) of the atoms will be in the initial state and 80 percent (0.8) will be in the final state.
One of the most puzzling results of quantum mechanics is the effect of measurement on a quantum system. Before a scientist measures the characteristics of a particle, its characteristics do not have definite values. Instead, they are described by a wave function, which gives the characteristics only as fuzzy probabilities. In effect, the particle does not exist in an exact location until a scientist measures its position. Measuring the particle fixes its characteristics at specific values, effectively “collapsing” the particle’s wave function. The particle’s position is no longer fuzzy, so the wave function that describes it has one high, sharp peak of probability. If the position of a particle has just been measured, the graph of its probability density looks like the following:
In the 1930s physicists proposed an imaginary experiment to demonstrate how measurement causes complications in quantum mechanics. They imagined a system that contained two particles with opposite values of spin, a property of particles that is analogous to angular momentum. The physicists can know that the two particles have opposite spins by setting the total spin of the system to be zero. They can measure the total spin without directly measuring the spin of either particle. Because they have not yet measured the spin of either particle, the spins do not actually have defined values. They exist only as fuzzy probabilities. The spins only take on definite values when the scientists measure them.
In this hypothetical experiment the scientists do not measure the spin of each particle right away. They send the two particles, called an entangled pair, off in opposite directions until they are far apart from each other. The scientists then measure the spin of one of the particles, fixing its value. Instantaneously, the spin of the other particle becomes known and fixed. It is no longer a fuzzy probability but must be the opposite of the other particle, so that their spins will add to zero. It is as though the first particle communicated with the second. This apparent instantaneous passing of information from one particle to the other would violate the rule that nothing, not even information, can travel faster than the speed of light. The two particles do not, however, communicate with each other. Physicists can instantaneously know the spin of the second particle because they set the total spin of the system to be zero at the beginning of the experiment. In 1997 Austrian researchers performed an experiment similar to the hypothetical experiment of the 1930s, confirming the effect of measurement on a quantum system.
IV THE QUANTUM ATOM
The first great achievement of quantum theory was to explain how atoms work. Physicists found explaining the structure of the atom with classical physics to be impossible. Atoms consist of negatively charged electrons bound to a positively charged nucleus. The nucleus of an atom contains positively charged particles called protons and may contain neutral particles called neutrons. Protons and neutrons are about the same size but are much larger and heavier than electrons are. Classical physics describes a hydrogen atom as an electron orbiting a proton, much as the Moon orbits Earth. By the rules of classical physics, the electron has a property called inertia that makes it want to continue traveling in a straight line. The attractive electrical force of the positively charged proton overcomes this inertia and bends the electron’s path into a circle, making it stay in a closed orbit. The classical theory of electromagnetism says that charged particles (such as electrons) radiate energy when they bend their paths. If classical physics applied to the atom, the electron would radiate away all of its energy. It would slow down and its orbit would collapse into the proton within a fraction of a second. However, physicists know that atoms can be stable for centuries or longer.
Quantum theory gives a model of the atom that explains its stability. It still treats atoms as electrons surrounding a nucleus, but the electrons do not orbit the nucleus like moons orbiting planets. Quantum mechanics gives the location of an electron as a probability instead of pinpointing it at a certain position. Even though the position of an electron is uncertain, quantum theory prohibits the electron from being at some places. The easiest way to describe the differences between the allowed and prohibited positions of electrons in an atom is to think of the electron as a wave. The wave-particle duality of quantum theory allows electrons to be described as waves, using the electron’s de Broglie wavelength.
If the electron is described as a continuous wave, its motion may be described as that of a standing wave. Standing waves occur when a continuous wave occupies one of a set of certain distances. These distances enable the wave to interfere with itself in such a way that the wave appears to remain stationary. Plucking the string of a musical instrument sets up a standing wave in the string that makes the string resonate and produce sound. The length of the string, or the distance the wave on the string occupies, is equal to a whole or half number of wavelengths. At these distances, the wave bounces back at either end and constructively interferes with itself, which strengthens the wave. Similarly, an electron wave occupies a distance around the nucleus of an atom, or a circumference, that enables it to travel a whole or half number of wavelengths before looping back on itself. The electron wave therefore constructively interferes with itself and remains stable:
An electron wave cannot occupy a distance that is not equal to a whole or half number of wavelengths. In a distance such as this, the wave would interfere with itself in a complicated way, and would become unstable:
An electron has a certain amount of energy when its wave occupies one of the allowed circumferences around the nucleus of an atom. This energy depends on the number of wavelengths in the circumference, and it is called the electron’s energy level. Because only certain circumferences, and therefore energy levels, are allowed, physicists say that the energy levels are quantized. This quantization means that the energies of the levels can only take on certain values.
The regions of space in which electrons are most likely to be found are called orbitals. Orbitals look like fuzzy, three-dimensional shapes. More than one orbital, meaning more than one shape, may exist at certain energy levels. Electron orbitals are also quantized, meaning that only certain shapes are allowed in each energy level. The quantization of electron orbitals and energy levels in atoms explains the stability of atoms. An electron in an energy level that allows only one wavelength is at the lowest possible energy level. An atom with all of its electrons in their lowest possible energy levels is said to be in its ground state. Unless it is affected by external forces, an atom will stay in its ground state forever.
The quantum theory explanation of the atom led to a deeper understanding of the periodic table of the chemical elements. The periodic table of elements is a chart of the known elements. Scientists originally arranged the elements in this table in order of increasing atomic number (which is equal to the number of protons in the nuclei of each element’s atoms) and according to the chemical behavior of the elements. They grouped elements that behave in a similar way together in columns. Scientists found that elements that behave similarly occur in a periodic fashion according to their atomic number. For example, a family of elements called the noble gases all share similar chemical properties. The noble gases include neon, xenon, and argon. They do not react easily with other elements and are almost never found in chemical compounds. The atomic numbers of the noble gases increase from one element to the next in a periodic way. They belong to the same column at the far right edge of the periodic table.
Quantum theory showed that an element’s chemical properties have little to do with the nucleus of the element’s atoms, but instead depend on the number and arrangement of the electrons in each atom. An atom has the same number of electrons as protons, making the atom electrically neutral. The arrangement of electrons in an atom depends on two important parts of quantum theory. The first is the quantization of electron energy, which limits the regions of space that electrons can occupy. The second part is a rule called the Pauli exclusion principle, first proposed by Austrian-born Swiss physicist Wolfgang Pauli.
The Pauli exclusion principle states that no electron can have exactly the same characteristics as those of another electron. These characteristics include orbital, direction of rotation (called spin), and direction of orbit. Each energy level in an atom has a set number of ways these characteristics can combine. The number of combinations determines how many electrons can occupy an energy level before the electrons have to start filling up the next level.
An atom is the most stable when it has the least amount of energy, so its lowest energy levels fill with electrons first. Each energy level must be filled before electrons begin filling up the next level. These rules, and the rules of quantum theory, determine how many electrons an atom has in each energy level, and in particular, how many it has in its outermost level. Using the quantum mechanical model of the atom, physicists found that all the elements in the same column of the periodic table also have the same number of electrons in the outer energy level of their atoms. Quantum theory shows that the number of electrons in an atom’s outer level determines the atom’s chemical properties, or how it will react with other atoms.
The number of electrons in an atom’s outer energy level is important because atoms are most stable when their outermost energy level is filled, which is the case for atoms of the noble gases. Atoms imitate the noble gases by donating electrons to, taking electrons from, or sharing electrons with other atoms. If an atom’s outer energy level is only partially filled, it will bond easily with atoms that can help it fill its outer level. Atoms that are missing the same number of electrons from their outer energy level will react similarly to fill their outer energy level.
Quantum theory also explains why different atoms emit and absorb different wavelengths of light. An atom stores energy in its electrons. An atom with all of its electrons at their lowest possible energy levels has its lowest possible energy and is said to be in its ground state. One of the ways atoms can gain more energy is to absorb light in the form of photons, or particles of light. When a photon hits an atom, one of the atom’s electrons absorbs the photon. The photon’s energy makes the electron jump from its original energy level up to a higher energy level. This jump leaves an empty space in the original inner energy level, making the atom less stable. The atom is now in an excited state, but it cannot store the new energy indefinitely, because atoms always seek their most stable state. When the atom releases the energy, the electron drops back down to its original energy level. As it does, the electron releases a photon.
Quantum theory defines the possible energy levels of an atom, so it defines the particular jumps that an electron can make between energy levels. The difference between the old and new energy levels of the electron is equal to the amount of energy the atom stores. Because the energy levels are quantized, atoms can only absorb and store photons with certain amounts of energy. The photon’s energy is related to its frequency, or color. As the frequency of photons increases, their energy increases. Atoms can only absorb certain amounts of energy, so only certain frequencies of light can excite atoms. Likewise, atoms only emit certain frequencies of light when they drop to their ground state. The different frequencies available to different atoms help astronomers, for example, determine the chemical makeup of a star by observing which wavelengths are especially weak or strong in the star’s light. See also Spectroscopy.
V DEVELOPMENT OF QUANTUM THEORY
The development of quantum theory began with German physicist Max Planck’s proposal in 1900 that matter can emit or absorb energy only in small, discrete packets, called quanta. This idea introduced the particle nature of light. In 1905 German-born American physicist Albert Einstein used Planck’s work to explain the photoelectric effect, in which light hitting a metal makes the metal emit electrons. British physicist Ernest Rutherford proved that atoms consisted of electrons bound to a nucleus in 1911. In 1913 Danish physicist Niels Bohr proposed that classical mechanics could not explain the structure of the atom and developed a model of the atom with electrons in fixed orbits. Bohr’s model of the atom proved difficult to apply to all but the simplest atoms.
In 1923 French physicist Louis de Broglie suggested that matter could be described as a wave, just as light could be described as a particle. The wave model of the electron allowed Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger to develop a mathematical method of determining the probability that an electron will be at a particular place at a certain time. Schrödinger published his theory of wave mechanics in 1926. Around the same time, German physicist Werner Heisenberg developed a way of calculating the characteristics of electrons that was quite different from Schrödinger’s method but yielded the same results. Heisenberg’s method was called matrix mechanics.
In 1925 Austrian-born Swiss physicist Wolfgang Pauli developed the Pauli exclusion principle, which allowed physicists to calculate the structure of the quantum atom for the first time. In 1926 Heisenberg and two of his colleagues, German physicists Max Born and Ernst Pascual Jordan, published a theory that combined the principles of quantum theory with the classical theory of light (called electrodynamics). Heisenberg made another important contribution to quantum theory in 1927 when he introduced the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
Since these first breakthroughs in quantum mechanical research, physicists have focused on testing and refining quantum theory, further connecting the theory to other theories, and finding new applications. In 1928 British physicist Paul Dirac refined the theory that combined quantum theory with electrodynamics. He developed a model of the electron that was consistent with both quantum theory and Einstein’s special theory of relativity, and in doing so he created a theory that came to be known as quantum electrodynamics, or QED. In the early 1950s Japanese physicist Shin’ichirô Tomonaga and American physicists Richard Feynman and Julian Schwinger each independently improved the scientific community’s understanding of QED and made it an experimentally testable theory that successfully predicted or explained the results of many experiments.
VI CURRENT RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS At the turn of the 21st century, physicists were still finding new problems to study with quantum theory and new applications for quantum theory. This research will probably continue for many decades. Quantum theory is technically a fully formulated theory—any questions about the physical world can be calculated using quantum mechanics, but some are too complicated to solve in practice. The attempt to find quantum explanations of gravitation and to find a unified description of all the forces in nature are promising and active areas of research. Researchers try to find out why quantum theory explains the way nature works—they may never find an answer, but the effort to do so is underway. Physicists also study the complicated area of overlap between classical physics and quantum mechanics and work on the applications of quantum mechanics.
Studying the intersection of quantum theory and classical physics requires developing a theory that can predict how quantum systems will behave as they get larger or as the number of particles involved approaches the size of problems described by classical physics. The mathematics involved is extremely difficult, but physicists continue to advance in their research. The constantly increasing power of computers should continue to help scientists with these calculations.
New research in quantum theory also promises new applications and improvements to known applications. One of the most potentially powerful applications is quantum computing. In quantum computing, scientists make use of the behavior of subatomic particles to perform calculations. Making calculations on the atomic level, a quantum computer could theoretically investigate all the possible answers to a query at the same time and make many calculations in parallel. This ability would make quantum computers thousands or even millions of time faster than current computers. Advancements in quantum theory also hold promise for the fields of optics, chemistry, and atomic theory.
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:20 PM
.N.T.S. No. 11851, vol. 828, pp. 305-388
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY OF MARCH 20, 1883,
AS REVISED AT BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 14, 1900,
AT WASHINGTON ON JUNE 2, 1911, AT THE HAGUE ON NOVEMBER 6, 1925,
AT LONDON ON JUNE 2, 1934, AT LISBON ON OCTOBER 31, 1958,
AND AT STOCKHOLM ON JULY 14, 1967
(1) The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union for
the protection of industrial property.
(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names,
indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of
(3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall
apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to
agricultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural
products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals,
mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.
(4) Patents shall include the various kinds of industrial patents
recognized by the laws of the countries of the Union, such as patents of
importation, patents of improvement, patents and certificates of addition,
(1) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection
of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the
advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to
nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the
latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights,
provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
(2) However, no requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country
where protection is claimed may be imposed upon nationals of countries of
the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property rights.
(3) The provisions of the laws of each of the countries of the Union
relating to judicial and administrative procedure and to jurisdiction, and
to the designation of an address for service or the appointment of an
agent, which may be required by the laws on industrial property are
Nationals of countries outside the Union who are domiciled or who have real
and effective industrial or commercial establishments in the territory of
one of the countries of the Union shall be treated in the same manner as
nationals of the countries of the Union.
A. (1) Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, or for
the registration of a utility model, or of an industrial design, or of a
trademark, in one of the countries of the Union, or his successor in title,
shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of
priority during the periods hereinafter fixed.
(2) Any filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing under the
domestic legislation of any country of the Union or under bilateral or
multilateral treaties concluded between countries of the Union shall be
recognized as giving rise to the right of priority.
(3) By a regular national filing is meant any filing that is adequate to
establish the date on which the application was filed in the country
concerned, whatever may be the subsequent fate of the application.
B. Consequently, any subsequent filing in any of the other countries of the
Union before the expiration of the periods referred to above shall not be
invalidated by reason of any acts accomplished in the interval, in
particular, another filing, the publication or exploitation of the
invention, the putting on sale of copies of the design, or the use of the
mark, and such acts cannot give rise to any third-party right or any right
of personal possession. Rights acquired by third parties before the date of
the first application that serves as the basis for the right of priority
are reserved in accordance with the domestic legislation of each country of
C. (1) The periods of priority referred to above shall be twelve months for
patents and utility models, and six months for industrial designs and
(2) These periods shall start from the date of filing of the first
application; the day of filing shall not be included in the period.
(3) If the last day of the period is an official holiday, or a day when the
Office is not open for the filing of applications in the country where
protection is claimed, the period shall be extended until the first
following working day.
(4) A subsequent application concerning the same subject as a previous
first application within the meaning of paragraph (2), above, filed in the
same country of the Union, shall be considered as the first application, of
which the filing date shall be the starting point of the period of
priority, if, at the time of filing the subsequent application, the said
previous application has been withdrawn, abandoned, or refused, without
having been laid open to public inspection and without leaving any rights
outstanding, and if it has not yet served as a basis for claiming a right
of priority. The previous application may not thereafter serve as a basis
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of priority to produce a copy of the application (description, drawings,
etc.) previously filed. The copy, certified as correct by the authority
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the filing of the subsequent application. They may require it to be
accompanied by a certificate from the same authority showing the date of
filing, and by a translation.
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determine the consequences of failure to comply with the formalities
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(5) Subsequently, further proof may be required.
Any person who avails himself of the priority of a previous application
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E. (1) Where an industrial design is filed in a country by virtue of a
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priority shall be the same as that fixed for industrial designs.
(2) Furthermore, it is permissible to file a utility model in a country by
virtue of a right of priority based on the filing of a patent application,
and vice versa.
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the ground that the applicant claims multiple priorities, even if they
originate in different countries, or on the ground that an application
claiming one or more priorities contains one or more elements that were not
included in the application or applications whose priority is claimed,
provided that, in both cases, there is unity of invention within the
meaning of the law of the country.
With respect to the elements not included in the application or
applications whose priority is claimed, the filing of the subsequent
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if any. Each country of the Union shall have the right to determine the
conditions under which such division shall be authorized.
H. Priority may not be refused on the ground that certain elements of the
invention for which priority is claimed do not appear among the claims
formulated in the application in the country of origin, provided that the
application documents as a whole specifically disclose such elements.
I. (1) Applications for inventors' certificates filed in a country in which
applicants have the right to apply at their own option either for a patent
or for an inventor's certificate shall give rise to the right of priority
provided for by this Article, under the same conditions and with the same
effects as applications for patents.
(2) In a country in which applicants have the right to apply at their own
option either for a patent or for an inventor's certificate, an applicant
for an inventor's certificate shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Article relating to patent applications, enjoy a right of priority
based on an application for a patent, a utility model, or an inventor's
(1) Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals
of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the
same invention in other countries, whether members of the Union or not.
(2) The foregoing provision is to be understood in an unrestricted sense,
in particular, in the sense that patents applied for during the period of
priority are independent, both as regards the grounds for nullity and
forfeiture, and as regards their normal duration.
(3) The provision shall apply to all patents existing at the time when it
comes into effect.
(4) Similarly, it shall apply, in the case of the accession of new
countries, to patents in existence on either side at the time of accession.
(5) Patents obtained with the benefit of priority shall, in the various
countries of the Union, have a duration equal to that which they would
have, had they been applied for or granted without the benefit of priority.
The inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as such in the patent.
The grant of a patent shall not be refused and a patent shall not be
invalidated on the ground that the sale of the patented product or of a
product obtained by means of a patented process is subject to restrictions
or limitations resulting from the domestic law.
A. (1) Importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has
been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union
shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights
conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases
where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent the said abuses. No proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of
a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the
grant of the first compulsory license.
(4) A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to
work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from
the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it
shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate
reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not be
transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with
that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.
(5) The foregoing provisions shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to
B. The protection of industrial designs shall not, under any circumstance,
the subject to any forfeiture, either by reason of failure to work or by
reason of the importation of articles corresponding to those which are
C. (1) If, in any country, use of the registered mark is compulsory, the
registration may be cancelled only after a reasonable period, and then only
if the person concerned does not justify his inaction.
(2) Use of a trademark by the proprietor in a form differing in elements
which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in
which it was registered in one of the countries of the Union shall not
entail invalidation of the registration and shall not diminish the
protection granted to the mark.
(3) Concurrent use of the same mark on identical or similar goods by
industrial or commercial establishments considered as co-proprietors of the
mark according to the provisions of the domestic law of the country where
protection is claimed shall not prevent registration or diminish in any way
the protection granted to the said mark in any country of the Union,
provided that such use does not result in misleading the public and is not
contrary to the public interest.
D. No indication or mention of the patent, of the utility model, of the
registration of the trademark, or of the deposit of the industrial design,
shall be required upon the goods as a condition of recognition of the right
(1) A period of grace of not less than six months shall be allowed for the
payment of the fees prescribed for the maintenance of industrial property
rights, subject, if the domestic legislation so provides, to the payment of
(2) The countries of the Union shall have the right to provide for the
restoration of patents which have lapsed by reason of non-payment of fees.
In any country of the Union the following shall not be considered as
infringements of the rights of a patentee:
1. the use on board vessels of other countries of the Union of devices
forming the subject of his patent in the body of the vessel, in the
machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories, when such vessels
temporarily or accidentally enter the waters of the said country,
provided that such devices are used there exclusively for the needs
of the vessel;
2. the use of devices forming the subject of the patent in the
construction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of other
countries of the Union, or of accessories of such aircraft or land
vehicles, when those aircraft or land vehicles temporarily or
accidentally enter the said country.
When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a
patent protecting a process of manufacture of the said product, the
patentee shall have all the rights, with regard to the imported product,
that are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of importation,
on the basis of the process patent, with respect to products manufactured
in that country.
Industrial designs shall be protected in all the countries of the Union.
(1) The conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be
determined in each country of the Union by its domestic legislation.
(2) However, an application for the registration of a mark filed by a
national of a country of the Union in any country of the Union may not be
refused, nor may a registration be invalidated, on the ground that filing,
registration, or renewal, has not been effected in the country of origin.
(3) A mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as
independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union,
including the country of origin.
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation
so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to
cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which
constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the
country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being
already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention
and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply
when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such
well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be
allowed for requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of
the Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the
prohibition of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.
A Article 6ter
(1) (a) The countries of the Union agree to refuse or to invalidate the
registration, and to prohibit by appropriate measures the use, without
authorization by the competent authorities, either as trademarks or as
elements of trademarks, of armorial bearings, flags, and other State
emblems, of the countries of the Union, official signs and hallmarks
indicating control and warranty adopted by them, and any imitation from a
heraldic point of view.
(b) The provisions of subparagraph (a), above, shall apply equally to
armorial bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, and names, of
international intergovernmental organizations of which one or more
countries of the Union are members, with the exception of armorial
bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, and names, that are already
the subject of international agreements in force, intended to ensure their
(c) No country of the Union shall be required to apply the provisions of
subparagraph (b), above, to the prejudice of the owners of rights acquired
in good faith before the entry into force, in that country, of this
Convention. The countries of the Union shall not be required to apply the
said provisions when the use or registration referred to in subparagraph
(a), above, is not of such a nature as to suggest to the public that a
connection exists between the organization concerned and the armorial
bearings, flags, emblems, abbreviations, and names, or if such use or
registration is probably not of such a nature as to mislead the public as
to the existence of a connection between the user and the organization.
(2) Prohibition of the use of official signs and hallmarks indicating
control and warranty shall apply solely in cases where the marks in which
they are incorporated are intended to be used on goods of the same or a
(3) (a) For the application of these provisions, the countries of the Union
agree to communicate reciprocally, through the intermediary of the
International Bureau, the list of State emblems, and official signs and
hallmarks indicating control and warranty, which they desire, or may
hereafter desire, to place wholly or within certain limits under the
protection of this Article, and all subsequent modifications of such list.
Each country of the Union shall in due course make available to the public
the lists so communicated.
Nevertheless such communication is not obligatory in respect of flags of
(b) The provisions of subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of this Article
shall apply only to such armorial bearings, flags, other emblems,
abbreviations, and names, of international intergovernmental organizations
as the latter have communicated to the countries of the Union through the
intermediary of the International Bureau.
(4) Any country of the Union may, within a period of twelve months from the
receipt of the notification, transmit its objections, if any, through the
intermediary of the International Bureau, to the country or international
intergovernmental organization concerned.
(5) In the case of State flags, the measures prescribed by paragraph (1),
above, shall apply solely to marks registered after November 6, 1925.
(6) In the case of State emblems other than flags, and of official signs
and hallmarks of the countries of the Union, and in the case of armorial
bearings, flags, other emblems, abbreviations, and names, of international
intergovernmental organizations, these provisions shall apply only to marks
registered more than two months after receipt of the communication provided
for in paragraph (3), above.
(7) In cases of bad faith, the countries shall have the right to cancel
even those marks incorporating State emblems, signs, and hallmarks, which
were registered before November 6, 1925.
(8) Nationals of any country who are authorized to make use of the State
emblems, signs, and hallmarks, of their country may use them even if they
are similar to those of another country.
(9) The countries of the Union undertake to prohibit the unauthorized use
in trade of the State armorial bearings of the other countries of the
Union, when the use is of such a nature as to be misleading as to the
origin of the goods.
(10) The above provisions shall not prevent the countries from exercising
the right given in paragraph (3) of Article 6quinquies, Section B, to
refuse or to invalidate the registration of marks incorporating, without
authorization, armorial bearings, flags, other State emblems, or official
signs and hallmarks adopted by a country of the Union, as well as the
distinctive signs of international intergovernmental organizations referred
to in paragraph (1), above.
(1) When, in accordance with the law of a country of the Union, the
assignment of mark is valid only if it takes place at the same time as the
transfer of the business or goodwill to which the mark belongs, it shall
suffice for the recognition of such validity that the portion of the
business or goodwill located in that country be transferred to the
assignee, together with the exclusive right to manufacture in the said
country, or to sell therein, the goods bearing the mark assigned.
(2) The foregoing provision does not impose upon the countries of the Union
any obligation to regard as valid the assignment of any mark the use of
which by the assignee would, in fact, be of such a nature as to mislead the
public, particularly as regards the origin, nature, or essential qualities,
of the goods to which the mark is applied.
A. (1) Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be
accepted for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the
Union, subject to the reservations indicated in this Article. Such
countries may, before proceeding to final registration, require the
production of a certificate of registration in the country of origin,
issued by the competent authority. No authentication shall be required for
(2) Shall be considered the country of origin the country of the Union
where the applicant has a real and effective industrial or commercial
establishment, or, if he has no such establishment within the Union, the
country of the Union where he has his domicile, or, if he has no domicile
within the Union but is a national of a country of the Union, the country
of which he is a national.
B. Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration
nor invalidated except in the following cases:
1. when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by
third parties in the country where protection is claimed;
2. when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to
designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place
of origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or have become
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established
practices of the trade of the country where protection is claimed;
3. when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in
particular, of such a nature as to deceive the public. It is
understood that a mark may not be considered contrary to public order
for the sole reason that it does not conform to a provision of the
legislation on marks, except if such provision itself relates to
This provision is subject, however, to the application of Article 10bis.
C. (1) In determining whether a mark is eligible for protection, all the
factual circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly the
length of time the mark has been in use.
(2) No trademark shall be refused in the other countries of the Union for
the sole reason that it differs from the mark protected in the country of
origin only in respect of elements that do not alter its distinctive
character and do not affect its identity in the form in which it has been
registered in the said country of origin.
D. No person may benefit from the provisions of this Article if the mark
for which he claims protection is not registered in the country of origin.
E. However, in no case shall the renewal of the registration of the mark in
the country of origin involve an obligation to renew the registration in
the other countries of the Union in which the mark has been registered.
F. The benefit of priority shall remain unaffected for applications for the
registration of marks filed within the period fixed by Article 4, even if
registration in the country of origin is effected after the expiration of
The countries of the Union undertake to protect service marks. They shall
not be required to provide for the registration of such marks.
(1) If the agent or representative of the person who is the proprietor of a
mark in one of the countries of the Union applies, without such
proprietor's authorization, for the registration of the mark in his own
name, in one or more countries of the Union, the proprietor shall be
entitled to oppose the registration applied for or demand its cancellation
or, if the law of the country so allows, the assignment in his favor of the
said registration, unless such agent or representative justifies his
(2) The proprietor of the mark shall, subject to the provisions of
paragraph (1), above, be entitled to oppose the use of his mark by his
agent or representative if he has not authorized such use.
(3) Domestic legislation may provide an equitable time limit within which
the proprietor of a mark must exercise the rights provided for in this
The nature of the goods to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no
case form an obstacle to the registration of the mark.
(1) The countries of the Union undertake to accept for filing and to
protect collective marks belonging to associations the existence of which
is not contrary to the law of the country of origin, even if such
associations do not possess an industrial or commercial establishment.
(2) Each country shall be the judge of the particular conditions under
which a collective mark shall be protected and may refuse protection if the
mark is contrary to the public interest.
(3) Nevertheless, the protection of these marks shall not be refused to any
association the existence of which is not contrary to the law of the
country of origin, on the ground that such association is not established
in the country where protection is sought or is not constituted according
to the law of the latter country.
A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without
the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of a
(1) All goods unlawfully bearing a trademark or trade name shall be seized
on importation into those countries of the Union where such mark or trade
name is entitled to legal protection.
(2) Seizure shall likewise be effected in the country where the unlawful
affixation occurred or in the country into which the goods were imported.
(3) Seizure shall take place at the request of the public prosecutor, or
any other competent authority, or any interested party, whether a natural
person or a legal entity, in conformity with the domestic legislation of
(4) The authorities shall not be bound to effect seizure of goods in
(5) If the legislation of a country does not permit seizure on importation,
seizure shall be replaced by prohibition of importation or by seizure
inside the country.
(6) If the legislation of a country permits neither seizure on importation
nor prohibition of importation nor seizure inside the country, then, until
such time as the legislation is modified accordingly, these measures shall
be replaced by the actions and remedies available in such cases to
nationals under the law of such country.
(1) The provisions of the preceding Article shall apply in cases of direct
or indirect use of a false indication of the source of the goods or the
identity of the producer, manufacturer, or merchant.
(2) Any producer, manufacturer, or merchant, whether a natural person or a
legal entity, engaged in the production or manufacture of or trade in such
goods and established either in the locality falsely indicated as the
source, or in the region where such locality is situated, or in the country
falsely indicated, or in the country where the false indication of source
is used, shall in any case be deemed an interested party.
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such
countries effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means
whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to
discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or
commercial activities, of a competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is
liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing
process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or
the quantity, of the goods.
(1) The countries of the Union undertake to assure to nationals of the
other countries of the Union appropriate legal remedies effectively to
repress all the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10, and 10bis.
(2) They undertake, further, to provide measures to permit federations and
associations representing interested industrialists, producers, or
merchants, provided that the existence of such federations and associations
is not contrary to the laws of their countries, to take action in the
courts or before the administrative authorities, with a view to the
repression of the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10, and 10bis, in so far
as the law of the country in which protection is claimed allows such action
by federations and associations of that country.
(1) The countries of the Union shall, in conformity with their domestic
legislation, grant temporary protection to patentable inventions, utility
models, industrial designs, and trademarks, in respect of goods exhibited
at official or officially recognized international exhibitions held in the
territory of any of them.
(2) Such temporary protection shall not extend the periods provided by
Article 4. If, later, the right of priority is invoked, the authorities of
any country may provide that the period shall start from the date of
introduction of the goods into the exhibition.
(3) Each country may require, as proof of the identity of the article
exhibited and of the date of its introduction, such documentary evidence as
it considers necessary.
(1) Each country of the Union undertakes to establish a special industrial
property service and a central office for the communication to the public
of patents, utility models, industrial designs, and trademarks.
(2) This service shall publish an official periodical journal. It shall
(a) the names of the proprietors of patents granted, with a brief
designation of the inventions patented;
(b) the reproductions of registered trademarks.
(1) (a) The Union shall have an Assembly consisting of those countries of
the Union which are bound by Articles 13 to 17.
(b) The Government of each country shall be represented by one delegate,
who may be assisted by alternate delegates, advisors, and experts.
(c) The expenses of each delegation shall be borne by the Government which
has appointed it.
(2) (a) The Assembly shall:
(i) deal with all matters concerning the maintenance and development of
the Union and the implementation of this Convention;
(ii) give directions concerning the preparation for conferences of
revision to the International Bureau of Intellectual Property
(hereinafter designated as "the International Bureau") referred to in
the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization (hereinafter designated as "the Organization"), due
account being taken of any comments made by those countries of the
Union which are not bound by Articles 13 to 17;
(iii)review and approve the reports and activities of the Director General
of the Organization concerning the Union, and give him all necessary
instructions concerning matters within the competence of the Union;
(iv) elect the members of the Executive Committee of the Assembly;
(v) review and approve the reports and activities of its Executive
Committee, and give instructions to such Committee;
(vi) determine the program and adopt the triennial budget of the Union,
and approve its final accounts;
(vii) adopt the financial regulations of the Union;
(viii)establish such committees of experts and working groups as it deems
appropriate to achieve the objectives of the Union;
(ix) determine which countries not members of the Union and which
intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations
shall be admitted to its meetings as observers;
(x) adopt amendments to Articles 13 to 17;
(xi) take any other appropriate action designed to further the objectives
of the Union;
(xii)perform such other functions as are appropriate under this
(xiii) subject to its acceptance, exercise such rights as are given to it
in the Convention establishing the Organization.
(b) With respect to matters which are of interest also to other Unions
administered by the Organization, the Assembly shall make its decisions
after having heard the advice of the Coordination Committee of the
(3) (a) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b), a delegate may
represent one country only.
(b) Countries of the Union grouped under the terms of a special agreement
in a common office possessing for each of them the character of a special
national service of industrial property as referred to in Article 12 may be
jointly represented during discussions by one of their number.
(4) (a) Each country member of the Assembly shall have one vote.
(b) One-half of the countries members of the Assembly shall constitute a
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b), if, in any session,
the number of countries represented is less than one half but equal to or
more than one third of the countries members of the Assembly, the Assembly
may make decisions but, with the exception of decisions concerning its own
procedure, all such decisions shall take effect only if the conditions set
forth hereinafter are fulfilled. The International Bureau shall communicate
the said decisions to the countries members of the Assembly which were not
represented and shall invite them to express in writing their vote or
abstention within a period of three months from the date of the
communication. If, at the expiration of this period, the number of
countries having thus expressed their vote or abstention attains the number
of countries which was lacking for attaining the quorum in the session
itself, such decisions shall take effect provided that at the same time the
required majority still obtains.
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 17 (2), the decisions of the
Assembly shall require two thirds of the votes cast.
(e) Abstentions shall not be considered as votes.
(5) (a) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b), a delegate may vote
in the name of one country only.
(b) The countries of the Union referred to in paragraph (3) (b) shall, as a
general rule, endeavor to send their own delegations to the sessions of the
Assembly. If, however, for exceptional reasons, any such country cannot
send its own delegation, it may give to the delegation of another such
country the power to vote in its name, provided that each delegation may
vote by proxy for one country only. Such power to vote shall be granted in
a document signed by the Head of State or the competent Minister.
(6) Countries of the Union not members of the Assembly shall be admitted to
the meetings of the latter as observers.
(7) (a) The Assembly shall meet once in every third calendar year in
ordinary session upon convocation by the Director General and, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, during the same period and at the
same place as the General Assembly of the Organization.
(b) The Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session upon convocation by
the Director General, at the request of the Executive Committee or at the
request of one fourth of the countries members of the Assembly.
(8) The Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
(1) The Assembly shall have an Executive Committee.
(2) (a) The Executive Committee shall consist of countries elected by the
Assembly from among countries members of the Assembly. Furthermore, the
country on whose territory the Organization has its headquarters shall,
subject to the provisions of Article 16 (7) (b), have an ex officio seat on
(b) The Government of each country member of the Executive Committee shall
be represented by one delegate, who may be assisted by alternate delegates,
advisors, and experts.
(c) The expenses of each delegation shall be borne by the Government which
has appointed it.
(3) The number of countries members of the Executive Committee shall
correspond to one fourth of the number of countries members of the
Assembly. In establishing the number of seats to be filled, remainders
after division by four shall be disregarded.
(4) In electing the members of the Executive Committee, the Assembly shall
have due regard to an equitable geographical distribution and to the need
for countries party to the Special Agreements established in relation with
the Union to be among the countries constituting the Executive Committee.
(5) (a) Each member of the Executive Committee shall serve from the close
of the session of the Assembly which elected it to the close of the next
ordinary session of the Assembly.
(b) Members of the Executive Committee may be re-elected, but only up to a
maximum of two thirds of such members.
(c) The Assembly shall establish the details of the rules governing the
election and possible re-election of the members of the Executive
(6) (a) The Executive Committee shall:
(i) prepare the draft agenda of the Assembly;
(ii) submit proposals to the Assembly in respect of the draft program and
triennial budget of the Union prepared by the Director General;
(iii)approve, within the limits of the program and the triennial budget,
the specific yearly budgets and programs prepared by the Director
(iv) submit, with appropriate comments, to the Assembly the periodical
reports of the Director General and the yearly audit reports on the
(v) take all necessary measures to ensure the execution of the program of
the Union by the Director General, in accordance with the decisions
of the Assembly and having regard to circumstances arising between
two ordinary sessions of the Assembly;
(vi) perform such other functions as are allocated to it under this
(b) With respect to matters which are of interest also to other Unions
administered by the Organization, the Executive Committee shall make its
decisions after having heard the advice of the Coordination Committee of
(7) (a) The Executive Committee shall meet once a year in ordinary session
upon convocation by the Director General, preferably during the same period
and at the same place as the Coordination Committee of the Organization.
(b) The Executive Committee shall meet in extraordinary session upon
convocation by the Director General, either on his own initiative, or at
the request of its Chairman or one fourth of its members.
(8) (a) Each country member of the Executive Committee shall have one vote.
(b) One-half of the members of the Executive Committee shall constitute a
(c) Decisions shall be made by a simple majority of the votes cast.
(d) Abstentions shall not be considered as votes.
(e) A delegate may represent, and vote in the name of, one country only.
(9) Countries of the Union not members of the Executive Committee shall be
admitted to its meetings as observers.
(10) The Executive Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
(1) (a) Administrative tasks concerning the Union shall be performed by the
International Bureau, which is a continuation of the Bureau of the Union
united with the Bureau of the Union established by the International
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
(b) In particular, the International Bureau shall provide the secretariat
of the various organs of the Union.
(c) The Director General of the Organization shall be the chief executive
of the Union and shall represent the Union.
(2) The International Bureau shall assemble and publish information
concerning the protection of industrial property. Each country of the Union
shall promptly communicate to the International Bureau all new laws and
official texts concerning the protection of industrial property.
Furthermore, it shall furnish the International Bureau with all the
publications of its industrial property service of direct concern to the
protection of industrial property which the International Bureau may find
useful in its work.
(3) The International Bureau shall publish a monthly periodical.
(4) The International Bureau shall, on request, furnish any country of the
Union with information on matters concerning the protection of industrial
(5) The International Bureau shall conduct studies, and shall provide
services, designed to facilitate the protection of industrial property.
(6) The Director General and any staff member designated by him shall
participate, without the right to vote, in all meetings of the Assembly,
the Executive Committee, and any other committee of experts or working
group. The Director General, or a staff member designated by him, shall be
ex officio secretary of these bodies.
(7) (a) The International Bureau shall, in accordance with the directions
of the Assembly and in cooperation with the Executive Committee, make the
preparations for the conferences of revision of the provisions of the
Convention other than Articles 13 to 17.
(b) The International Bureau may consult with intergovernmental and
international non-governmental organizations concerning preparations for
conferences of revision.
(c) The Director General and persons designated by him shall take part,
without the right to vote, in the discussions at these conferences.
(8) The International Bureau shall carry out any other tasks assigned to
(1) (a) The Union shall have a budget.
(b) The budget of the Union shall include the income and expenses proper to
the Union, its contribution to the budget of expenses common to the Unions,
and, where applicable, the sum made available to the budget of the
Conference of the Organization.
(c) Expenses not attributable exclusively to the Union but also to one or
more other Unions administered by the Organization shall be considered as
expenses common to the Unions. The share of the Union in such common
expenses shall be in proportion to the interest the Union has in them.
(2) The budget of the Union shall be established with due regard to the
requirements of coordination with the budgets of the other Unions
administered by the Organization.
(3) The budget of the Union shall be financed from the following sources:
(i) contributions of the countries of the Union;
(ii) fees and charges due for services rendered by the International
Bureau in relation to the Union;
(iii)sale of, or royalties on, the publications of the International
Bureau concerning the Union;
(iv) gifts, bequests, and subventions;
(v) rents, interests, and other miscellaneous income.
(4) (a) For the purpose of establishing its contribution towards the
budget, each country of the Union shall belong to a class, and shall pay
its annual contributions on the basis of a number of units fixed as
Class I 25
Class II 20
Class III 15
Class IV 10
Class V 5
Class VI 3
Class VII 1
(b) Unless it has already done so, each country shall indicate,
concurrently with depositing its instrument of ratification or accession,
the class to which it wishes to belong. Any country may change class. If it
chooses a lower class, the country must announce such change to the
Assembly at one of its ordinary sessions. Any such change shall take effect
at the beginning of the calendar year following the said session.
(c) The annual contribution of each country shall be an amount in the same
proportion to the total sum to be contributed to the budget of the Union by
all countries as the number of its units is to the total of the units of
all contributing countries.
(d) Contributions shall become due on the first of January of each year.
(e) A country which is in arrears in the payment of its contributions may
not exercise its right to vote in any of the organs of the Union of which
it is a member if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of
the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. However,
any organ of the Union may allow such a country to continue to exercise its
right to vote in that organ if, and as long as, it is satisfied that the
delay in payment is due to exceptional and unavoidable circumstances.
(f) If the budget is not adopted before the beginning of a new financial
period, it shall be at the same level as the budget of the previous year,
as provided in the financial regulations.
(5) The amount of the fees and charges due for services rendered by the
International Bureau in relation to the Union shall be established, and
shall be reported to the Assembly and the Executive Committee, by the
(6) (a) The Union shall have a working capital fund which shall be
constituted by a single payment made by each country of the Union. If the
fund becomes insufficient, the Assembly shall decide to increase it.
(b) The amount of the initial payment of each country to the said fund or
of its participation in the increase thereof shall be a proportion of the
contribution of that country for the year in which the fund is established
or the decision to increase it is made.
(c) The proportion and the terms of payment shall be fixed by the Assembly
on the proposal of the Director General and after it has heard the advice
of the Coordination Committee of the Organization.
(7) (a) In the headquarters agreement concluded with the country on the
territory of which the Organization has its headquarters, it shall be
provided that, whenever the working capital fund is insufficient, such
country shall grant advances. The amount of these advances and the
conditions on which they are granted shall be the subject of separate
agreements, in each case, between such country and the Organization. As
long as it remains under the obligation to grant advances, such country
shall have an ex officio seat on the Executive Committee.
(b) The country referred to in subparagraph (a) and the Organization shall
each have the right to denounce the obligation to grant advances, by
written notification. Denunciation shall take effect three years after the
end of the year in which it has been notified.
(8) The auditing of the accounts shall be effected by one or more of the
countries of the Union or by external auditors, as provided in the
financial regulations. They shall be designated, with their agreement, by
(1) Proposals for the amendment of Articles 13, 14, 15, 16, and the present
Article, may be initiated by any country member of the Assembly, by the
Executive Committee, or by the Director General. Such proposals shall be
communicated by the Director General to the member countries of the
Assembly at least six months in advance of their consideration by the
(2) Amendments to the Articles referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
adopted by the Assembly. Adoption shall require three fourths of the votes
cast, provided that any amendment to Article 13, and to the present
paragraph, shall require four fifths of the votes cast.
(3) Any amendment to the Articles referred to in paragraph (1) shall enter
into force one month after written notifications of acceptance, effected in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes, have been
received by the Director General from three fourths of the countries
members of the Assembly at the time it adopted the amendment. Any amendment
to the said Articles thus accepted shall bind all the countries which are
members of the Assembly at the time the amendment enters into force, or
which become members thereof at a subsequent date, provided that any
amendment increasing the financial obligations of countries of the Union
shall bind only those countries which have notified their acceptance of
(1) This Convention shall be submitted to revision with a view to the
introduction of amendments designed to improve the system of the Union.
(2) For that purpose, conferences shall be held successively in one of the
countries of the Union among the delegates of the said countries.
(3) Amendments to Articles 13 to 17 are governed by the provisions of
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve the right to make
separately between themselves special agreements for the protection of
industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the
provisions of this Convention.
(1) (a) Any country of the Union which has signed this Act may ratify it,
and, if it has not signed it, may accede to it. Instruments of ratification
and accession shall be deposited with the Director General.
(b) Any country of the Union may declare in its instrument of ratification
or accession that its ratification or accession shall not apply:
(i) to Articles 1 to 12, or
(ii) to Articles 13 to 17.
(c) Any country of the Union which, in accordance with subparagraph (b),
has excluded from the effects of its ratification or accession one of the
two groups of Articles referred to in that subparagraph may at any later
time declare that it extends the effects of its ratification or accession
to that group of Articles. Such declaration shall be deposited with the
(2) (a) Articles 1 to 12 shall enter into force, with respect to the first
ten countries of the Union which have deposited instruments of ratification
or accession without making the declaration permitted under paragraph (1)
(b) (i), three months after the deposit of the tenth such instrument of
ratification or accession.
(b) Articles 13 to 17 shall enter into force, with respect to the first ten
countries of the Union which have deposited instruments of ratification or
accession without making the declaration permitted under paragraph (1) (b)
(ii), three months after the deposit of the tenth such instrument of
ratification or accession.
(c) Subject to the initial entry into force, pursuant to the provisions of
subparagraphs (a) and (b), of each of the two groups of Articles referred
to in paragraph (1) (b) (i) and (ii), and subject to the provisions of
paragraph (1) (b), Articles 1 to 17 shall, with respect to any country of
the Union, other than those referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b), which
deposits an instrument of ratification or accession or any country of the
Union which deposits a declaration pursuant to paragraph (1) (c), enter
into force three months after the date of notification by the Director
General of such deposit, unless a subsequent date has been indicated in the
instrument or declaration deposited. In the latter case, this Act shall
enter into force with respect to that country on the date thus indicated.
(3) With respect to any country of the Union which deposits an instrument
of ratification or accession, Articles 18 to 30 shall enter into force on
the earlier of the dates on which any of the groups of Articles referred to
in paragraph (1) (b) enters into force with respect to that country
pursuant to paragraph (2) (a), (b), or (c).
(1) Any country outside the Union may accede to this Act and thereby become
a member of the Union. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
(2) (a) With respect to any country outside the Union which deposits its
instrument of accession one month or more before the date of entry into
force of any provisions of the present Act, this Act shall enter into
force, unless a subsequent date has been indicated in the instrument of
accession, on the date upon which provisions first enter into force
pursuant to Article 20(2) (a) or (b); provided that:
(i) if Articles 1 to 12 do not enter into force on that date, such
country shall, during the interim period before the entry into force
of such provisions, and in substitution therefor, be bound by
Articles 1 to 12 of the Lisbon Act,
(ii) if Articles 13 to 17 do not enter into force on that date, such
country shall, during the interim period before the entry into force
of such provisions, and in substitution therefor, be bound by
Articles 13 and 14(3), (4), and (5), of the Lisbon Act.
If a country indicates a subsequent date in its instrument of accession,
this Act shall enter into force with respect to that country on the date
(b) With respect to any country outside the Union which deposits its
instrument of accession on a date which is subsequent to, or precedes by
less than one month, the entry into force of one group of Articles of the
present Act, this Act shall, subject to the proviso of subparagraph (a),
enter into force three months after the date on which its accession has
been notified by the Director General, unless a subsequent date has been
indicated in the instrument of accession. In the latter case, this Act
shall enter into force with respect to that country on the date thus
(3) With respect to any country outside the Union which deposits its
instrument of accession after the date of entry into force of the present
Act in its entirety, or less than one month before such date, this Act
shall enter into force three months after the date on which its accession
has been notified by the Director General, unless a subsequent date has
been indicated in the instrument of accession. In the latter case, this Act
shall enter into force with respect to that country on the date thus
Subject to the possibilities of exceptions provided for in Articles 20 (1)
(b) and 28(2), ratification or accession shall automatically entail
acceptance of all the clauses and admission to all the advantages of this
After the entry into force of this Act in its entirety, a country may not
accede to earlier Acts of this Convention.
(1) Any country may declare in its instrument of ratification or accession,
or may inform the Director General by written notification any time
thereafter, that this Convention shall be applicable to all or part of
those territories, designated in the declaration or notification, for the
external relations of which it is responsible.
(2) Any country which has made such a declaration or given such a
notification may, at any time, notify the Director General that this
Convention shall cease to be applicable to all or part of such territories.
(3) (a) Any declaration made under paragraph (1) shall take effect on the
same date as the ratification or accession in the instrument of which it
was included, and any notification given under such paragraph shall take
effect three months after its notification by the Director General.
(b) Any notification given under paragraph (2) shall take effect twelve
months after its receipt by the Director General.
(1) Any country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance
with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application of
(2) It is understood that, at the time a country deposits its instrument of
ratification or accession, it will be in a position under its domestic law
to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.
(1) This Convention shall remain in force without limitation as to time.
(2) Any country may denounce this Act by notification addressed to the
Director General. Such denunciation shall constitute also denunciation of
all earlier Acts and shall affect only the country making it, the
Convention remaining in full force and effect as regards the other
countries of the Union.
(3) Denunciation shall take effect one year after the day on which the
Director General has received the notification.
(4) The right of denunciation provided by this Article shall not be
exercised by any country before the expiration of five years from the date
upon which it becomes a member of the Union.
(1) The present Act shall, as regards the relations between the countries
to which it applies, and to the extent that it applies, replace the
Convention of Paris of March 20, 1883, and the subsequent Acts of revision.
(2) (a) As regards the countries to which the present Act does not apply,
or does not apply in its entirety, but to which the Lisbon Act of October
31, 1958, applies, the latter shall remain in force in its entirety or to
the extent that the present Act does not replace it by virtue of paragraph
(b) Similarly, as regards the countries to which neither the present Act,
nor portions thereof, nor the Lisbon Act applies, the London Act of June 2,
1934 shall remain in force in its entirety or to the extent that the
present Act does not replace it by virtue of paragraph (1).
(c) Similarly, as regards the countries to which neither the present Act,
nor portions thereof, nor the Lisbon Act, nor the London Act applies, the
Hague Act of November 6, 1925, shall remain in force in its entirety or to
the extent that the present Act does not replace it by virtue of paragraph
(3) Countries outside the Union which become party to this Act shall apply
it with respect to any country of the Union not party to this Act or which,
although party to this Act, has made a declaration pursuant to Article 20
(1) (b) (i). Such countries recognize that the said country of the Union
may apply, in its relations with them, the provisions of the most recent
Act to which it is party.
(1) Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention, not settled by
negotiation, may, by any one of the countries concerned, be brought before
the International Court of Justice by application in conformity with the
Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree on some other
method of settlement. The country bringing the dispute before the Court
shall inform the International Bureau; the International Bureau shall bring
the matter to the attention of the other countries of the Union.
(2) Each country may, at the time it signs this Act or deposits its
instrument of ratification or accession, declare that it does not consider
itself bound by the provisions of paragraph (1). With regard to any dispute
between such country and any other country of the Union, the provisions of
paragraph (1) shall not apply.
(3) Any country having made a declaration in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (2) may, at any time, withdraw its declaration by notification
addressed to the Director General.
(1) (a) This Act shall be signed in a single copy in the French language
and shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden.
(b) Official texts shall be established by the Director General, after
consultation with the interested Governments, in the English, German,
Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish languages, and such other
languages as the Assembly may designate.
(c) In case of differences of opinion on the interpretation of the various
texts, the French text shall prevail.
(2) This Act shall remain open for signature at Stockholm until January 13,
(3) The Director General shall transmit two copies, certified by the
Government of Sweden, of the signed text of this Act to the Governments of
all countries of the Union and, on request, to the Government of any other
(4) The Director General shall register this Act with the Secretariat of
the United Nations.
(5) The Director General shall notify the Governments of all countries of
the Union of signatures, deposits of instruments of ratification or
accession and any declarations included in such instruments or made
pursuant to Article 20 (1) (c), entry into force of any provisions of this
Act, notifications of denunciation, and notifications pursuant to Article
(1) Until the first Director General assumes office, references in this Act
to the International Bureau of the Organization or to the Director General
shall be deemed to be references to the Bureau of the Union or its
(2) Countries of the Union not bound by Articles 13 to 17 may, until five
years after the entry into force of the Convention establishing the
Organization, exercise, if they so desire, the rights provided under
Articles 13 to 17 of this Act as if they were bound by those Articles. Any
country desiring to exercise such rights shall give written notification to
that effect to the Director General; such notification shall be effective
from the date of its receipt. Such countries shall be deemed to be members
of the Assembly until the expiration of the said period.
(3) As long as all the countries of the Union have not become Members of
the Organization, the International Bureau of the Organization shall also
function as the Bureau of the Union, and the Director General as the
Director of the said Bureau.
(4) Once all the countries of the Union have become Members of the
Organization, the rights, obligations, and property, of the Bureau of the
Union shall devolve on the International Bureau of the Organization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have
signed this Act.
DONE at Stockholm, on July 14, 1967.
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:29 PM
WATER is the most abundant substance on the Earth’s surface, and its properties have a profound effect on the ocean’s chemical, physical, and biological makeup. To understand the behavior of the ocean we need to understand sea water. In this unit we start with the oceanic processes dominated by incoming solar radiation.
1–1. Thermal Characteristics
Most people live within a few hundred miles of the sea, and all of us live within the ocean’s influence. The ocean provides us with recreation and food, receives our wastes, and serves as our global highway. It is the source from which the atmosphere draws its water. It stores, and later releases, much of the solar energy that powers the winds and causes our weather. By contrasting the large daily temperature changes of an inland desert with the limited temperature range in a coastal climate, we see how deeply the ocean influences our lives.
The unique properties of water are attributed to its molecular structure. Two-hydrogen atoms are combined with one oxygen atom. (NOTE: Both hydrogen atoms share the single electron of the oxygen atom, and are attached at a 105 degree angle to the oxygen atom.) The oxygen side carries a negative charge, the hydrogen side is positively charged. This positive and negative characteristic causes it to be dipolar. The dipolar nature of water gives it solvent properties, surface tension, and high specific heat value.
· Solvent properties–the ability to dissolve other substances.
· Surface tension–the ability to support heavier objects.
· Specific heat–the ability to absorb great amounts of heat.
Lowering the temperature causes the molecular structure to shrink and align in six-sided rings. These rings form the crystal structure of ice. (NOTE: This open network of molecules causes the expansion of water when it changes state from liquid to frozen.) Density increases with depth due to the combined effects of decreasing temperature, increasing salinity and pressure.
400. Heating of the ocean
We know the major source of heat for the oceans is the Sun. However, the amount of heat energy received, absorbed, and retained by a particular portion of the ocean depends on many things.
The Earth’s curvature causes solar heat energy to be unevenly dispersed. In lower latitudes, the Suns rays generally strike the ocean more perpendicular to its surface. This decreases the area they cover, and increase their ability to heat the ocean. At higher latitudes, sunshine strikes the ocean less perpendicular to its surface. This increases the area it covers, and decreases its ability to heat the ocean.
The percent of the Sun’s electromagnetic energy (all wavelengths) reflected by the surface of an object back into space is known as albedo. The albedo of water varies with the angle of incidence. The albedo for water is 100 percent when the Sun is very low on the horizon, and decreases to 2 percent when the Sun is directly overhead. This decrease is not linear. After the Sun is more than 25 percent above the horizon, the albedo is less than 10 percent. The angle of incidence varies with the latitude of the water surface, the season of the year, and the time of day. Generally, the albedo of water is quite low. The albedo of the ocean varies in some parts of the world due to prolonged periods of cloud cover, large areas of sea ice, and intense atmospheric pollution.
Water is essentially opaque to all electromagnetic radiation except visible light and extremely low frequency (ELF) radio waves. Most energy coming to the Earth from the Sun is in the visible to infrared (IR) portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Most heat energy is in the IR portion, and water is nearly opaque to it. Most IR energy is absorbed by water before reaching a depth of one meter, so most of the Sun’s heat energy is absorbed at or near the ocean surface. Visible light and ELF radio waves do not play a significant role in heating the ocean’s surface.
The daily input of solar energy is quickly mixed through near-surface waters by wind-induced wave action. Since the heat gained is spread throughout the upper layer of water, it is not easily lost after sunset. This mixing also prevents the ocean surface temperature from rising significantly during the day. On land, the heat can not penetrate below the surface, so it is quickly lost after sunset.
The amount of heat needed to raise the temperature of one gram of a substance 1C° is called specific heat. Several times as much heat is required to raise the temperature of water 1°C than is necessary to raise the temperature of an equal mass of granite. You may notice this difference on a summer day at the beach. The ground becomes hot during the day and cools quickly at night, but water temperatures change very little over a 24-hour period. The specific heat of sea water decreases slightly as salinity increases. The ocean’s capacity to store heat is much greater than that of land due to the high specific heat of water. Therefore, ocean water can absorb and release large amounts of heat and yet change temperature very little. This, in part, accounts for the land having a much greater temperature range than the sea, which results in monsoons and the familiar land and sea breezes of Tropical and temperate regions.
401. Cooling the ocean
Heat is lost from the ocean surface night and day, and in all seasons, by three processes.
The absorbed short-wave solar heat energy increases the water temperature. The warm water then radiates long-wave radiation back out to space. This is the same process commonly seen on land. About 40 percent of the heat received by oceans is lost to outer space by this process.
The ocean surface is usually about 1°C warmer than the overlying atmosphere. Since the ocean and atmosphere are in contact at the air-ocean interface, heat energy passes from the warmer ocean to the colder atmosphere. About 10 percent of ocean cooling is through this process.
Since the ocean is normally warmer than the overlying atmosphere, there is a natural tendency for water to evaporate. The evaporated water (water vapor) absorbs heat energy from the atmosphere and ocean below to obtain the needed energy to change from liquid to gas. About 50 percent of ocean heat loss is due to evaporation of water. When the water vapor condenses and falls as precipitation, the atmosphere gains heat from the process of condensation. This results in a net temperature gain for the atmosphere because only a portion of the evaporative cooling was atmospheric.
402. Heat budget
The temperature balance established in the ocean between heat gain and heat loss mechanisms is known as heat budget. For the entire world’s ocean, heat gained equals heat lost. Therefore the ocean’s temperature remains relatively constant. Temperatures at specific places around the world depend on whether there is a net heat gain or loss at that specific location. Large ocean currents and prevailing wind patterns transport, or redistribute, large amounts of energy around the world’s oceans.
Due to the high specific heat of water, ocean temperatures do not vary nearly as much as land mass temperatures at the same latitude. Diurnal temperature variations in the open ocean average 0.2° to 0.3° C. Absolute temperature variations are much smaller than those normally found on land.
The Oceanographic Thermal Equator is a direct reflection of the ocean’s ability to balance temperature. It is located between 5 and 10 degrees North latitude, near, but not coincident with, the thermal equator for the following reasons. More water exists in the Southern Hemisphere (81 percent is covered by water) than in the Northern Hemisphere (61 percent is covered by water). The high specific heat of water allows the Southern Hemisphere to absorb a great deal of heat without a corresponding large temperature increase. The large ice covered continent of Antarctica acts as a cooling mechanism for the entire Southern Hemisphere. The mass transport of water with varying temperatures is accomplished by currents. If there were no surface currents, the sea-surface temperatures would parallel latitude lines.
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:31 PM
The Ocean Body
Just as the air of one region of Earth can differ in its makeup from that of another region, so can sea water. For example, the water around Antarctica differs from that of the mid-latitudes and the Tropics, and water found at the ocean surface differs from that found at or near the bottom. The differences found in sea water are related to sea water properties. It is the sea water properties that are used to classify water masses. In this lesson, we will cover various sea water properties, the three-layer ocean model as it relates to the property of temperature, the water masses of the world’s oceans and land and sea ice.
403. Properties of sea water
The properties of sea water have long been a concern to the oceanographer. Whether studying the physical ocean (topography, currents, tides, etc.) or the biological ocean (animal, plant and fish life) they have always been concerned about the properties of sea water and the result of changes to those properties. Since nearly three-quarters of our Earth is covered by water, it’s only logical that changes in the ocean will eventually affect our weather.
Temperature, pressure, and salinity are the three most important properties of sea water, and they determine the other physical properties associated with sea water. This differs from pure water, where only pressure and temperature determine the physical properties. Wave motion and the presence of small suspended particles in sea water are also important variables that affect the properties of sea water. Wave motion causes a change in the processes of chemical diffusion, heat conduction, and transfer of momentum from one layer to another. The suspended particles increase the scattering of radiation, thereby absorbing more radiation than a similar layer (thickness) of pure water. The variables of wave motion and suspended particles, although important, cannot be measured.
Besides temperature, pressure, and salinity, other common physical properties of sea water are water color, transparency, ice and sound velocity. Some of the lesser known properties include specific heat, compressibility, osmotic pressure, eddy viscosity, electrical conductivity, radioactivity, and surface tension. Many of the lesser known properties can only be determined using complex mathematical calculation and formulation that incorporates data on one or mole of the common physical properties, especially temperature, pressure, and/or salinity.
Temperature is the most important property of sea water. The ocean, like the atmosphere, is heated by the Sun’s incoming radiation. In all latitudes the ice-free portions of oceans receive a surplus of radiation. Some of this heat is given up to the atmosphere, and some of it is retained. Because the sea retains a portion of this heat, the sea-surface temperature (SST) is normally higher than the air temperature. However this is true only when average conditions are considered. Whether the sea surface is warmer or colder than the air above it at any particular moment depends on the locality, the season of the year, the character of the atmospheric circulation and the character of the ocean currents.
The temperature of the ocean ranges from about –2°C to 30°C. Ocean water that is nearly surrounded by land may have higher temperatures, but the open sea, where the water is free to move about, hardly ever heats above 30°C. Here, the ocean currents distribute the heat and tend to equalize the temperature. Deep and bottom water temperatures are always low, varying between 4°C and 1°C.
SSTs change from day to night just like those of the atmosphere, but to a much lesser degree. The diurnal variation of SST in the open ocean is on the average only 0.2°C to 0.3°C. The greatest diurnal variation takes place in the Tropics, with lesser variation at higher latitudes. The range of diurnal variation depends on the amount of cloudiness and the direction and speed of the wind.
The smallest seasonal temperature variation of surface water occurs in equatorial and polar regions. The largest seasonal temperature variation occurs in the mid-latitudes (±2° Celsius from the monthly mean). In areas where warm and cold currents meet, surface temperatures may differ by 4°C. The absolute maximum is about 32°C in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf in summer with an absolute minimum of about –2°C in the polar region during the winter.
The annual variation of SST in any region depends on the variation of incoming radiation, the character of the ocean currents, and the character of the atmospheric circulation. The annual range of surface temperatures is much greater over the oceans of the Northern Hemisphere than those of the Southern Hemisphere. This wider range of temperatures appears to be associated with the character of the prevailing winds, particularly the cold winds blowing from the continents. On the other hand, the annual range of ocean temperatures in the Southern Hemisphere is most definitely related to the range of incoming solar radiation, because of the absence of large land masses south of 45°S. Here, the prevailing winds travel almost entirely over water. This causes a greater degree of consistency in the annual SST patterns and a much smaller annual temperature range compared to the northern Hemisphere.
The temperatures near the Equator experience a semiannual variation. This corresponds to the twice yearly passage of the Sun’s most direct rays across the Equator.
The annual variation of temperature in subsurface layers depends on several additional factors–namely, the variation in the amount of heat that is directly absorbed at different depths, the effect of heat conduction, the variation in currents related to lateral displacement, and the effect of vertical motion. Diurnal temperature variations in subsurface layers are largely unknown. What we do know is that they are extremely small.
Vertical temperature distribution
As we move away from the upper layer of the ocean surface, where the heat from the Sun is stored, and toward the ocean floor, the temperature of the ocean drops (fig. 1–1). This gives us the vertical temperature distribution. There are three layers in the ocean regarding temperature: The mixed layer is the layer closest to and inclusive of the surface; The main thermocline; and the deep-water layer.
Figure 1–1. Environmental profile.
Horizontal thermal structure
Due to more heat input into lower latitudes than higher latitudes, it can be assumed that sea water temperatures decrease poleward. Sea water temperatures are warmer in each hemisphere’s summer.
Pressure is the second most important property. Pressure beneath the sea surface is measured in decibars. The pressure exerted by one meter of sea water very nearly equals one decibar (1/10 of a bar) or 100,000 dynes per square centimeter.
In the ocean for each 32.8 feet (10 meters) increase in depth there is an equivalent increase of one atmosphere of pressure. This may also be expressed as a one bar increase for every ten-meter increase in depth. The decibar unit is a convenient measurement because it very nearly equals the corresponding depth in meters.
The farther one descends in the sea, the greater the pressure, and since pressure in the ocean is essentially a function of depth, the numerical value of pressure in decibars approximates the ocean depth in meters. Therefore, pressure ranges from zero at the surface to over 10,000 decibars in the deepest parts of the oceans. The pressure is created by the weight of the sea water above. The weight per unit volume of sea water, in turn, varies with the temperature and salinity. In a column of water of constant depth, the pressure increases as the temperature of the sea decreases, or the salinity increases, or both.
Salinity is the third most important property. The term salinity is related often to the amount of salt in the water. In oceanography, salinity is defined as ‘‘the total amount of dissolved solids in sea water." Salinity is measured in parts per thousand by weight, and is symbolized by ‰. The measurement gives us the grams of dissolved material per kilogram of sea water.
The salinity values of ocean water range between 33‰ and 37‰ with an average of 35‰. In the open ocean, surface salinity is decreased by precipitation, increased by evaporation, and changed by the vertical mixing and inflow of adjacent water. Near shore, salinity is generally reduced by river discharge and freshwater runoff from land. In the colder waters that freeze and thaw, salinity generally increases during periods of ice formation and decreases during periods of ice melt.
Salinity is at its minimum in the fall. This corresponds with Tropical storm season. The vast amount of precipitation associated with these Tropical storms as they move across the ocean surface decreases salinity.
Latitudinally, surface salinity varies in a similar manner in all oceans. Maximum salinity values occur between 20° and 23°N and S, whereas minimum salinity values occur near the Equator and toward higher latitudes. The controlling factor in average surface salinity distribution is the latitudinal differences in evaporation and precipitation. Exceptions to this statement do occur, and local variations should be expected, especially near the mouth of the larger river systems and in the Atlantic coastal water of the United States, Labrador, Spain, and Scandinavia. The best known region of strong horizontal salinity gradients is the Grand Banks region, where warm, saline Gulf Stream water mixes with the colder, less saline water of the Labrador
Here, water with a salinity value as low as 32‰ may override or lie next to water having a salinity value greater than 36‰. A similar situation prevails in the Pacific Ocean, where the Kuroshio and Oyashio currents mix.
At latitudes poleward of 40°N and S, where precipitation generally exceeds evaporation, salinity values tend to increase with depth. Usually during summer, these positive salinity gradients are accompanied by strong negative temperature gradients and result in very stable water, especially in the coastal regions. These strong, shallow salinity (and temperature) gradients persist through the summer.
In the open oceans, salinity is normally considered a constant. The arctic and coastal regions experience an input of large quantities of fresh water in the spring when ice melt or river runoff reduces the salinity of the surface layer. This becomes a transition layer, creating a "salinity front". High salinity levels occur where evaporation exceeds precipitation such as the Eastern Mediterranean (39‰) and the Red Sea (41‰).
The density of sea water depends on salinity, temperature, and pressure. At constant temperature and pressure, density varies with salinity. A temperature of 32°F and an atmospheric pressure of 1013.2 millibars are considered standard for density determination. At other temperatures and pressures the effects of thermal expansion and compressibility are used to determine density. The density at a particular pressure affects the buoyancy of various objects, notably submarines. Density is defined as mass per unit volume, and is expressed in grams per cubic centimeter.
Density and temperature have an indirect (inverse) relationship. As temperature increases density decreases. Likewise, if temperature decreases density increases. Density has a direct relationship with both pressure and salinity. As pressure and/or salinity increases density increases.
The greatest changes in density of sea water occur at the surface. Here, density is decreased by precipitation, runoff from land, melting of ice, or heating. When the surface water becomes less dense, it tends to float on top of the denser water below. There is little tendency for the water to mix; therefore, the condition is one of stability. The density of surface water is increased by evaporation, the formation of sea ice, and cooling. If the surface water becomes denser than the water below, it sinks to a level having the same density. Here, it tends to spread out to form a layer, or to increase the thickness of the layer of which it has become a part. As the denser water sinks, the less dense water rises, and a convective circulation is established. The circulation continues until the density becomes uniform from the surface to a depth at which a greater density occurs. If the surface water becomes sufficiently dense, it sinks all the way to the bottom. If this occurs in an area where horizontal flow is unobstructed, the water that has descended spreads to other regions, creating a dense bottom layer. Since the greatest increase in density occurs in polar regions, where the air is cold and great quantities of ice form, the cold, dense polar water sinks to the bottom and then spreads to lower latitudes. This process has continued for such a long time that the entire ocean floor is covered with this dense polar water. This explains the layer of cold water at great depths in the ocean.
Compressibility is the ability of water to be compacted under pressure. Sea water is not as compressible as pure water, due to salinity and increased specific heat generated during the compression process. Sea water is highly elastic making it a good medium for sound. This value changes slightly with changes in temperature or salinity. The effect of compression is to force the molecules of the substance closer together, causing the substance to become denser. Even though the compressibility of sea water is low, the total effect is considerable because of the amount of water involved. If it were zero, sea level would be about 90 feet higher than it is now.
Viscosity is resistance to flow. Sea water is slightly more viscous than freshwater, and the level of resistance is controlled by its temperature and salinity. Viscosity increases when salinity increases or the water temperature decreases. However, the effect of decreasing temperature is greater than that of increasing salinity. The resistance rate is not uniform; it increases as the temperature decreases. Because of the effect of temperature on viscosity, an incompressible object might sink at a faster rate in warm surface water than in colder subsurface water. For most compressible objects, viscosity effects may be more than offset by the compressibility of the object. In reality this is a very simple explanation to a complex problem, since the actual relationships existing in the ocean are considerably more complicated than portrayed here.
Liquids expand and contract when temperature changes take place; some more than others. Sea water has a higher coefficient of expansion than that of freshwater. Within the sea, the coefficient of thermal expansion is affected by salinity, temperature, and pressure. It is greater in high salinity water; greater in warm water than in cold (under similar salinity conditions); and it increases with increasing depth under constant temperature and salinity conditions. Of course, constancy is not a trademark of any of these properties; they are all quite variable. In turn, the thermal expansion that takes place in the sea varies and is difficult to assess.
A major role of thermal expansion is in the formation of ice. Pure water is densest at 4°C. Thermal expansion takes place when water warms above 4°C, but it also expands when it cools below 4°C. When expansion takes place, the volume is increased, which in turn decreases the density. When water cools below 4°C, it expands slightly, and as it freezes, it expands much more. If water failed to expand during the freezing process, the density of ice would be such that it would sink to the bottom on forming. In the cold of winter, freshwater lakes would eventually become solid blocks of ice. Come summer, only the upper few feet of ice would melt, leaving the remaining ice beneath the melted water.
The property that enables a substance to change its length, volume or shape in direct response to a force, and recover its original form upon removal of that force. Directly proportional to sound speed and inversely proportional to compressibility.
404. The three-layered ocean
A convenient method of visualizing the sea is to divide it into layers in much the same way that we do the atmosphere. Using bathythermograph information (temperature versus depth profiles), the oceans display a basic three-layered structure: the mixed layer, main thermocline, and deep-water layer. The latitudinal distribution of these layers is shown in figure 1–2, while the typical thermal structure is shown in figure 1–3. Both figures are representative of winter.
Figure 1–2. North-south distribution of a simple three-layered ocean (North Atlantic).
Figure 1–3. Typical thermal structure of the oceans (winter conditions in the middle latitudes).
The mixed layer is the upper layer of the three-layered ocean model. It is a layer of fairly constant warm temperatures that, in middle latitudes, extends from the surface to a maximum depth of about 450 meters, or 1,500 feet. This layer gets its name from the mixing processes that cause its fairly constant warm temperatures. The two mixing processes are classified as mechanical and convective.
This mixing process is caused by wave action, surface storms, etc. The wave action stirs up the water. Warmer surface water is driven downward, where it mixes with colder subsurface water. Eventually, a layer of water with a fairly constant temperature is produced. This process is more important in summer than in winter,
because surface waters are much warmer and less dense than subsurface waters, thereby producing a stable water column. The mechanical mixing process is more rapid and irregular than the convective mixing process.
This process occurs as a result of changes in water stability. When surface waters become denser than subsurface waters, an unstable condition exists. Such a condition can occur when there is an increase in surface salinity owing to evaporation or the formation of ice, or by a decrease in the surface water temperature. A temperature decrease of 0.01°C or a salinity increase of 0.01‰ is sufficient to initiate the convective mixing process. In the former case, for example, a cold polar or arctic air mass moving over warm water cools the surface water before it can cool the subsurface water. As the surface waters cool and become colder than the subsurface waters, they become denser and sink. As the colder surface water sinks, the warmer and less dense subsurface water rises to the surface to replace it. This process continues until the water is thoroughly mixed, the density difference eliminated, and the water column stabilized.
Even though winds and the resultant wave action are generally stronger during winter, convective mixing, caused by the colder winter air temperatures, produces a deeper mixed layer than can be attained by mechanical mixing. It is for this reason that convective mixing is considered the more important of the two, and the predominant process in winter.
The convection process is strongest in northern waters where vertical temperature and salinity gradients are not extreme and surface waters undergo a high degree of cooling. Convective mixing attributed to salinity changes is most noticeable in the Mediterranean and Red seas, where evaporation far exceeds precipitation.
We have looked at both processes individually; however, the two processes can and often do take place simultaneously. When this occurs, the mixed layer normally attains a greater depth than would be attained by either process individually.
This is the part of the ocean where temperature decreases rapidly with depth. Mixing no longer affects the ocean layers, and especially the solar heating of the surface.
The main thermocline is the central layer of the ocean generally between 1,000 and 3,000 feet. It is found at the base of the mixed layer and is marked by a rapid decrease of water temperature with depth. The portion of the ocean where temperature commonly decreases rapidly with a small increase in depth; no significant changes occur from season to season.
At high latitudes there is no marked change in water temperature with the seasons, while in the mid-latitudes, a seasonal thermocline develops with the approach of summer. This seasonal thermocline comes about from the gradual warming of the surface water during spring. The warming takes place in the upper few-hundred feet of the surface, and results in the seasonal thermocline becoming superimposed on the main thermocline. Figure 1–4 illustrates the development of the seasonal thermocline in the mid-latitudes.
The mid-latitude summer thermocline is more pronounced than the thermocline of spring or autumn. Bathythermograph traces of the summer thermocline show that it affects a much broader range of depth than at any other time of year. In our illustration, the seasonal thermocline is roughly 35 meters thick (90 to 125 meters deep). NOTE: That the winter temperature profile shows no seasonal thermocline. The mixed layer extends to a depth of more than 160 meters. Come spring, the surface water is warmed and a seasonal thermocline develops between 35 and 60 meters. As summer takes hold, the water warms to 25 °C and the mixed layer extends to a depth of approximately 90 meters. The thermocline now exists between 90 and 125 meters. In summer, the seasonal thermocline is deeper and covers a broader range of depth than at any other season of the year.
With the approach of autumn, the mixed layer continues to drive the thermocline deeper, but the water within the mixed layer is cooler than it was in summer. Just as in the spring, the cooler water in the mixed layer decreases the range of depths covered by the thermocline. In low latitudes, small seasonal temperature changes make it difficult to distinguish between the seasonal and the permanent thermoclines.
A small decrease in vertical temperature, typically 1° to 2° C, observed above the permanent thermocline in the mixed layer; short-term phenomenon usually associated with heating and/or wind mixing. The stronger the wind/wave action the deeper the transient thermocline–the tradeoff is a reduction in magnitude since the absorbed heat is spread over a larger area in the mixing process. The afternoon effect (caused by diurnal heating) results in a transient thermocline.
The deep-water layer is the bottom layer of water, which in the middle latitudes exists below 1,200 meters. This layer is characterized by fairly constant cold temperatures, generally less than 4°C.
To better understand the basic vertical temperature distribution, look again at figure 1–3. At high latitudes in winter, the water is cold from top to bottom. The vertical temperature profile is essentially isothermal (no change in temperature with depth). In middle latitudes, the structure is like that illustrated in figure 1–4. In low latitudes, the mixed layer extends to a depth of about 300 feet. Here, the main thermocline is encountered and the temperature drops about 1°C more than it does in the mid-latitudes. This sharper drop is due to the higher surface temperature in the lower latitudes. The thermocline extends to 2,100 feet, where the deep layer is encountered.
405. Water masses and water types
The idea of visualizing water masses as we do air masses is possible because both are based on the physical properties that go into their makeup. The properties of temperature and salinity are used to classify both water types and water masses.
A water type has a single value of salinity and a single value of temperature associated with it, while a water mass takes into account a range of temperatures and salinity’s. For example, Red Sea water is a water type characterized by a temperature of 9°C and a salinity of 35.5‰. On the other hand, North Atlantic Central Water (a water mass) is characterized by a range of temperatures (4°C to 17°C) and salinity (35.1‰ to 36.2‰). A water mass may be considered to be made up of a combination of two or more water types.
The vast majority of water masses are formed at the surface of the sea in middle and high latitudes. Cold, highly dense surface water sinks until it reaches a level having the same constant density. Here, it spreads out horizontally. The manner in which it spreads out depends on its density in relation to the density of the surrounding water. This is true of nearly all water masses, except those of low latitudes–in particular, the equatorial water masses of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These water masses are formed by the mixing of subsurface waters.
Water masses can be modified through mixing with other masses being advected or from atmospheric intervention (seasonal or diurnal). Normally these changes are negligible. NOTE: A typhoon near Guam in the mid-eighties became stationary for three days. At the end of the three day period it dissipated leaving behind a cold pool of surface water. This atmospheric intervention caused substantial upwelling to drastically alter the water mass in that area.
In low and middle latitudes the vertical arrangement of water is such that we can distinguish a surface layer, upper water (central and equatorial), intermediate water, deep water, and in some localities, bottom water. In high latitudes, the layered structure all but disappears because the surface water is similar to the water at or near the bottom.
The surface layer is not classified as a water mass or water type, because its properties vary widely from one area to another, depending on current variations, evaporation, precipitation, and various seasonal changes, especially in the middle latitudes. In low
and middle latitudes it is found above central and/or equatorial water to depths of 100 to 200 meters. The surface layer is separated from deeper water by a transition layer (the main thermocline).
Beneath the surface layer, we come across the water types and water masses. Like air masses, the water types and water masses have source regions in which they form. Figure 1–5 is provided as a reference for the source regions of various water types and water masses.
Central water masses
Central water is normally found in relatively low latitudes although its source region is around the subtropical convergences (between the 35th and 40th parallel in each hemisphere). Convergence’s are regions in the ocean where surface waters are brought together by the currents. In the western North Atlantic Ocean, a region of subtropical convergence exists where the Gulf Stream meets the colder, denser Labrador Current. Convergences are marked by rapidly rising SSTs.
Central water is not usually discernible at the surface and is generally relatively shallow. Its greatest thickness is observed along its western boundaries. In the western North Atlantic around the Sargasso Sea, the thickness may reach 900 meters.
Variations in heating and cooling, evaporation and precipitation, ocean circulation patterns, and mixing processes all contribute to the salinity values of central water being either quite similar or considerably different. For example, central water of the South Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the western South Pacific Ocean all have similar salinity values, while the salinity values of North Atlantic central water are considerably higher than the central water of the North Pacific Ocean.
You will note as you look at figure 1–5 that the central water of the North and South Atlantic oceans is not separated by equatorial water like the central water of the North and South Pacific oceans. Instead, the central water of the North and South Atlantic come together and mix, forming a region of transition consisting of intermediate properties.
Equatorial water masses
Equatorial water is found in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean. In the Pacific it is thought to originate on the southern side of the Equator. There are two reasons for this: Its properties are similar to those of the water masses of the South Pacific, and its salinity values are higher than those of the water masses found in the North Pacific Ocean.
Equatorial water is also found in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. Here, its higher salinity’s are probably due to its mixing with the waters of the Red Sea. However, this conclusion has not been proved.
Equatorial water, like central water, is not discernible at the surface, because the temperature and salinity values used to isolate it cannot be clearly ascertained in the upper 100 to 200 meters.
Figure 1–5. Approximate source regions for water masses of the world.
Intermediate water is found below central water in all oceans. Intermediate water includes Antarctic intermediate water, Arctic intermediate water, Mediterranean water, and Red Sea water.
Antarctic intermediate water
Antarctic intermediate water encircles the Antarctic continent and is the most widespread of all the intermediate water masses. It forms near the Antarctic convergence, where it sinks. As it sinks, it flows north and mixes with the water masses that lie immediately above and below it.
In the Atlantic, the absence of equatorial water allows Antarctic intermediate water to flow across the Equator and reach roughly 20° to 35° N latitude. In the South Pacific and Indian oceans, where equatorial water does exist, Antarctic intermediate water fails to reach the Equator. It spreads north to about 10°S latitude.
One of the characteristics of Antarctic intermediate water is its low salinity (34.1‰, to 34.6‰). In comparison to the water around it, it displays the lowest salinity values.
Arctic intermediate water
Arctic intermediate water and Sub-Arctic water are similar; however, in the North Atlantic Ocean, Arctic intermediate water forms only in small quantities, and in a relatively small area east of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.
In the North Pacific, Arctic intermediate water forms during winter at the convergence formed by the Oyashio current and the Kuroshio Extension. It exists between latitude 20° and 43°N, except off the west coast of North America. Here, Sub-Arctic water extends to lower latitudes, and the northern boundary of the intermediate water is pushed much farther south.
This water mass is formed by the interaction of dense Mediterranean Sea water with the waters of the adjacent North Atlantic Ocean. The denser Mediterranean water flows out through the Strait of Gibraltar and sinks to a depth of about 1,000 meters, where it mixes with the water at this depth.
Red Sea water
This water type is found over large parts of the equatorial and western regions of the Indian Ocean. Large quantities of warm, highly saline water from the Red Sea flow into the Indian Ocean, where its mixes with Antarctic intermediate water to form the Red Sea water mass. The spreading of Red Sea water is not as well defined as Mediterranean water.
Antarctic circumpolar or subantarctic water
This water mass is thought to form through a combination of mixing and vertical circulation in the region between the subtropical and Antarctic convergences. Here, large quantities of Antarctic intermediate water and Antarctic bottom water mix with North Atlantic deep water to form Antarctic circumpolar water.
The physical properties of this water mass are quite conservative, and as its name implies, it extends completely around the Antarctic continent and the South Pole. Because Antarctic circumpolar water forms in the deeper waters of the Antarctic Ocean, it is often referred to as Sub-Antarctic water.
Sub-Arctic water masses
Sub-Arctic water is much like Antarctic circumpolar or Sub-Antarctic water; however, there are differences. The differences are attributed to the land and sea distribution in the two hemispheres. In the Southern Hemisphere, the Antarctic convergence extends around the continent of Antarctica, but in the Northern Hemisphere, the Arctic convergence is found only in the western portions of oceans. However, even in these areas the convergence is not always well defined.
In the North Atlantic Ocean, Sub-Arctic water covers a relatively small area, and it possesses a higher salinity than surrounding waters. On the other hand, the Sub-Arctic water of the North Pacific is much more extensive, and its salinity values are lower than surrounding waters.
Deep and bottom water masses
In the deep-ocean basins below intermediate water, high density deep and bottom water exists. These water masses form in both hemispheres. In the Southern Hemisphere, Antarctic bottom water forms near the Antarctic continent, while in the Northern Hemisphere, Arctic deep and bottom water forms in northwestern Labrador Basin and in a small area off the southeast coast of Greenland. These water masses form at the surface, sink, and spread out to fill the deep-ocean basins. Deep and bottom waters are detectable in areas far removed from their source regions.
Roughly three percent of the world’s water surfaces are ice covered. In the polar seas, submarines transit beneath the ice-covered water, while surface ships operate in and around the ice. From a safety standpoint, all ships must be aware of where ice lies in relation to their position.
The two main types of ice found in the seas and oceans are sea ice, which accounts for 95 percent of the total coverage, and glacier ice. The Naval Polar Oceanography Center at Suitland, Maryland, keeps the US Navy advised of the development, movement, and the equatorward limit of sea ice, and the location and movement of icebergs. This is done through the issuance of global sea-ice analyses and forecasts.
We know that pure water freezes at 0°C, but the freezing point of sea water varies depending on salinity (fig. 1–6). Under average salinity conditions (35‰), sea water begins to freeze at –1.9°C. However, before surface waters will freeze, the entire water column must cool to its temperature of maximum density. Therefore, shallow waters (of low salinity–less than 24.7‰) freeze more rapidly than
deeper water. As you can see, the freezing of sea water is governed primarily by temperature, salinity, and depth; however, this ice formation can be retarded by winds, currents, and tides.
In the open sea, the first sign that the sea surface is freezing is an oily opaque appearance of water. This appearance is caused by the formation of minute ice needles (spicules) and thin plates of ice (frazil crystals). As the formation process continues, the surface attains a thick soupy consistency termed grease ice. Next, depending on the wind, waves, and salinity, an elastic or brittle crust forms. The elastic crust (nil’s) has a matte appearance, while the brittle crust (ice rind) is shiny. As the crust thickens, the wind and sea cause the ice to break up into rounded masses known as pancake ice. With continued freezing, the pancake ice forms into a continuous sheet.
Sea ice forms by the freezing of sea water at temperatures near –2° C. Sea ice is made up of crystals of pure ice separating small cells of brine. As the ice further cools salt solids in the brine crystallize out leaving pure ice and increasing the salinity of the surrounding water. If the ice temperatures’ raise to near 0°C the brine and encompassing water will melt first and become hummocked leaving behind ice that can be used as potable water.
Sea ice properties differ greatly from those of fresh water ice. Properties depend on:
· The amount of enclosed brine.
· Number of air bubbles left in the ice if all or part of the brine has become hummocked (trickled down).
Density of pure ice at 0° C is 0.9168. The density of sea ice may be more or less than that amount depending on the brine and/or air bubble amount.
The formation of sea ice usually begins with the onset of autumn, and the first ice usually appears in the mouths of rivers that empty into shallow seas, such as that off northern Siberia. During the increasingly longer and colder nights of autumn, ice
forms along the shorelines (fast ice) and becomes a semipermanent feature that widens and spreads. When islands are close together, as in the Siberian Sea, fast ice blankets the sea surface, and bridges the waters between all land areas.
On the average in the Northern Hemisphere, sea ice is at a minimum in September, while at a maximum in March. In the Southern Hemisphere these times are nearly opposite; minimum in March and maximum in September.
There are only certain areas of the Earth where sea ice forms that we will discuss.
The high latitudes
The high latitudes encompass the polar regions, the polar (or frigid) zones, defined by the Arctic Circle (66.3°N) to 90°N, and the Antarctic Circle (66.33°S) to 90°S. These boundaries approximate the 50°F isotherm during the warmest months.
North of the Arctic Circle
Six countries border the Arctic: the United States, Canada, Soviet Union, Norway, Finland and Greenland. Nine ocean areas (approximately 4,600,000 square nautical miles) are contained within the Arctic: the Arctic Ocean, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, Kara Sea, Barents Sea, Greenland Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and the Norwegian Sea. Permanent sea ice covers most of the Arctic Ocean north of 85°N.
50°N to the Arctic Circle
This area includes all the arctic countries plus Iceland, Sweden, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland, and Germany. It includes all the Arctic Ocean areas plus the Bering Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, North Sea, Labrador Sea, extreme northern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Hudson Bay area. Seasonal sea ice (pack ice) extends south over the region to approximately 40°N in the winter. Pack ice concentrations depend on latitude, wind, and cloud cover.
South of the Antarctic Circle
This area includes the Antarctic continent and all the peripheral islands. It includes the extreme southern Indian Ocean, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Bellingshausen Sea, Ross Sea, Weddell Sea, Amundsen Sea, and the Davis Sea. Permanent ice covers the Antarctic continent and extends out along the continental shelf from 15 to 40 nautical miles.
50°S to the Antarctic Circle
It includes the Antarctic Palmer Peninsula, the tip of Chile and Argentina, the Antarctic Ocean areas and the Tasman Sea.
Snow and ice
The amount of snow and/or ice cover in any region of the Arctic determines the radiation budget of that region.
Surface snow and ice cover
Solar absorption over snow-free land may be relatively high and as a result, temperatures in the summer may rise to 40° to 50°F. Over the ice pack solar absorption is much less, keeping temperatures at 32°F year round. At the ice edges, temperature and moisture gradients is often quite large. Greater than normal precipitation, cloudiness, fog and altered cyclone tracks occur at the sea-ice interface. Leads and polynyas have a similar effect, they provide a significant source of heat and moisture. Open water produces a moderating effect on local temperatures, while snow covered land or ice produces extremely cold temperatures. Actual snowfall amounts are small due to the lack of water vapor at low temperatures. Arctic ocean averages five inches annually, while the ocean margin areas average approximately ten inches annually. Blowing snow is prevalent in the high latitudes and creates the illusion of more snowfall than is actually occurring. NOTE: The average depth of snow cover in March to April range from 8 to 20 inches over the frozen oceans to 16 to 28 inches over the subarctic regions. The effect of the variation in snow cover is reflected in the fact that there is a very short transitional period between winter and summer. (Spring and fall last only a few weeks.)
Permanent ice and icebergs
Permanent ice fields exist over Greenland in the Arctic and over the continent of Antarctica in the Southern Hemisphere. Permanent ice may be sea ice or land-fast ice created from eons of snow accumulation and glaciation. Greenland has an elevation over 11,000 feet and the vast ice plateau of Antarctica is over 14,000 feet AGL. Icebergs "calve" off the land ice and begin their travel into the adjoining ocean following the wind and currents. Icebergs can travel up to 12 miles in a day. The predominant currents’ control the speed and heading the icebergs travel. Wind and the coriolis effect also influences the iceberg’s movement. The portion of the iceberg above the water is the "freeboard" and it acts like a sail, the larger the freeboard the more the wind affects the iceberg’s speed.
Sea ice classification
Sea ice is subdivided into young ice, first-year ice, and old ice.
This ice forms in one year or less, and its thickness ranges from 10 to 30 centimeters (4 to 12 inches). It is further classified as gray ice and gray-white ice.
This ice is a reasonably unbroken level of ice of not more than one winter’s growth that starts as young ice. Its thickness is from 30 centimeters to 2 meters (1 foot to 6 ½ feet). First-year ice may be subdivided into thin first-year ice, medium first-year ice, and thick first-year ice. The latter is more than 4-feet thick.
Old ice is extremely heavy sea ice that has survived at least one summer’s melt. It occurs primarily in the arctic and Antarctic polar packs as a vast mass of converging, crushing, and dividing ice floes of various ages, sizes, shapes, and thicknesses that drift around the Arctic Basin and Antarctica. Old ice may be subdivided into second-year ice and multi-year ice.
Generally, sea ice is categorized into seven sizes. Refer to figure 1–7 for relative sizes and a comparison to other more common features.
Figure 1–7. Sizes of sea ice. Topography
The terms most frequently used to describe the topography, or configuration of the ice surface, are related to the degree of surface roughness. Figure 1–8 illustrates the types of topography.
This type of topography occurs when ice cakes override one another. Rafting occurs when wind forces ice cakes or ice floes together. It is associated with young and first-year ice.
Ridged ice is much rougher than rafted ice and occurs with first-year ice. Wind and weather can eventually smooth the surface of the ridges.
Pack ice, sea ice covering more than half of the visible sea surface, usually drifts to the right of the true wind in the Northern Hemisphere (left in the Southern Hemisphere). Observations show that the actual drift is about 30 degrees from that of the wind direction, or very nearly parallel to the isobars on a weather product. The drift more closely follows the wind in winter than in summer. In summer, the tides play a bigger role in the movement of the ice.
Figure 1–8. Various types of ice topography caused by pressure.
A close estimate of the speed of drifting pack ice is possible using the wind speed. On the average, the drift of ice in the Northern Hemisphere ranges from 1.4 percent of the wind speed in April, to 2.4 percent of the wind speed in September. Although wind is the primary driving force, the presence or absence of open water in the direction of the drift greatly influences the speed of drift. Ice-free water in the direction of the drift, no matter how distant, permits the pack ice to drift freely in that direction. Ice-clogged water, on the other hand, slows the ice’s forward movement.
Naval operations in and around fields of sea ice can be hazardous. The movement of massive floes of ice can cut off ships from open water, and worse yet, the ice may close in around a ship, leaving it stranded in a sea of ice. Therefore, open water in ice-covered seas becomes very important.
There are a great variety of water features associated with sea ice. Some of the most common features are as follows:
1. Fracture. Any break through the ice.
1. Lead. A long, narrow break or passage through the ice; a navigable fracture. A lead may be open or refrozen.
2. Puddle. A depression in sea ice usually filled with melted water caused by warm weather.
3. Thaw holes. Holes in the ice that are caused by the melting associated with warm weather.
4. Polynya. Any sizable area of sea water enclosed by sea ice. Put another way, simply a large hole in the ice.
Ice of land origin composed initially of large accumulations of compacted snow that reach the sea as coastal glaciers and ice shelves. The leading edges of these glaciers break off (calve) and fall into the sea. This ice then drifts to sea as icebergs.
Since 86 percent of the world’s glaciers occur in Antarctica, most icebergs originate around that continent. Most of the remainder of the world’s glaciers are located in Greenland. Greenland is the main source of icebergs in the Northern Hemisphere (about 90 percent). Nearly 70 percent of Greenland’s icebergs originate along the western coast near 68°N.
Icebergs are pinnacled (cone-shaped) or tabular (flat-topped and straight-sided) as shown in figure 1–9. The structure, and to some extent the appearance, depends on the ice that produces the berg. Pinnacled or irregular-shaped bergs come from glaciers that plow across uneven ground on their way to the tidewater, while the tabular bergs
come from ice shelves that thrust directly out to sea. Pinnacled and irregular bergs are most prevalent in the Northern Hemisphere, while the tabular bergs are more prevalent in the Southern Hemisphere.
Size and depth
Icebergs originating in Greenland average 70 meters in height and 280 to 450 meters in length when first formed. The largest ones may exceed 120 meters in height and several miles in length. The tabular bergs of Antarctica average 30 to 40 meters in height, but their horizontal dimensions greatly surpass those bergs of the Northern Hemisphere. For example, one iceberg observed near Scott Island in 1956 measured 60 miles by 208 miles.
The portion of an iceberg that is visible above the water depends on the type of the berg and the density differences between the sea water and the ice. The type of berg (pinnacle or tabular) determines the height of the ice above the water. In the case of the tabular berg, the depth below the surface is about seven times the height above the water line. In the case of the pinnacle or irregular berg, the depth below the surface averages about five times that above the water line.
Regarding density, sea water with a temperature of –1°C and a salinity of 35‰ produces a density condition that allows for nearly 90 percent of the ice to be submerged.
Irregular icebergs often have rams (protrusions of ice beneath the surface). These rams can be a great hazard to vessels that might pass close to this type of bergs.
While the general direction of the drift of icebergs over a long time is known, it may not be possible to predict the drift of an individual berg at a given place and time, for bergs lying close together have been observed to move in different directions. The reason for this is that icebergs move under the influence of the prevailing current at the iceberg’s submerged depth. This subsurface current often opposes the existing wind and sea or surface drift.
Bergy bits and growlers
Like icebergs, bergy bits and growlers originate from glaciers and form when icebergs and other masses of land ice disintegrate. A bergy bit is a medium sized fragment of
glacier ice and is about the size of a small cottage. A growler is a small fragment of ice about the size of a grand piano. It is usually of glacial origin, and generally greenish in color.
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:43 PM
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY: INTERESTS AND GOALS.
The bitter struggle that divided the world for over two generations has come to an end. The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold War is over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new era, one whose outline would have been unimaginable only three years ago.
This new era offers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the even greater uncertainty we face. Almost immediately new crises and instabilities came upon us. The Gulf War was a forceful reminder that there are still autonomous sources of turbulence in the world. In the Soviet Union, while we have seen a healthy retrenchment in foreign policy, we also see a continuing internal crisis, with a danger of violence overhanging the hopes for internal reform. We face new challenges not only to our security, but to our ways of thinking about security.
For over 40 years, the American grand strategy of containment has reflected an era of expanding Soviet power, Soviet aggression and Soviet Communism. We now find, however, that the Soviet Union is far more inwardly focused as it wrestles with its internal crises. We do not know what path the Soviet Union will ultimately take, but a return to the same superpower adversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely.
That said, the Soviet Union remains the only state possessing the physical military capability to destroy American society with a single, cataclysmic attack and, in spite of severe economic strains, the modernization of Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across the board. Even with a START Treaty, the Soviets will retain more than 6,000 strategic weapons. The Soviets will also -- despite the heartening reductions we have seen in their conventional capabilities -- retain some three million men in their armed forces. These enduring realities cannot be ignored.
Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an understanding of the extraordinary trends at work today -- a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an accurate sense of the opportunities that history has put before us and a sober appreciation of the dangers that remain.
Politically, a key issue is how America's role of alliance leader -- and indeed our alliances themselves -- will be affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat. The positive common basis of our alliances -- the defense of democratic values -- must be reaffirmed and strengthened. Yet, differences among allies are likely to become more evident as the traditional concern for security that first brought them together diminishes in intensity. We need to consider how the United States and its allies can best respond to a new agenda of political challenges -- such as the troubled evolution of the Soviet Union or the volatile Middle East -- in the framework of the moral and political values we continue to share.
In the realm of military strategy, we confront dangers more ambiguous than those we previously faced. What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities? How do we reduce our conventional capabilities in ways that ensure we could rebuild them faster than an enemy could build a devastating new threat against us? How does the proliferation of advanced weaponry affect our traditional problem of deterrence? How should we think about these new military challenges and what capabilities and forces should we develop to secure ourselves against them?
America will continue to support an international economic system as open and inclusive as possible, as the best way to strengthen global economic development, political stability and the growth of free societies. But how can these goals best be attained, especially if they are not completely shared by all of our economic competitors? How will the end of the Cold War and the increased economic strength of our major trading partners influence economic, political and even security relationships? In addition to working actively to conclude successfully the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, what other market- opening objectives should the United States pursue, and with whom should we pursue them?
In the emerging post-Cold War world, international relations promise to be more complicated, more volatile and less predictable. Indeed, of all the mistakes that could be made about the security challenges of a new era, the most dangerous would be to believe that suddenly the future can be predicted with certainty. The history of the 20th century has been replete with surprises, many unwelcome.
In many ways, if there is a historical analogy for today's strategic environment, it is less the late 1940s than it is the 1920s. In the 1920s, judging that the great threat to our interests had collapsed and that no comparable threat was evident, the Nation turned inward. That course had near disastrous consequences then and it would be even more dangerous now. At a time when the world is far more interdependent -- economically, technologically, environmentally -- any attempt to isolate ourselves militarily and politically would be folly.
Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension -- political, economic and military. In these circumstances, our natural desire to share burdens more equitably with newly-strong friends does not relieve us of our own responsibilities.
America's role is rooted not only in power, but also in trust. When, in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, the Saudis invited foreign forces onto their soil, King Fahd observed:
I trust the United States of America. I know that when you say you will be committed, you are, in fact,
tted. I know that you will stay as long as
sary to do what has to be done, and I know you
leave when you are asked to leave at the end, and that you have no ulterior motives.
We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems. But we remain the country to whom others turn when in distress. This faith in us creates burdens, certainly, and in the Gulf we showed that American leadership must include mobilizing the world community to share the danger and risk. But the failure of others to bear their burden would not excuse us. In the end, we are answerable to our own interests and our own conscience -- to our ideals and to history -- for what we do with the power we have. In the 1990s, as for much of this century, there is no substitute for American leadership. Our responsibility, even in a new era, is pivotal and inescapable.
The Gulf crisis interrupted a time of hope. We saw a new world coming, a world freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, more secure in the quest for peace. Democracy was gaining ground as were the principles of human rights and political and economic freedom. This new world is still within reach, perhaps brought closer by the unprecedented international cooperation achieved in the Gulf crisis.
But even after such a success, we face not only the complex security issues outlined above, but a new agenda of new kinds of security issues. Our national power, for example, ultimately rests on the strength and resilience of our economy, and our security would be badly served if we allowed fiscal irresponsibility at home to erode our ability to protect our interests abroad, to aid new democracies or to help find solutions to other global problems. The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as a free people, diverts our energies from more positive pursuits and threatens friendly democratic governments now plagued by drug traffickers. The environmental depredations of Saddam Hussein have underscored that protecting the global ecology is a top priority on the agenda of international cooperation -- from extinguishing oil fires in Kuwait to preserving the rain forests to solving water disputes to assessing climate change. The upheavals of this era are also giving rise to human migrations on an unprecedented scale, raising a host of social, economic, political and moral challenges to the world's nations.
A security strategy that takes the Republic safely into the next century will tend to these as well as to more traditional threats to our safety and well-being.
OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990s
We need, then, an approach to security broad enough to preserve the basic sources of our national strength and focused enough to deal with the very real threats that still exist. Such an approach begins with an understanding of our basic interests and objectives, interests and objectives that even in a new era are enduring:
The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to:
-- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies;
-- effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;
-- improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
-- promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage;
-- foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism;
-- prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and
-- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.
A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:
-- promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy;
-- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space;
-- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; and
-- achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.
healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:
-- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;
-- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;
-- strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress;
-- support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; and
-- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.
A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.
Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:
-- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;
-- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
-- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
-- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and
-- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.
II. TRENDS IN THE WORLD TODAY: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CONCERNS
Despite the uncertainties that remain, we see a fundamental transformation of the global strategic environment in several areas. Our policies and strategy for the decade ahead must be designed to adapt to these changes, and to shape them in ways that benefit the United States and its friends and allies.
The Soviet Future
If Central and Eastern Europe was the scene of the peaceful Revolution of 1989, the dramatic story of 1991 is the deepening crisis within the Soviet Union. The old system of Communist orthodoxy is discredited, yet its die-hard adherents have not given up the struggle against change. Fundamental choices -- of multi-party democracy, national self-determination and market economic reform -- have been postponed too long. The economy is deteriorating. The painful process of establishing new, legitimate political and economic institutions has much farther to go.
If reform is to succeed, Soviet leaders must move decisively to effect institutional change. When invited and where appropriate, we will offer our cooperation. But it is clearly not in our interest to offer assistance in a way that allows the Soviet government to avoid the hard choices that in the longer run are the only hope for the people of that country. At the July 1991 London Economic Summit, the participants announced their support for special associate status for the Soviet Union in the IMF and World Bank. This will give the Soviets access to the technical advice they need to formulate and implement their reform program.
The processes of reform inside the Soviet Union have already had a revolutionary impact on Soviet foreign policy. With former ideological imperatives giving way to a new pragmatism, areas of cooperation have expanded. The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was a transforming event. Soviet policy toward the unification of Germany was constructive. The reduced role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy has diminished the importance of many developing areas as arenas of conflict with the West. Soviet support in the UN Security Council for the resolutions against Iraqi aggression was an important contribution to the international effort. We are hopeful that such cooperation can be expanded. Of course, the Soviets would pay a severe political price for any return to practices of an earlier era, exploiting regional disputes and instabilities for their presumed advantage.
Today, the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict is lower than at any time since the end of World War 11. With the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the unilateral reductions now underway and the recently signed CFE treaty (if faithfully implemented), the threat of a sudden, massive offensive against NATO will have been eliminated. Despite uncertainty over the Soviet internal evolution, any attempt by the Soviets to resolve such a threat would require lengthy preparation and be enormously costly and virtually impossible to conceal. Moreover, the START Treaty signed at the Moscow Summit will significantly reduce US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.
But Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant. The Soviet Union is and will remain a military super-power. Beyond its modernized strategic arsenal, the Soviet Union's conventional forces west of the Urals will dwarf any other national force in Europe. While they no longer pose the threat of a short-warning, theater-wide offensive, they could still pose a potent threat to a single flank or region. The size and orientation of Soviet military forces must therefore remain critical concerns to the United States and the overall health of the European system will still require a counterweight to Soviet military strength.
It is our responsibility as a government to hedge against the uncertainties of the future. Elements of the U.S.- Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge. Our evolving relationship is also not immune to Soviet attempts to lay the problems created by decades of domestic tyranny, misrule and mismanagement at the feet of "foreign enemies". Nor is it immune to the implications of the forceful repression of democratic forces, slowing the Soviet Union's progress on a road that must be taken if it is to successfully meet the challenges before it. The internal order of a state is ultimately reflected in its external behavior. We will remain alert to the potential strategic consequences of a return to totalitarian policies.
The Growing Roles of Germany and Japan
One of the most important and far-reaching strategic developments of a new era and a major success of America's postwar policy -- is the emergence of Japan and Germany as economic and political leaders. The United States has long encouraged such a development, and our close ties with these democracies have created the climate of reassurance necessary for their evolution as stable and powerful countries enjoying good relations with their neighbors. As these countries assume a greater political role, the health of American ties with them -- political, military and economic -- will remain crucial to regional and even global stability. These links are not relics of an earlier period. They are all the more needed in a new era as these countries' roles expand.
But we frequently find ourselves competitors -- sometimes even bitter competitors -- in the economic arena. These frictions must be managed if we are to preserve the partnerships that have fostered reconciliation, reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period. In this sense, ongoing trade negotiations now share some of the strategic importance we have traditionally attached to arms talks with the Soviet Union.
The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of urgency, the question of responsibility-sharing -- not only with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulf operations, but also with regard to sharing the costs of U.S. forces defending Europe and Japan. Our allies are doing more, as befits their economic strength, but the issue may grow more acute as we and they adjust to a new era.
The New Europe
It is Europe more than any other area that has held the key to the global balance in this century, and it is this continent more than any other that is experiencing fundamental change. The unification of Germany last October quickened the pace to a new, more promising era and a continent truly whole and free. As Europe is being transformed politically, we are also lifting the military shadows and fears with which we have lived for nearly half a century.
All across the Continent, the barriers that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. East Europeans are determining their own destinies, choosing freedom and economic liberty. One by one, the states of Central and Eastern Europe have begun to reclaim the European cultural and political tradition that is their heritage. All Soviet forces are gone from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and withdrawals from Germany and Poland are underway. The military capability of the Soviet forces still remaining in Eastern Europe is rapidly diminishing and the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved.
Basic to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout Europe is the continued vitality of the North Atlantic Alliance -- the indispensable foundation of transatlantic cooperation. To keep the Alliance strong and viable in a new environment we must recognize that there are important tasks beyond the changed -- but still important -- requirement to balance and deter Soviet military power. NATO must deter and defend against the threat of aggression from any state against the territory of a NATO member. NATO will also be essential in promoting a stable security environment throughout Europe, an environment based on democratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of disputes, an environment free of intimidation or attempts at hegemony. Finally, NATO still serves as an indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations on issues that affect common political and security interests. As the European Community heads toward the new milestone of a single market by the end of 1992, we enter a revolution of relations in the West, perhaps ultimately as important strategically as the revolution taking place in the East. It is no accident that Europeans are contemplating greater West European cohesion in the security field, even while preserving the vital transatlantic framework. We will work to adapt NATO's structures to encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the Alliance and we will encourage greater European responsibility for Europe's defense. While European governments will naturally take the lead in developing their own institutions, these efforts will enjoy our full support as long as they strengthen the Alliance. We will also work to adapt Alliance command structures to new realities -- the reassessment of risks, a new NATO strategy, a different force structure -- in ways that sustain the unique contribution of NATO's integrated military command.
The continued freedom, vitality and national independence of the new Eastern European democracies are also critical to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout Europe. Any reversal of the present positive trend in Soviet policy would have serious implications. As the North Atlantic allies declared in June: "Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us." We and our NATO allies have established a program of contacts with the militaries of these states to support military establishments that will sustain newly won freedoms and we have extended our bilateral International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to strengthen military professionalism and to promote the principle of civilian oversight of the armed forces.
It is important that we not let euphoria over the easing of East-West confrontation blind us to the potential security problems within a new Europe. Historical enmities in Western Europe have been largely consigned to the past but disputes between and among some Eastern European states and ethnic groups appear to have been merely frozen in time by decades of Cold War. In the interwar period, the politics of these states were often dominated by economic hardship, competing nationalisms and overlapping territorial claims. We have reason to be more hopeful today, but security problems could emerge in the East in the course of the 1990s. The powerful centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia are particularly worrisome.
The overall structure of peace in Europe must be made solid enough to withstand the turmoil that looms ahead. We need to develop the processes and principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and perhaps other mechanisms to ease ethnic and national tensions and to dampen and resolve conflicts.
Europe also may be about to face a new problem, not new in kind, but in scope: mass migrations and flows of refugees in response to the breakdown of the communist world and the magnetic attraction of Western European prosperity. From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, from North Africa and the Near East, we could see thousands fleeing economic hardship and seeking a better life. For Western European countries, there could be enormous economic, social and political strains -- an unprecedented challenge to the new Europe, testing its moral and political character.
While Europe remains a central strategic arena, the Gulf crisis reminded us how much our interests can be affected in other regions as well.
As the effects of the Cold War recede, regional disputes are less likely automatically to be perceived as part of a permanent -- frequently dangerous, sometimes violent -- global competition, thus allowing broader international cooperation in their resolution.
Less happily, in some regions this overall positive trend could unleash local, destructive forces that were formerly kept in check. As we saw in the Gulf, there is the danger of locally dominant powers, armed with modern weaponry and ancient ambitions, threatening the world's hope for a new era of cooperation. We see regimes that have made themselves champions of regional radicalism, states that are all too vulnerable to such pressures, governments that refuse to recognize one another, and countries that have claims on one another's territory -- some with significant military capabilities and a history of recurring war. A key task for the future will be maintaining regional balances and resolving such disputes before they erupt in military conflict.
If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise and liberates U.S. policy from many of its earlier concerns, we should be able to concentrate more on enhancing security -- in the developing world, particularly through means that are more political, social and economic than military. We must recognize the stark fact that our hopeful new era still has within it dislocations and dangers that threaten the fragile shoots of democracy and progress that have recently emerged. Malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty put dangerous pressures on democratic institutions as hungry, uneducated or poorly housed citizens are ripe for radicalization by movements of the left and the right. Our response to need and turmoil must increasingly emphasize the strengthening of democracy, and a long-term investment in the development of human resources and the structures of free markets and free governments. Such measures are an investment in our own security as well as a response to the demands of simple justice.
The Western Hemisphere
Nowhere is this more true than in our own hemisphere, where our fundamental aims are to deepen the sense of partnership and common interest.
Latin Americans have long argued that U.S. interest has waxed and waned with the rise and fall of extrahemispheric threats to regional security. Our policy has sought to allay these fears, as it is founded on the principle of a common destiny and mutual responsibility. The Western Hemisphere is all the more significant to the United States in light of today's global trends, political and economic.
The resurgence of democracy, the worldwide phenomenon that is such an inspiration to us, is heading toward a dramatic achievement -- a completely democratic hemisphere. This drive gained momentum last year with the election of democratic governments in Nicaragua and Haiti, the restoration of democracy in Panama, and several other democratic elections. The electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is especially noteworthy as it has led to the end of Soviet and Cuban military assistance, thereby increasing the security of all of Central America. The United States has provided political and economic support for the new government and its program for reconstruction and long-term development. Despite these successes, we realize that democratic institutions in much of Latin
East Asia and the Pacific
East Asia and the Pacific are home to some of the world's most economically and politically dynamic societies. The region also includes some of the last traditional Communist regimes on the face of the globe. Regional hotspots tragically persist on the Korean peninsula and in Cambodia, and there are territorial disputes in which progress is long overdue, including the Soviet Union's continued occupation of Japan's Northern Territories.
In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. This is placing new stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea as Soviet military and economic aid declines and Moscow seeks to improve relations with Seoul, Tokyo and other capitals. China is coming to view its neighbors in a new light, and is gradually adjusting to a changing perception of the Soviet threat.
Through a web of bilateral relationships, the United States has pursued throughout the postwar period a policy of engagement in support of the stability and security that are prerequisites to economic and political progress. U.S. power remains welcome in key states in the region, who recognize the pivotal role we continue to play in the regional balance. We remain a key factor of reassurance and stability. By ensuring freedom of the seas through naval and air strength and by offering these capabilities as a counterweight in the region's power equations, we are likely to remain welcome in an era of shifting patterns and possible as new frictions.
Today's basically healthy conditions cannot be taken for granted. We will continue to be a beacon for democracy and human rights. We will meet our responsibilities in the security field. We will also remain actively engaged in promoting free and expanding markets through Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, recognizing that economic progress is a major ingredient in Asia's political stability and democratic progress.
As noted earlier, our alliance with Japan remains of enormous strategic importance. Our hope is to see the U.S.- Japan global partnership extend beyond its traditional confines and into fields like refugee relief, non- proliferation and the environment. On the Korean peninsula, we and the Republic of Korea seek to persuade North Korea of the benefit of confidence-building measures as a first step to lasting peace and reunification. We firmly believe that true stability can only be achieved through direct North- South talks. At the same time, the United States remains committed to the security of the Republic of Korea as it continues to open its economic and political systems. We are increasingly concerned about North Korea's failure to observe its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and consider this to be the most pressing security issue on the peninsula.
China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as it proceeds inexorably toward major systemic change. China's inward focus and struggle to achieve stability will not preclude increasing interaction with its neighbors as trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact with China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure.
The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive relations with Taiwan where rapid economic and political change is underway. One of our goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait.
In Southeast Asia, there is renewed hope for a settlement in Cambodia. Only through resolution of the conflict in Cambodia can there be the promise of our restoring normal relations with that beleaguered nation and with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penh have sadly delayed the day when they can enjoy normal ties with us or their Southeast Asian neighbors. Of course, the pace and scope of our actions will also be directly affected by steps that are taken to resolve the fate of Americans still unaccounted for. The resolution of this issue remains one of our highest priorities.
Even with the loss of Clark Air Base, we remain committed to helping the Philippines make a success of its new democracy and to fulfilling our legitimate defense function there as allies and equals. In the South Pacific, we are demonstrating renewed interest in and assistance for the island states. Australia retains its special position as a steadfast ally and key Pacific partner. We look forward to the day when New Zealand will choose to resume its responsibilities to the ANZUS alliance and rejoin Australia and the United States in this important regional structure.
The Middle East and South Asia
The reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a watershed event. Nonetheless, our basic policy toward the region shows powerful continuity. American strategic concerns still include promoting stability and the security of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms sales, countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's security.
The regional environment since Desert Storm presents new challenges and new opportunities. Even as we provide badly needed relief and protection to refugees, we will work to bring about greater security and a lasting peace.
-- We will help states in the Middle East to fashion
nal security arrangements that bolster deterrence
ncourage the peaceful resolution of disputes.
-- We will work with parties inside and outside the region to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation. This will involve confidence-building and arms control measures as well as more global forms of control over the supply of arms, especially weapons of mass
uction and the means to deliver them.
-- We will encourage economic reconstruction and recovery, using the political and economic strengths of the victorious coalition to support economic openness and cooperation. We will also encourage regional states to evolve toward greater political participation and respect for human rights.
-- We will continue the effort to bring about a comprehensive peace and true reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians.
-- We will continue to demand that Iraq comply fully and unconditionally with all relevant UN resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 687 and its stipulation that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile- related facilities be destroyed.
-- We remain open to an improved relationship with Iran. However, meaningful improvement can only occur after Iran makes clear it is lending no support to hostage-taking or other forms of terrorism.
-- We will also continue to monitor Libyan behavior, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and attempts to destabilize neighboring governments.
In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that security is best served by resolving disputes through negotiations rather than military pressure. The dangers of intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to moderate their military competition. We also remain committed to achieving a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan.
The end of the Cold war should benefit Africa in that it will no longer be seen as a battleground for superpower conflict. In a world at peace, more attention and resources should be freed to help the world's poorest. Nonetheless, many Africans now fear that the outside world will lose interest in their troubled continent, just at the moment when many negative trends from economic decline to AIDS to environmental degradation are likely to accelerate.
In a continent as diverse as Africa, democracy -- as it emerges, reemerges, or begins its development -- may take different forms, and its progress will be uneven. But we need not be inhibited in supporting values that have proved universal -- political and human rights, democratic limits on the powers of government, judicial independence, free press and free speech. To those who think these goals are out of reach because of Africa's poverty and disparate cultures, we say that democracy remains the political system most open to cultural diversity and most conducive to economic advance. Freedom, in its universal meaning, is Africa's birthright as much as it is anyone else's.
In the economic realm, hope lies in reducing the burden of statism and encouraging indigenous enterprise and human talent, especially in agriculture. The most important steps are those that must be taken by Africans themselves. Concepts of democracy and market economics must be applied in a continent where initially these concepts were rejected because socialism was fashionable. That failed experiment has now run its course, and political elites across Africa are rediscovering basic truths about political and economic freedom as the source of progress. We need to support this growing realism, which recognizes the failures from the past and which has produced pragmatic new leaders ready to move in new directions. Benign neglect will not suffice.
Africa is not without its beacons of hope. The efforts of white and black leaders in South Africa to move that country into a democratic, constitutional, post-apartheid era merit our active support and we have provided it. We have made clear our firm and enthusiastic support for the brave endeavor on which they have embarked.
Elsewhere in Africa, we can be proud of the role we played in bringing to an end civil wars in Angola and Ethiopia. We continue to play an active role in helping to resolve other conflicts such as those in Liberia and Mozambique.
Africa is now entering an age in which it can benefit from past mistakes and build a realistic, self-sustaining future. It is in our interest, for political as well as humanitarian reasons, to help that process.
III. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: A POLITICAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND A NEW UNITED NATIONS
Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. The stable foundation of our security will continue to be a common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and political values and security interests. Those nations with whom we are bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners in building a new world order.
As our response to the Gulf crisis demonstrated, our leadership in a new era must also include a broader concept of international community and international diplomacy. If tensions with the Soviet Union continue to ease, we will face more ambiguous -- but still serious -- challenges. It will be difficult to foresee where future crises will arise. In many cases they will involve states not part of one or another bloc. Increasingly we may find ourselves in situations in which our interests are congruent with those of nations not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the Gulf, we may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies but also nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral outlook. This will require flexibility in our diplomacy and military policy, without losing sight of the fundamental values which that diplomacy and policy are designed to protect and on which they are based. To this end, we are well served to strengthen the role of international organizations like the United Nations.
For over 40 years political differences, bloc politics and demagogic rhetoric have kept the UN from reaching the full potential envisioned by its founders. Now we see the UN beginning to act as it was designed, freed from the superpower antagonisms that often frustrated consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so often weakened its credibility.
The response of the UN to Iraq's unprovoked aggression against a member state has truly vindicated and rejuvenated the institution. But even before that, the UN had distinguished itself in fostering democratic change in Namibia and Nicaragua. In the near future, we hope to see it play a constructive role in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, El Salvador and elsewhere, assisting with elections and the return of displaced persons, as well as with peace-keeping.
The role of the UN in improving the human condition and ameliorating human suffering -- development, aid to refugees, education, disaster relief -- will continue to attract our leadership and resources. High on our agenda for international cooperation are the global challenges posed by illegal drugs, terrorism and degradation of the environment.
The costs of a world organization that can effectively carry out these missions are already significant and will increase as new tasks are undertaken. We have re-stated our intention to pay in full our annual assessments and are now paying arrearages. We intend to complete arrearages payments no later than 1995 and to pay our share of any new peacekeeping requirements. In voluntary funding, we will pay our fair share and encourage others to do the same.
THE CONTEST OF IDEAS AND THE NURTURING OF DEMOCRACY
Recent history has shown how much ideas count. The Cold War was, in its decisive aspect, a war of ideas. But ideas count only when knowledge spreads. In today's evolving political environment, and in the face of the global explosion of information, we must make clear to our friends and potential adversaries what we stand for.
The need for international understanding among different peoples, cultures, religions and forms of government will only grow. In a world without the clear-cut East-West divisions of the past, the flow of ideas and information will take on larger significance as once-isolated countries seek their way toward the international mainstream. Indeed, information access has already achieved global proportions. A truly global community is being formed, vindicating our democratic values.
Through broadcasts, academic and cultural exchanges, press briefings, publications, speakers and conferences, we engage those abroad in a dialogue about who and what we are -- to inform foreign audiences about our policies, democratic traditions, pluralistic society and rich academic and cultural diversity. We will increase our efforts to clarify what America has to contribute to the solution of global problems -- and to drive home democracy's place in this process.
ARMS CONTROL Arms control is an important component of a balanced strategy to ameliorate the deadly consequences of global tensions as well as to reduce their fundamental causes. Our goal remains agreements that will enhance the security of the United States and its allies while strengthening international stability by:
-- reducing military capabilities that could provide incentives to initiate attack;
-- enhancing predictability in the size and structure of forces in order to reduce the fear of aggressive intent;
-- ensuring confidence in compliance, through effective verification.
Our pursuit of these goals has profited from the recent, positive changes in East-West relations. With renewed commitment to conscientious implementation and the resolution of remaining issues, we are within reach of completing an arms control agenda that few imagined possible.
Much has already been accomplished. Within the past year we and the Soviets have agreed to cease production of chemical weapons and to destroy, using safe and environmentally- sound procedures, the vast majority of our chemical weapons stocks. We have agreed to new protocols to treaties on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, incorporating unprecedented on-site verification of compliance with the limits set by the treaties. At the Paris Summit last November, the United States, the Soviet Union and the other nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) endorsed new measures to promote transparency in military dispositions and practices.
Also in Paris, the United States, our North Atlantic allies, the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), a historic agreement that will establish numerical parity in major conventional armaments between East and West from the Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty will require thousands of weapons to be destroyed and includes unprecedented monitoring provisions. Submitting the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification was delayed by Soviet claims made after the treaty was signed -- that some of its ground force equipment held by units like naval infantry and coastal defense was not covered by the agreement. The satisfactory resolution of this question has opened the way for us to move forward.
Soviet behavior on CFE complicated the completion of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, during the London Economic Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev were able to overcome the last few obstacles on START, ending nine long years of difficult, technical negotiations. Signed in Moscow, this agreement will mark a fundamental milestone in reducing the risk of nuclear war-stabilizing the balance of strategic forces at lower levels, providing for significant reductions in the most threatening weapons and encouraging a shift toward strategic systems better suited for retaliation than for a first strike.
Our efforts to improve strategic stability will not stop here. We and the Soviets have pledged further efforts to enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. We will seek agreements that improve survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defenses. In particular, we will pursue Soviet agreement to permit the deployment of defenses designed to address the threat of limited ballistic missile strikes, a growing mutual concern. We are also consulting with our NATO allies on the framework that will guide the United States in future discussions with the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe.
The United States has long supported international agreements designed to promote openness and freedom of navigation on the high seas. Over the past year, however, the Soviet Union has intensified efforts to restrict naval forces in ways contrary to internationally recognized rights of access. We will continue to reject such proposals. As a maritime nation, with our dependence on the sea to preserve legitimate security and commercial ties, freedom of the seas is and will remain a vital interest. We will not agree to measures that would limit the ability of our Navy to protect that interest, nor will we permit a false equation to be drawn between our Navy and regional ground-force imbalances that are inherently destabilizing. Recent events in the Gulf, Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere show that American seapower, without arbitrary limits on its force structure or operations, makes a strong contribution to global stability and mutual security.
As we put the main elements of European and East-West arms control into place, attention will increasingly turn to other regional and global arms control objectives. None is more urgent than stopping the global proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them.
The Gulf crisis drove home several lessons about this challenge:
-- International agreements, while essential, cannot cope with the problem alone. Iraq is a party to both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Notwithstanding its treaty obligations, Iraq has used chemical weapons and pursued nuclear ambitions.
-- Export controls must be strengthened. Chemical weapons facilities in Libya and Iraq received technology and equipment from Western companies. Iraq used the deadly product of its facilities against its own people. Iraqi and several other nations' nuclear efforts and missile programs have also benefited from outside assistance.
-- A successful non-proliferation strategy must address the underlying security concerns that drive the quest to obtain advanced weapons and must encompass contingency planning to deal with these weapons should prevention fail.
We are pursuing a three-tiered non-proliferation strategy: to strengthen existing arrangements; to expand the membership of multilateral regimes directed against proliferation; and to pursue new initiatives -- such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the initiative the President launched in May for the Middle East.
This latter effort reflects all the elements of our non- proliferation strategy. It includes promising new approaches, such as a proposed set of guidelines for responsible conventional weapons transfers to the region and a proposal to freeze acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles. It also seeks to expand the membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, and to strengthen the application of these and other agreements where they are already in force.
In other areas, we have already tightened export controls, streamlining export-licensing procedures while taking full account of security needs. New standards will ensure that the export of supercomputers will be subject to stringent safeguards against misuse. Criminal penalties and other sanctions against those who contribute to proliferation will be expanded.
To thwart the export of chemical and biological weapon- related materials and technology, we have expanded our own controls over precursor chemicals and proposed stringent international controls, recognizing that only multilateral measures will be truly effective in a competitive global marketplace. This multilateral approach bore fruit in the twenty-nation Australia Group of major chemical suppliers, which agreed in May to control common lists of chemical weapon precursors and equipment usable in chemical weapons manufacture. The best non-proliferation measure, of course, would be a completed Chemical Weapons Convention.
Our efforts to stem the proliferation of threatening missiles center on the multinational Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), strengthened last year by the inclusion of several new members. Since missile proliferation efforts will surely persist, we and our MTCR partners must improve controls, broaden membership further and reinforce the emerging international consensus against the spread of missile technology.
In the nuclear sphere, last year's review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty produced a large measure of consensus that the NPT remains essential to global stability, although intransigence by a few delegations blocked unanimous agreement to a final conference declaration. The United States remains steadfast in support of the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides technical assistance for civilian uses of nuclear energy while safeguarding materials essential for the development of nuclear weapons. Although trouble spots remain, progress has been made. Iraqi nuclear efforts have been set back substantially, while the UN Special Commission implementing Security Council Resolution 687 seeks dismantlement of all nuclear weapon-related activities in Iraq. Argentina and Brazil have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to take steps toward bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which creates a Latin American nuclear-weapons- free zone. Agreement by India and Pakistan to ban attacks on each other's nuclear facilities also helped ease the tense nuclear rivalry in that part of the world.
The proliferation of advanced weapons poses an ominous challenge to global peace and stability. To meet it, we will work with our allies to address the causes of strife while curbing exports to builders of weapons of mass destruction.
The unprecedented scope and pace of change in today's world -- and the increasing number of actors now able to threaten global peace -- highlight the need for reliable information and a sophisticated understanding of events and trends. The global reach of American intelligence capabilities is a unique national asset, crucial not only to our own security, but also to our leadership role in responding to international challenges.
The Soviet Union necessarily remains a major concern of U.S. policy. While changes in the Soviet Union promise hope, the turbulence of change itself demands that we monitor events and assess prospects for the future. Our monitoring of Soviet military capabilities and the effective verification of arms control treaties will remain the bedrock of any effort to build confidence and a safer world.
In a new era there are also new tasks and new priorities. Regional turmoil will place growing burdens on intelligence collection, processing and analysis. At the same time, we must track the threats posed by narcotics trafficking, terrorism and the proliferation of advanced weapons. We must also be more fully aware of international financial, trade and technology trends that could affect the security of the United States, including its economic well-being.
Sweeping political and economic changes also make for a more challenging counterintelligence environment. Warmer relations between the United States and former adversaries will open new opportunities for the intelligence services of those countries. Growing international economic competition and potential regional instabilities vastly broaden the scope of the potential intelligence threat. Our traditional openness, combined with recent changes in immigration laws and the sheer volume of information flow in the United States, affords great access to sensitive information and facilities as well as to individuals who may be targets for intelligence collection.
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Foreign assistance is a vital instrument of American foreign policy. Now as we look forward to expanded cooperation with our prosperous fellow democracies, with a growing number of regional organizations and with a revitalized United Nations -- we are revisiting the direction and priorities of our foreign assistance program. We will focus our efforts and resources on five major challenges:
-- Promoting and consolidating democratic values: Our programs will be an increasingly valuable instrument for fostering political choice, human rights and self- determination. From Central America to South Africa to Eastern Europe, we have used our influence to advance these universal goals.
-- Promoting market principles: U.S. assistance must encourage economic reform and sustainable development. Multilaterally -- through institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- we foster policies that break down statist barriers to enterprise and unleash the productive forces within every society.
-- Promoting peace: The bonds of collective defense can be strengthened through economic and security assistance. Such programs allow friendly states to achieve the security and stability essential for political freedom and economic growth. They are also an indispensable tool in cementing our alliance relationships enhancing interoperability, promoting needed access and reaping goodwill.
-- Protecting against transnational threats: International terrorism, narcotics, AIDS and environmental degradation threaten all peaceful nations. Our aid helps combat these dangers.
-- Meeting urgent human needs. We will respond quickly and substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man- made disasters.
Managed wisely, our aid programs can play a key role in fostering a world order that comports with our fundamental values. But we must ensure that our resources are adequate, that our programs pursue well-defined goals, and that we retain the flexibility to respond to change and unforeseen requirements and opportunities. The changes we have recently proposed to the Foreign Assistance Act will eliminate obsolete and inconsistent provisions and set a solid foundation for cooperation with the Congress on a program that can respond to fast-moving events in the world as quickly as they occur. Such reform is urgently needed if our aid program is to be relevant to today's necessities.
The international trade in drugs is a major threat to our national security. No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions, and the domestic violence generated by the trade in drugs is all too familiar. Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign governments of our friends and weaken and distort national economies with a vast, debilitating black market and large funding requirements for enforcement, criminal justice, prevention and treatment systems. Demand reduction at home and an aggressive attack on the international drug trade are the main elements in our strategy. They must be pursued together.
During the 1990s, cocaine traffickers will likely try to develop new markets in Europe -- particularly in light of the impending relaxation of border controls between EC countries -- and in those nations of East Asia experiencing rapid economic growth. We can also expect increasingly energetic efforts to import cocaine and heroin into the United States, including the use of longer-range aircraft entering U.S. airspace via Canada and of drug-laden cargo containers transshipped to the United States via Europe and the Pacific. Renewed assaults on the U.S. market by increasingly sophisticated traffickers remind us of the need to also attack the drug trade at the source -- its home country base of operations.
Such an effort begins with bolstering the political commitment of drug producer and transit countries to strengthen their laws, legal institutions and programs to prosecute, punish, and -- where appropriate -- extradite drug traffickers and money launderers. In the Andean region, where most of the world's cocaine is cultivated and refined, we seek to enhance the effectiveness of host- nation law enforcement and military activities against powerful and well entrenched trafficking organizations, and to increase public and leadership awareness of the drug threat. Our trade, aid and investment programs aim to strengthen and diversify the legitimate economies of the drug- producing Andean nations to enable them to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating coca and its derivatives, major sources of income. Our heroin strategy will foster cooperation with other countries, to engage their resources to dismantle their own cultivation and refining industries, and reduce demand for drugs. We will solicit the assistance of others in influencing producers to whom we have limited access.
IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
As a nation founded by immigrants and refugees, the United States has a strong tradition of taking in those who flee persecution and seek a better life. We open our doors annually to tens of thousands of refugees and hundreds of thousands of immigrants, welcoming both for the diversity and strength they bring the Nation. We also have a commitment to help the uprooted who are in danger or in need, a commitment demonstrated in the past several months by our role in the international effort to assist Iraqi refugees and our reaching out to Africans and others.
In 1990 the United States welcomed refugees from all regions of the world. As in the past several years, the majority came from the Soviet Union and Asia. In Vietnam, we are dismayed by continued human rights abuses. Hanoi is, however, allowing former political prisoners to emigrate. The United States resettled 14,000 former political prisoners and their family members from Vietnam in 1990 and the number will increase this year. But we cannot take in everyone. We must look to other countries to be more receptive to those in need. Nor can the United States Government fund and provide for every refugee in this country. As in the past, our private sector has an important role to play.
As noted earlier, economic hardship, political uncertainty and ethnic strife may generate large numbers of refugees in Europe. Some will be true refugees and others will be economic migrants, those who move to escape economic misery. Though international responses must differ between these two categories -- to be able to protect those who flee persecution and may be in physical danger -- the world's nations must be ready to respond quickly and humanely to both. For 16 million refugees worldwide, the United States offers assistance through international programs and recognizes the critical role of nongovernmental organizations in providing care. Our budgeted refugee assistance levels have increased, and we will do our fair share. We will also meet our responsibility to search for diplomatic solutions to the problems that spawn refugee flows.
A period of turmoil and transition is often a period of dislocation. If our diplomatic efforts and our aid programs prove inadequate, the volume of refugees and migrants will be an index of our failure. The world community will need to be prepared.
IV. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
Events of the past year have reaffirmed the critical link between the strength and flexibility of the U.S. economy and our ability to achieve national objectives. Indeed, strong macroeconomic performance on the part of the United States is not only an economic objective but a prerequisite for maintaining a position of global political leadership.
Even as we now see a transformation of the global economy along lines consistent with policies we nave pursued for many years, new challenges -- the crisis in the Gulf and its aftermath, the political and economic transformation in Eastern Europe and potentially in the Soviet Union, the resurgence of democracy and market economies in Central and South America -- have placed new demands on our management of economic policy. We must ensure that our domestic economy and our economic involvement abroad are responsive to a changing economic landscape.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and actions taken by the international coalition to resist Iraqi aggression, especially tested our economic strength and our ability to help manage international economic forces. Economies around the world were affected by the volatility of oil prices and the disruption of economic ties to countries in the Gulf. Egypt, Turkey and Jordan were particularly hurt. We must continue to work to ensure the economic health of these countries as well as others that have suffered markedly from this crisis. The United States will provide leadership, but in close collaboration with major donors and creditors and with international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
As always, a dynamic domestic economy plays a critical role in helping us achieve national objectives in all spheres. Policies to control inflation, reduce the Federal deficit, promote savings, improve the labor force and encourage competitiveness and entrepreneurial initiative remain critical to our overall well-being and security. As economies expand worldwide, the economic strength of others will, of course, grow in relative terms. This is not a threat to us, but rather a success of Western policies. That said, Americans must realize that the economic strength vital to our national interests comes from investing for the future, thus putting a premium on domestic saving. Today's labor force and management, and those of tomorrow, must also be committed to quality and innovation. These are the fruits of hard work -- and a prerequisite for continued global leadership.
We continue to pursue a strategy that expands and strengthens market economies around the world. This will require international efforts to open markets and expand trade; to strengthen cooperation among major industrial countries and with international financial institutions; and to apply imaginative solutions to the problems of developing countries.
MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH
Clear signs are emerging that the U.S. economy is pulling out of its brief recession but uncertainty remains over economic performance in much of the rest of the world. Therefore, macroeconomic policies in all the major countries must be designed to sustain global economic recovery with price stability. Global growth is needed in order to create a favorable economic and trade environment for reform and reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and ensure as well the success of the democratic, market-oriented measures that have been adopted worldwide. The major countries must continue to strengthen global coordination of economic policies to achieve these aims.
While the U.S. trade deficit has continued to decline, trade imbalances with Japan and many other countries remain substantial. Reducing these imbalances remains a priority. I or the United States this requires a sustained effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate budget deficits while also encouraging private savings and investment in order to preserve U.S. competitiveness. Countries with large trade surpluses bear a special responsibility for maintaining adequate growth in domestic demand and opening their markets further to imports.
The aggregate debt of developing countries was projected to reach $1.3 trillion in 1990, according to the World Bank. Inappropriate domestic policies in debtor countries -- overvalued exchange rates, large budget deficits, investment in inefficient public enterprises and restrictions on trade and investment -- were major causes of this debt accumulation and contributed to capital flight. External shocks, high international interest rates and recession in the 1980s also hurt. Recently this burden has been exacerbated by the economic dislocations and fluctuations in energy prices resulting from the Gulf crisis.
In March 1989, the United States proposed a new international debt strategy that advanced voluntary reduction of commercial bank debt and debt service to help restore debtor financial health and pave the way for new commercial bank lending. Implementation of a strong economic reform program supported by the IMF and World Bank is a prerequisite. So far, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Morocco, Uruguay and Chile have negotiated agreements under these proposals. Others are undertaking reforms to obtain such support.
Creditor governments have also made substantial contributions to relief through rescheduling of official bilateral debt and have recently offered new treatment for the official debt of lower middle income countries, as mandated by last year's Houston Economic Summit, and for Poland and Egypt. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative also promotes growth in Latin America by emphasizing official debt reduction and investment reform.
Countries accept as natural that trade and investment should flow freely within national boundaries or within special regional groupings in order to improve economic and social welfare. Internationally, this concept has met varying degrees of acceptance. Countries have protected certain sectors for national security, economic, industrial or social reasons.
For the last 50 years, significant efforts have been undertaken, primarily through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to expand trade among all nations by opening markets and resolving trade disputes. The latest and most ambitious effort has been the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, begun in 1986. The Uruguay Round is distinguished from previous efforts by the intention of GATT members to extend GATT rules to areas such as agriculture, services, investment, the protection of intellectual property and textiles. At the Houston Economic Summit in 1990, the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the European Community committed to removing trade barriers in these politically difficult areas. The wise action of Congress in extending "fast track" procedures for trade agreements is evidence of America's commitment to responsible leadership.
The promise of the Uruguay Round has yet to be fulfilled, however, primarily because of strong differences over the scope and pace of efforts to dismantle the enormous barriers to trade in agricultural goods. Given the interdependence of modern economies, and the need to expand trading opportunities for emerging democracies and other developing countries, it is important that the Round be brought to a successful conclusion. This is a test of the ability and willingness of all countries to rise to the challenges of a new world order and will require compromise on all sides. The United States will do its part. A successful Round will not end bilateral trade disputes but it will enable countries to resolve them in a multilateral context and on the basis of internationally agreed rules.
The United States will continue its efforts to expand trade further. We are working with Japan under the Structural Impediments Initiative to lower trade barriers. As noted earlier, we are building on the successful U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement by undertaking discussions with Mexico and Canada which we expect will lead to a trilateral free trade agreement linking all three economies. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and preferential trade programs for the Caribbean basin and the Andean region will also foster trade liberalization.
The interrelationship of economic and military strength has never been stronger. Both are affected by the way technology transfer is handled, particularly with respect to export controls. Balances must be struck. Loss of technological leadership can undermine military readiness and strength. Not participating freely in worldwide markets constrains economic growth. Recent changes to our strategic trade policies reflect a new balance between these competing factors.
In cooperation with our Western partners in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), we have completely overhauled export controls, reducing them to a core list of only the most strategically significant goods and technologies. This action reflects the emergence of democratic governments in Eastern Europe as well as a reduced military threat to the United States and our allies from a dissolved Warsaw Pact and a Soviet army that is withdrawing. The result has been a two-thirds reduction in the licenses that industry is required to obtain prior to exporting.
Treating the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe differently from the Soviet Union, we and our COCOM partners have adopted a wide-ranging special procedure for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia that ensures that controlled technology imports are used for purely civilian applications. We look forward to the day when we can remove these countries completely from the list of proscribed destinations. We have a strong interest in promoting the growth of free markets in democratic societies. At the same time we must be sure that the easing of COCOM controls does not result in the proliferation of dangerous technologies to other areas like the Middle East. For that reason, we have -- in close cooperation with other supplier nations -- significantly improved controls on technologies useful in developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.
Secure, ample, diversified and clean supplies of energy are essential to our national economic prosperity and security. For the foreseeable future, oil will remain a vital element in our energy mix. For geological and economic reasons, U.S. oil imports are likely to increase in coming years. The rate of increase, however, could be reduced by improving the efficiency with which oil is used in the economy and by substituting alternative fuels.
Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive foreign policy and appropriate military capabilities. We will work to improve understanding among key participants in the oil industry of the basic fundamentals of the oil market. We will also maintain our capability to respond to requests to protect vital oil facilities, on land or at sea, while working to resolve the underlying political, social and economic tensions that could threaten the free flow of oil.
The stability of the Gulf region, which contains two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves, is of fundamental concern to us. Political and military turbulence in the region has a direct impact on our economy, largely through higher oil prices and potential supply disruptions. Diversification of both productive and spare capacity is important to providing a cushion to the oil market. Increased production, in an environmentally sound manner, from other areas would also contribute to the security of oil supplies.
Because energy markets particularly the oil market are global, our energy security requires close cooperation among energy consumers. The aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrates the need to improve strategic stock levels within oil-consuming countries and the value of international cooperation to help mitigate damage brought about by sudden, serious disruptions of supply. The United States should develop creative mechanisms to fill its Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the statutorily required one billion barrels, consistent with sound budgetary practices and avoiding an unnecessary burden on the oil market.
Our use of oil is the key source of our vulnerability to world oil supply disruption. To reduce this vulnerability, we must work to both reduce oil consumption and to use oil more efficiently. The efficient use of energy in all sectors of our economy is of particular importance. We must intensify The development of alternative sources of energy (nuclear, natural gas, coal and renewables) and support aggressive research and development of advanced energy technologies to provide the clean, affordable, reliable energy supplies we will need in the mid-21 st century.
To meet pressing environmental concerns, we must limit the harmful effects of energy production, transportation and use. The increased, safe use of nuclear power, for example, can significantly reduce green-house gas emissions.
We must manage the Earth's natural resources in ways that protect the potential for growth and opportunity for present and future generations. The experience of the past half-century has taught that democratic political institutions and free market economies enhance human well- being. But even as we experience political and economic success, we cannot ignore the costs that growth, unguided by wisdom, can impose on our natural environment. A healthy economy and a healthy environment go hand-in hand. Solutions must be found that protect our environment while allowing for the economic development needed to improve the living standards of a growing world population.
Global environmental concerns include such diverse but interrelated issues as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, food security, water supply, deforestation, biodiversity and treatment of wastes. A common ingredient in each is that they respect no international boundaries. The stress from these environmental challenges is already contributing to political conflict. Recognizing a shared responsibility for global stewardship is a necessary step for global progress. Our partners will find the United States a ready and active participant in this effort.
The time has come to look beyond brief space encounters and to commit to a future in which Americans and citizens of all nations live and work in space. We have developed a plan to make this vision a reality and the National Space Council, under Vice President Quayle, is charged with bringing coherence, continuity and commitment to our efforts. We have made solid progress in the five key elements of our space strategy:
-- Developing our space launch capability as a national resource: This infrastructure will be to the 21st century what the great highway and dam projects were to the 20th. Reliable space launchers will provide the "highway" to space and the solar system in the next century.
-- Expanding human presence and activity beyond earth orbit and into the Solar System: We are well underway with unmanned exploration of the Solar System. Magellan, Viking and Voyager have been spectacular successes, Galileo is on its way to Jupiter, Ulysses has launched on its wide- ranging orbit of the sun and soon we will begin missions to Saturn and the Asteroid Belt. The Space Exploration Initiative will build on the successes and expertise developed in the Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle and eventually the Space Station Freedom programs, ultimately establishing permanent human settlements on the Moon and putting humans on Mars.
-- Obtaining scientific, technological and economic benefits and improving the quality of life on earth: Communications satellites already link people around the globe; their contribution to the free flow of information and ideas played a part in the Revolution of '89. We also use space systems to verify arms control treaties. But the potential of space to improve life on earth has barely been tapped. A very promising application is in the area of the
onment -- monitoring and helping to understand the process of ecological change, and holding significant promise for new sources of energy, material and products.
-- Capitalizing on the unique environment of space to foster economic well-being: Private investment in space will create jobs, boost the economy and strengthen our scientific, engineering and industrial base. New commercial markets will be created, and existing industries will become stronger and more competitive in the world marketplace. The recently approved commercial launch policy is a first step in this process.
-- Ensuring the freedom of space for exploration and development: There are now some ten significant spacefaring nations, with others on the way. Space will become in the future what oceans have always been -- highways to discovery and commerce. But as with sea lanes, space lanes can be closed and can even be used as springboards for attack. We must ensure the freedom to use space for exploration and development, for ourselves and all nations. Assured access to space requires a healthy military space program. We must be able to monitor events in space, warn of threats and intervene to protect important space assets. This protection may take the form of passive measures to enhance the survivability of critical systems. We must also have the option of active defense systems, including an anti-satellite system, to stop an aggressor before he can use a space system to threaten objects or people in or from space.
V. RELATING MEANS TO ENDS: A DEFENSE AGENDA FOR THE 1990S
As the war to liberate Kuwait clearly showed, the essential demands on our military forces to deter conflict whenever possible but to prevail in those that do arise -- are certain to endure. Nonetheless, the specific challenges facing our military in the 1990s and beyond will be different from those that have dominated our thinking for the past 40 years.
In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies -- including possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe -- will shape how we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces. We must also have the ability to reconstitute forces, if necessary, to counter any resurgent global threat.
As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of the Soviet threat does not mean an end to all hazards. As we seek to build a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an expansionist communism than it is instability itself. And, in the face of multiple and varied threats to stability, we will increasingly find our military strength a source of reassurance and a foundation for security, regionally and globally.
In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changing but still dangerous world, we have developed a new defense strategy that provides the conceptual framework for our future forces. This new strategy will guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to defend our interests and meet our global responsibilities. It will also guide our restructuring so that our remaining forces are appropriate to the challenges of a new era. The four fundamental demands of a new era are already clear: to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be needed.
Deterrence will indeed be enhanced as a result of the START Treaty and U.S. force modernization efforts can go forward with greater knowledge and predictability about future Soviet forces. Nevertheless, even with the Treaty, Soviet nuclear capabilities will remain substantial. Despite economic and political difficulties, the Soviet Union continues its modernization of strategic forces. Even in a new era, deterring nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States.
Strategic Nuclear Forces
The modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-launched missiles will be vital to the effectiveness of our deterrent in the next century. We need to complete the Trident submarine program with the eighteen boats and modern missiles necessary to ensure a survivable force. The B-2 strategic bomber must be deployed so that the flexibility traditionally provided by the bomber force will be available in the future. The B-2 will also firmly plant our aerospace industry in a new era of low-observable technology and the bomber itself will have unique value across the spectrum of conflict. Finally, we must continue the development of land-based, mobile ICBMs in order to keep our deployment options open.
Our command, control and communications capabilities arc critical to nuclear deterrence and to ensuring the survivability of our constitutional government under all circumstances of attack. Our civil defense program is still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also providing important capabilities to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes.
The safety, security, control and effectiveness of United States nuclear weapon systems are also of paramount importance. We are incorporating the most modern safety and control features into our deterrent stockpile as rapidly as practicable and developing new safety technologies for future weapons. Older weapons that lack the most modern safety features are being replaced or retired.
Testing of nuclear weapons plays a key part in assuring the safety and effectiveness of our deterrent forces. While we test only as much as is required for national security purposes, testing is essential to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of our weapons, to identify any safety issues and to prove any corrective measures. A halt to nuclear testing would not eliminate weapons or increase security, but it would erode confidence in our deterrent and severely restrict our ability to make improvements, especially in nuclear safety.
Just as our weapons must be safe, the facilities that produce them must be safe, efficient, economical, and environmentally sound. Our current facilities are being renovated and brought up to modern standards. At the same time we are moving forward to consolidate and reconfigure the current large and older complex, looking toward one that will be smaller, more flexible and more efficient. Our production complex must be able to respond to potential needs ranging from accelerated production to accelerated retirement of weapons, depending on the security environment in the years ahead.
We must also recognize that the deterrence issues of a new era are now at hand. Despite the threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor of their use -- massive war in Europe -- is less likely than at any other time since World War II. These developments affect questions of nuclear targeting, the alert status and operational procedures of our forces and ultimately the type and number of weapons sufficient to ensure our safety and that of our allies. We have already begun to make adjustments to our nuclear forces and to the policies that guide them in recognition of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and changes in the Soviet Union itself. Beyond this, while we have traditionally focused on deterring a unitary, rational actor applying a relatively knowable calculus of potential costs and gains, our thinking must now encompass potential instabilities within states as well as the potential threat from states or leaders who might perceive they have little to lose in employing weapons of mass destruction.
Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
Below the level of strategic forces, we have traditionally maintained other nuclear forces for a variety of purposes. They have highlighted our resolve and have helped to link conventional defense to the broader strategic nuclear guarantee of the United States. This has helped remove incentives that otherwise might have accelerated nuclear proliferation. These systems have also served to deter an enemy's use of such weapons and they have contributed to the deterrence of conventional attack. These needs persist.
In Europe, we and our allies have always sought the lowest number and most stable types of weapons needed to prevent war. Indeed, NATO has unilaterally reduced thousands of nuclear weapons over the past decade, in addition to the elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons as called for in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. Changes in Europe have now allowed us to forgo plans to modernize our LANCE missiles and nuclear artillery shells and we will work to implement the commitments of the London Declaration with respect to short-range nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe.
Even with the dramatic changes we see in Europe, however, non strategic nuclear weapons remain integral to our strategy of deterrence. They make NATO's resolve unmistakably clear and help prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a nuclear response to military action might be discounted. In practical terms, this means greater reliance on aircraft armed with modern weapons. As the principal means by which Alliance members share nuclear risks and burdens, these aircraft and their weapons must be based in Europe. Such a posture is not designed to threaten any European state but to provide a secure deterrent in the face of unforeseen circumstances.
Flexible response and deterrence through the threat of retaliation have preserved the security of the United States and its allies for decades. In the early 1980s, we began the Strategic Defense Initiative in the face of an unconstrained Soviet ballistic-missile program and a significant Soviet commitment to strategic defenses. SDI was intended to shift deterrence to a safer, more stable basis as effective strategic defenses would diminish the confidence of an adversary in his ability to execute a successful attack.
Notwithstanding the continued modernization of Soviet offensive forces and the pursuit of more effective strategic defenses, the positive changes in our relationship with the Soviet Union and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have markedly reduced the danger of a war in Europe that could escalate to the strategic nuclear level. At the same time, the threat posed by global ballistic-missile proliferation and by an accidental or unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. Thus, the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles.
In response to these trends, we have redirected SDI to pursue a system providing Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). With adequate funding, it will be possible to begin to deploy systems that will better protect our troops in the field from ballistic-missile attack by the mid-l 990s and that will protect the United States itself from such attacks by the turn of the century. GPALS is designed to provide protection against a ballistic missile launched from anywhere against a target anywhere in the world. The system will be based on technologies which SDI has pioneered, but would be both smaller and less expensive than the initial deployment originally projected for SDI.
GPALS offers many potential advantages: the United States would be protected against limited strikes by ballistic missiles; our forward-deployed forces would be better defended against missile attacks; and our allies, many of whom lie on the edge of troubled areas, could also be better protected. The record of the PATRIOT against Iraqi SCUDs highlights the great potential for defenses against ballistic missiles, the critical role of missile defenses and the need to improve such defenses further.
GPALS could also provide incentives against further proliferation of ballistic missiles. If these missiles did not hold the potential to cause certain and immediate damage, nations might be less likely to go to such great lengths to acquire them. Access to U.S. assistance in defenses may also provide an incentive for countries not to seek ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction.
Maintaining a positive influence in distant regions requires that we demonstrate our engagement. The forward presence of our military forces often provides the essential glue in important alliance relationships and signals that our commitments are backed by tangible actions. Our presence can deter aggression, preserve regional balances, deflect arms races and prevent the power vacuums that invite conflict. While our forward deployments will be reduced in the future, the prudent forward basing of forces and the propositioning of equipment reduce the burden of projecting power from the continental United States. Indeed, certain regions -- like Europe and East Asia -- represent such compelling interests to the United States that they will demand the permanent deployment of some U.S. forces for as long as they are needed and welcomed by our allies as part of a common effort. But even in these regions, the site of our forward deployments can be smaller as the threat diminishes and the defense capabilities of our allies improve. In other regions our presence, while important, can take less permanent forms.
Across the Atlantic: Europe and the Middle East
In Europe, Soviet reductions and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact allow us to scale back our presence to a smaller, but still significant, contribution to NATO's overall force levels. This presence will include the equivalent of a robust army corps, with a corps headquarters, associated corps units, and two ground force divisions supplemented by several air wings, appropriate naval forces, and sufficient infrastructure to support a return of additional forces. Such a force will preserve the operational, not just symbolic, significance of our presence.
As called for in July at the London NATO Summit, we will work with our allies to make our forces in Europe more flexible and mobile and more fully integrated into multinational formations. NATO will establish a multinational Rapid Reaction Corps to respond to crises and we expect Alliance forces, including those of the United States, to be organized into multinational corps that would function in peacetime, and not just be contingent structures activated in a crisis. We will also exploit the prospect of longer warning time in the event of a major crisis by backing up our deployed forces with the ability to reinforce them with active and reserve units from the United States, supported by the ability to reconstitute larger forces over time should the need arise.
The aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf portends a need for some measure of continuing presence in that region consistent with the desires and needs of our friends. While the United States will not maintain a permanent ground presence, we are committed to the region's security. We will work with our friends to bolster their confidence and security through such measures as exercises, propositioning of heavy equipment and an enhanced naval presence. Our vital national interests depend on d stable and secure Gulf.
Across the Pacific
Our enduring interests in East Asia and the Pacific also demand forces sufficient to meet our responsibilities and to sustain our long-term relationships with friends and allies. While East Asia has been considerably less affected by the Revolution of '89 than Europe, the growing strength and self-reliance of our friends in the region permit some reduction in our presence.
A phased approach, responding to global and regional events, is the soundest. We have announced our intent to adjust military personnel levels in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase is designed to thin out existing force structure and reshape our security relationships. Before this phase ends in December 1992, over 15,000 U.S. personnel will be withdrawn. Later phases will reduce and reorganize our force structure further, as circumstances permit.
Korea represents the area of greatest potential danger, and reductions there must be carefully measured against North Korean actions. However, we have judged that the growing strength of our Korean allies permits us to reduce our presence and begin to move toward a security partnership in which the Korean armed forces assume the leading role. We are also encouraged by the progress of the Japanese Government in rounding out its own self-defense capabilities.
The Rest of the World
In other regions, as the need for our presence persists, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits, training missions, access agreements, propositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning and security and humanitarian assistance to sustain the sense of common interest and cooperation on which we would rely in deploying and employing our military forces. As the Gulf crisis clearly showed, our strategy is increasingly dependent on the support of regional friends and allies. In fact -- during crises -- the cooperation and support of those local states most directly threatened will be critical factors in determining our own course of action.
Despite our best efforts to deter conflict, we must be prepared for our interests to be challenged with force, often with little or no warning. The Gulf crisis was ample evidence that such challenges will not always be small or easily resolved. Because regional crises are the predominant military threat we will face in the future, their demands -- along with our forward presence requirements -- will be the primary determinant of the size and structure of our future forces.
The regional contingencies we could face are many and varied. We must be prepared for differences in terrain, climate and the nature of threatening forces, as well as for differing levels of support from host nations or others. We must also be able to respond quickly and effectively to adversaries who may possess cruise missiles, modern air defenses, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and even large armor formations. Although our forward deployed forces speed our ability to respond to threats in areas like the Pacific or Europe, there are other regions where threats, while likely to be less formidable, may prove no less urgent.
In this new era, therefore, the ability to project our power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where propositioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a less developed industrial base and infrastructure to support our forces once they have arrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move men and materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force. The 100-hour success of our ground forces in the war to liberate Kuwait was stunning, but we should not allow it to obscure the fact that we required six months to deploy these forces. As our overall force levels draw down and our forward-deployed forces shrink, we must sustain and expand our investment in airlift, sealift and where possible -- propositioning. We must also ensure unimpeded transit of the air and sea lanes and access to space through maritime and aerospace superiority. our security assistance must, among other things, enhance the ability of other nations to facilitate our deployments. And, over the longer term, we must challenge our technology to develop forces that are lethal but more readily deployable and more easily sustained than today's.
Readiness and Our Guard and Reserve Forces
For almost two decades, our Total Force Policy has placed a substantial portion of our military manpower in high- quality, well-trained, well-equipped and early-mobilizing Guard and Reserve units. Compared to maintaining such a force in the active component, this was a cost-effective strategy, a prudent response to an international security environment where the predominant threat was major conflict in Europe or global war with the Soviets, with warning of such a conflict measured in weeks or even days.
That environment has been transformed. Today we must reshape our Guard and Reserve forces so that they can continue their important contributions in new circumstances. While we still face the possibility of sudden conflict in many of the regional contingencies that could concern us, these threats -- despite their danger -- will be on a smaller scale than the threat formerly posed by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. This will allow a smaller force overall, but those units oriented towards short-warning, regional contingencies must be kept at high readiness.
Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to respond initially to any regional contingency with units -- combat and support -- drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more economically maintained in the reserve component, we will still rely on reserve support units in any extended confrontation. The primary focus of reserve combat units will be to supplement active units in any especially large or protracted deployment. To hedge against a future need for expanded forces to deal with a renewed global confrontation, which -- though possible -- is less likely and clearly less immediate than previously calculated, some reserve combat units will be retained in cadre status.
This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Force appropriate for the strategic and fiscal demands of a new era: a smaller, more self-contained and very ready active force able to respond quickly to emerging threats; and a reduced but still essential reserve component with emphasis on supporting and sustaining active combat forces, and -- in particularly large or prolonged regional contingencies - - providing latent combat capability that can be made ready when needed.
Even as we restructure for a new era, we will continue to place a premium on the quality of our military personnel, the backbone of any effective fighting force. True military power is measured by the professional skills and dedication of our young men and women. In six weeks and 1()0 decisive hours, today's military proved it is the most skilled and effective fighting force this Nation has ever possessed. As we make the adjustments appropriate to a new environment, we will preserve this precious resource.
Beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate wholly new forces should the need arise. Although we are hopeful for the future, history teaches us caution. The 20th century has seen rapid shifts in the geopolitical climate, and technology has repeatedly transformed the battlefield. The ability to reconstitute is what allows us safely and selectively to scale back and restructure our forces in-being.
This difficult task will require us to invest in hedging options whose future dividends may not always be measurable now. It will require careful attention to the vital elements of our military potential: the industrial base, science and technology, and manpower. These elements were easily accommodated in an era when we had to maintain large standing forces, when we routinely invested heavily in defense R&D and when new items of equipment were broadly and extensively produced. We will now have to work much more deliberately to preserve them.
The standard by which we should measure our efforts is the response time that our warning processes would provide us of a return to previous levels of confrontation in Europe or in the world at large. We and our allies must be able to reconstitute a credible defense faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense.
Reconstitution obviously includes manpower. Relatively large numbers of personnel, trained in basic military skills, can be raised in one to two years. But skilled, seasoned leaders -- high-quality senior NCOs and officers - - require many years to develop and we must preserve this critical nucleus to lead an expanding military force. This must be reflected in how we man active, reserve and cadre units over the long term.
Another challenge will be to maintain our edge in defense technology, even as we reduce our forces. Technology has historically been a comparative advantage for American forces, and we have often relied on it to overcome numerical disparities and to reduce the risk to American lives.
Our technological edge in key areas of warfare will be even more important at lower levels of forces and funding, and in the complex political and military environment in which our forces will operate. But maintaining this margin will become increasingly difficult as access to advanced weaponry spreads and as our defense industry shrinks. Even in regional contingencies it will not be uncommon for our forces to face high-technology weapons in the hands of adversaries. This spread of advanced systems will surely erode the deterrent value of our own -- and our competitive edge in warfare -- unless we act decisively to maintain technological superiority.
We will, of course, have to decide which technologies we want to advance and how we will pursue them. Our focus should be on promising, high-leverage areas, especially those that play to our comparative advantages and exploit the weaknesses of potential adversaries, whoever and wherever they may be. Stealth, space-based systems, sensors, precision weapons, advanced training technologies all these proved themselves in the Gulf, yet when these programs (and others) were begun, no one foresaw their use against Iraq. Our investment strategies must hedge against the unknown, giving future Presidents the flexibility that such capabilities provide.
We must be able to move promising research through development to rapid fielding when changes in the international environment so require. The "generation leaps" in technology and fielded systems that some have suggested may not be possible. We will have to build some systems, as the early production effort is a vital component of technology development.
Production, even in limited numbers, will also facilitate the development of innovative doctrine and organizational structures to make full use of the new technologies we field. In an era of tight fiscal constraints, our development efforts must also strive to make our weapons less expensive as well as more effective.
In the competition for scarce resources, emphasis on technology development -- to pursue those new capabilities that may be most decisive in the longer term -- may mean accepting some continued risk in the near term. But accepting such risk may well be prudent in a period of reduced East-West tensions.
The Industrial Base
Providing and sustaining modern equipment to support a rapid expansion of the armed forces is an equally difficult proposition. We will need a production base to produce new systems and a maintenance and repair base to support them. These requirements pose unique problems, as reduced defense budgets are shrinking the defense industrial sector overall. As we make procurement and investment decisions, we will have to place a value on the assured supply and timely delivery of defense materials in time of crisis.
In the near term, some of these problems can be ameliorated by retaining and storing equipment from units being deactivated. Over the longer term, however, as stored equipment becomes obsolete, the issue becomes our capability to expand production or use alternative sources of supply. We will need the capacity for industrial surge, accelerating orders that are already in the pipeline. We will also have to plan for production from new or alternative industrial capacity. It may also be possible to reduce unneeded military specifications to make greater use of items that can be created by the commercial production base. Above all, we must continue to involve the creative resources of our national economy and ensure that corporations continue to have incentives to engage in innovative defense work.
A SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED FORCE
Our future military will be smaller. Assuming there are no unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War. The changes we have seen in the overall international environment have made this smaller force possible, and the increasing demands on our resources to preserve the other elements of our national strength have made it necessary.
Minimum Essential Military Forces The Base Force
Yet these planned reductions will cut our forces to a minimally acceptable level -- to a Base Force below which further reductions would not be prudent. These minimum forces represent our national security insurance policy and consist of four basic force packages: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces and Contingency Forces.
Our Strategic Forces must continue to meet the enduring demands of nuclear deterrence and defense. The conventional force packages provide forces for forward presence as well as the ability to respond to crises. Our Atlantic Forces will be postured and trained for the heavy threats characteristic of Europe and Southwest Asia and must be modern and lethal enough to deal with these threats. Pacific Forces will be structured for an essentially maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities, backed by the essential air and ground forces for enduring deterrence and immediate crisis response. U.S.-based reinforcements will be lighter than those we envisage for the Atlantic, as befits the potential contingencies in the Pacific. Contingency Forces will include the Army's light and airborne units, Marine expeditionary brigades, special operations forces and selected air and naval assets. They will be largely based in the United States and -- since they must be able to respond to spontaneous and unpredictable crises -- they will largely be in the active component. At times, the quick deployment of such a force in itself may be enough to head off confrontation. At other times, we may need actually to employ this force to deal with insurgencies, conduct anti-drug or anti-terrorist operations, evacuate non-combatants or as we did in Desert Shield -- be the first into action while heavier forces are alerted and moved.
The reductions projected by the mid-1990s are dramatic. It will be important to manage their pace rationally and responsibly. We must accommodate the actions taken in support of Desert Storm and Desert Shield and we must be attentive to the professional skills of the armed forces that have been built up over the past decade -- and which, as the war made clear, remain vital to our national security. But now that the war has been won, and as long as no unanticipated ominous trends emerge, we will get back on the spending path agreed to before hostilities began. Highly effective military forces can be supported within the levels agreed to by Congress in the 1990 Budget Agreement if we can end unneeded programs, consolidate bases, streamline procedures and adjust overall manpower levels without arbitrary restrictions.
VI. TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY
The 20th century has taught us that security is indivisible. The safety, freedom and well-being of one people cannot be separated from the safety, freedom and well-being of all. Recently, the Gulf crisis strengthened this sense of international community. Many of the underlying forces now at work in the world are tending to draw that global community even closer together. Technology, especially the explosion of communication and information, has accelerated the pace of human contact. The growing acceptance of the democratic ideal -- evidenced in the erosion of totalitarianism and the expansion of basic human freedoms -- has also brought the world closer together. The expansion of commerce and the growing acceptance of market principles have accelerated the movement toward interdependence and the integration of economies. Even the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of enormous destructiveness have begun to draw the community of nations together in common concern.
As we move toward the 21st century, this interdependence of peoples will grow and will continue to demand responsible American leadership. Guided by the values that have inspired and nurtured our democracy at home, we will work for a new world in which peace, security and cooperation finally replace the confrontation of the Cold War, and overcome the kind of threat represented by Iraq's aggression.
Developments in the Soviet Union and elsewhere have set in motion a change in the strategic landscape as dramatic as that which the Nation experienced when Soviet policy first forced the Cold War upon us. The great threat to global peace has ebbed and we now see a Soviet state and society struggling to overcome severe internal crisis. Notwithstanding the uncertainties about the future course of the Soviet Union, that state's willingness -- indeed, in many ways, its ability -- to project power beyond its borders has been dramatically reduced for the foreseeable future. Our strategy for this new era recognizes the opportunities and challenges before us, and includes among its principles:
-- reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliances together, even as perceptions of a common security threat change;
-- encouraging the constructive evolution of the Soviet Union, recognizing the limits of our influence and the continuing power of Soviet military forces;
-- supporting the independence and vitality of the new Eastern European democracies even as we deal with the uncertainties of the Soviet future;
-- championing the principles of political and economic freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and happiness, as well as global peace;
-- working with others in the global community to resolve regional disputes and stem the proliferation of advanced weapons;
-- cooperating with the Soviet Union and others in achieving arms control agreements that promote security and stability;
-- reducing our defense burden as appropriate, while restructuring our forces for new challenges;
-- tending more carefully to our own economic competitiveness as the foundation of our long-term strength; and
-- addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows, drug abuse and environmental degradation.
We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements of our power will remain formidable. But our wealth and our strength are not without limits. We must balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must wisely choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs in the future. This is the challenge of strategy.
In this country we make such choices for peace just as we make the awful choices of war -- as a democracy. When President and Congress work together to build an effective security posture and policy -- was was done in the 1980s -- we are successful. In the Gulf, our armed forces benefited from the legacy of investment decisions, technological innovations, and strategic planning that came in the decade before. Today's planning decisions will determine whether we are well or ill prepared for the contingencies that will confront us in the future.
This is a heavy responsibility, shared between the President and Congress. We owe our servicemen and women not only the best equipment, but also a coherent strategy and posture geared to new realities. This coherence can only< come from a partnership between the Branches. Divided, we will invite disasters. United, we can overcome any challenge.
In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong when he doubted America's unity and will. The extraordinary unity we showed as a Nation in the Gulf assured that we would prevail. It also sent the message loud and clear that America is prepared for the challenges of the future, committed and engaged in the world, as a reliable ally, friend and leader. (END TEXT)
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:50 PM
White House Press Release
Classified National Security Information
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release April 17, 1995
- - - - - - -
Classified National Security Information
This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying,
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information.
Our democratic principles require that the American people be
informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our
Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information.
Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national interest
has required that certain information be maintained in
confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic
institutions, and our participation within the community of
nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's
security remains a priority. In recent years, however, dramatic
changes have altered, although not eliminated, the national
security threats that we confront. These changes provide a
greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open
Now, Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Part 1 Original Classification
Section 1.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order:
(a) "National security" means the national defense or
foreign relations of the United States.
(b) "Information" means any knowledge that can be
communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical
form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for,
or is under the control of the United States Government.
"Control" means the authority of the agency that originates
information, or its successor in function, to regulate accessto
(c) "Classified national security information" (hereafter
"classified information") means information that has been
determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked
to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.
(d) "Foreign Government Information" means:
(1) information provided to the United States
Government by a foreign government or governments, an
international organization of governments, or any
element thereof, with the expectation that the
information, the source of the information, or both,
are to be held in confidence;
(2) information produced by the United States pursuant
to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign
government or governments, or an international
organization of governments, or any element thereof,
requiring that the information, the arrangement, or
both, are to be held in confidence; or
(3) information received and treated as "Foreign
Government Information" under the terms of a predecessor
(e) "Classification" means the act or process by which
information is determined to be classified information.
(f) "Original classification" means an initial
determination that information requires, in the interest of
national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure.
(g) "Original classification authority" means an
individual authorized in writing, either by the President, orby
agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to
classify information in the first instance.
(h) "Unauthorized disclosure" means a communication or
physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized
(i) "Agency" means any "Executive agency," as defined in 5
U.S.C. 105, and any other entity within the executive branch
that comes into the possession of classified information.
(j) "Senior agency official" means the official designated
by the agency head under section 5.6(c) of this order to direct
and administer the agency's program under which information is
classified, safeguarded, and declassified.
(k) "Confidential source" means any individual or
organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be
expected to provide, information to the United States on matters
pertaining to the national security with the expectation that
the information or relationship, or both, are to be held in
(l) "Damage to the national security" means harm to the
national defense or foreign relations of the United States from
the unauthorized disclosure of information, to include the
sensitivity, value, and utility of that information.
Sec. 1.2. Classification Standards. (a) Information may
be originally classified under the terms of this order only if
all of the following conditions are met:
(1) an original classification authority is classifying
(2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or
is under the control of the United States Government;
(3) the information falls within one or more of the
categories of information listed in section 1.5 of this
(4) the original classification authority determines
that the unauthorized disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the
national security and the original classification
authority is able to identify or describe the damage.
(b) If there is significant doubt about the need to
classify information, it shall not be classified. This
provision does not:
(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or
procedures for classification; or
(2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject
to judicial review.
(c) Classified information shall not be declassified
automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure of
identical or similar information.
Sec. 1.3. Classification Levels. (a) Information maybe
classified at one of the following three levels:
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security that the original classification
authority is able to identify or describe.
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national
security that the original classification authority is
able to identify or describe.
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national security that
the original classification authority is able to
identify or describe.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other
terms shall be used to identify United States classified
(c) If there is significant doubt about the appropriate
level of classification, it shall be classified at the lower
Sec. 1.4. Classification Authority. (a) The authorityto
classify information originally may be exercised only by:
(1) the President;
(2) agency heads and officials designated by the
President in the Federal Register; or
(3) United States Government officials delegated this
authority pursuant to paragraph (c), below.
(b) Officials authorized to classify information at a
specified level are also authorized to classify information at a
(c) Delegation of original classification authority.
(1) Delegations of original classification
authority shall be limited to the minimum
required to administer this order. Agency heads
are responsible for ensuring that designated
subordinate officials have a demonstrable and
continuing need to exercise this authority.
(2) "Top Secret" original classification
authority may be delegated only by the President
or by an agency head or official designated
pursuant to paragraph (a)(2), above.
(3) "Secret" or "Confidential" original
classification authority may be delegated only
by the President; an agency head or official
designated pursuant to paragraph (a)(2), above;
or the senior agency official, provided that
official has been delegated "Top Secret"
original classification authority by the agency
(4) Each delegation of original classification
authority shall be in writing and the authority
shall not be redelegated except as provided in
this order. Each delegation shall identify the
official by name or position title.
(d) Original classification authorities must receive
training in original classification as provided in this order
and its implementing directives.
(e) Exceptional cases. When an employee, contractor,
licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency that does
not have original classification authority originates
information believed by that person to require classification,
the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with
this order and its implementing directives. The information
shall be transmitted promptly as provided under this order or
its implementing directives to the agency that has appropriate
subject matter interest and classification authority with
respect to this information. That agency shall decide within30
days whether to classify this information. If it is not clear
which agency has classification responsibility for this
information, it shall be sent to the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office. The Director shall determine the
agency having primary subject matter interest and forward the
information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency
for a classification determination.
Sec. 1.5. Classification Categories.
Information may not be considered for classification
unless it concerns:
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities (including special
activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United
States, including confidential sources;
(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters
relating to the national security;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding
nuclear materials or facilities; or
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems,
installations, projects or plans relating to the national
Sec. 1.6. Duration of Classification. (a) At the timeof
original classification, the original classification authority
shall attempt to establish a specific date or event for
declassification based upon the duration of the national
security sensitivity of the information. The date or event
shall not exceed the time frame in paragraph (b), below.
(b) If the original classification authority cannot
determine an earlier specific date or event for
declassification, information shall be marked for
declassification 10 years from the date of the original
decision, except as provided in paragraph (d), below.
(c) An original classification authority may extend the
duration of classification or reclassify specific information
for successive periods not to exceed 10 years at a time if such
action is consistent with the standards and procedures
established under this order. This provision does not apply to
information contained in records that are more than 25 years old
and have been determined to have permanent historical value
under title 44, United States Code.
(d) At the time of original classification, the original
classification authority may exempt from declassification within
10 years specific information, the unauthorized disclosure of
which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the
national security for a period greater than that provided in
paragraph (b), above, and the release of which could reasonably
be expected to:
(1) reveal an intelligence source, method, or activity,
or a cryptologic system or activity;
(2) reveal information that would assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(3) reveal information that would impair the
development or use of technology within a United States
(4) reveal United States military plans, or national
security emergency preparedness plans;
(5) reveal foreign government information;
(6) damage relations between the United States and a
foreign government, reveal a confidential source, or
seriously undermine diplomatic activities that are
reasonably expected to be ongoing for a period greater
than that provided in paragraph (b), above;
(7) impair the ability of responsible United States
Government officials to protect the President, the Vice
President, and other individuals for whom protection
services, in the interest of national security, are
(8) violate a statute, treaty, or international
(e) Information marked for an indefinite duration of
classification under predecessor orders, for example,
"Originating Agency's Determination Required," or information
classified under predecessor orders that contains no
declassification instructions shall be declassified in
accordance with part 3 of this order.
Sec. 1.7. Identification and Markings. (a) At the time
of original classification, the following shall appear on the
face of each classified document, or shall be applied to other
classified media in an appropriate manner:
(1) one of the three classification levels defined in
section 1.3 of this order;
(2) the identity, by name or personal identifier and
position, of the original classification authority;
(3) the agency and office of origin, if not otherwise
(4) declassification instructions, which shall indicate
one of the following:
(A) the date or event for declassification, as
prescribed in section 1.6(a) or section 1.6(c);
(B) the date that is 10 years from the date of
original classification, as prescribed in
section 1.6(b); or
(C) the exemption category from classification,
as prescribed in section 1.6(d); and
(5) a concise reason for classification which, at a
minimum, cites the applicable classification categories
in section 1.5 of this order.
(b) Specific information contained in paragraph (a),
above, may be excluded if it would reveal additional classified
(c) Each classified document shall, by marking or other
means, indicate which portions are classified, with the
applicable classification level, which portions are exempt from
declassification under section 1.6(d) of this order, and which
portions are unclassified. In accordance with standards
prescribed in directives issued under this order, the Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office may grant waivers
of this requirement for specified classes of documents or
information. The Director shall revoke any waiver upon a
finding of abuse.
(d) Markings implementing the provisions of this order,
including abbreviations and requirements to safeguard classified
working papers, shall conform to the standards prescribed in
implementing directives issued pursuant to this order.
(e) Foreign government information shall retain its
original classification markings or shall be assigned a U.S.
classification that provides a degree of protection at least
equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the
(f) Information assigned a level of classification under
this or predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at
that level of classification despite the omission of other
required markings. Whenever such information is used in the
derivative classification process or is reviewed for possible
declassification, holders of such information shall coordinate
with an appropriate classification authority for the application
of omitted markings.
(g) The classification authority shall, whenever
practicable, use a classified addendum whenever classified
information constitutes a small portion of an otherwise
Sec. 1.8. Classification Prohibitions and Limitations.
(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to:
(1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or
(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization,or
(3) restrain competition; or
(4) prevent or delay the release of information that
does not require protection in the interest of national
(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly
related to the national security may not be classified.
(c) Information may not be reclassified after it has been
declassified and released to the public under proper authority.
(d) Information that has not previously been disclosed to
the public under proper authority may be classified or
reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under
the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or the Privacy Act
of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), or the mandatory review provisions of
section 3.6 of this order only if such classification meets the
requirements of this order and is accomplished on a
document-by-document basis with the personal participation or
under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head,
or the senior agency official designated under section 5.6 of
this order. This provision does not apply to classified
information contained in records that are more than 25 years old
and have been determined to have permanent historical value
under title 44, United States Code.
(e) Compilations of items of information which are
individually unclassified may be classified if the compiled
information reveals an additional association or relationship
(1) meets the standards for classification under this
(2) is not otherwise revealed in the individual items
As used in this order, "compilation" means an aggregation of
pre-existing unclassified items of information.
Sec. 1.9. Classification Challenges. (a) Authorized
holders of information who, in good faith, believe that its
classification status is improper are encouraged and expectedto
challenge the classification status of the information in
accordance with agency procedures established under paragraph
(b) In accordance with implementing directives issued
pursuant to this order, an agency head or senior agency official
shall establish procedures under which authorized holders of
information are encouraged and expected to challenge the
classification of information that they believe is improperly
classified or unclassified. These procedures shall assure that:
(1) individuals are not subject to retribution for
bringing such actions;
(2) an opportunity is provided for review by an
impartial official or panel; and
(3) individuals are advised of their right to appeal
agency decisions to the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel established by section 5.4
of this order.
Part 2 Derivative Classification
Sec. 2.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a)
"Derivative classification" means the incorporating,
paraphrasing, restating or generating in new form information
that is already classified, and marking the newly developed
material consistent with the classification markings that apply
to the source information. Derivative classification includes
the classification of information based on classification
guidance. The duplication or reproduction of existing
classified information is not derivative classification.
(b) "Classification guidance" means any instruction or
source that prescribes the classification of specific
(c) "Classification guide" means a documentary form of
classification guidance issued by an original classification
authority that identifies the elements of information regarding
a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the
level and duration of classification for each such element.
(d) "Source document" means an existing document that
contains classified information that is incorporated,
paraphrased, restated, or generated in new form into a new
(e) "Multiple sources" means two or more source documents,
classification guides, or a combination of both.
Sec. 2.2. Use of Derivative Classification. (a) Persons
who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified
information, or who only apply classification markings derived
from source material or as directed by a classification guide,
need not possess original classification authority.
(b) Persons who apply derivative classification markings
(1) observe and respect original classification
(2) carry forward to any newly created documents the
pertinent classification markings. For information
derivatively classified based on multiple sources, the
derivative classifier shall carry forward:
(A) the date or event for declassification that
corresponds to the longest period of
classification among the sources; and
(B) a listing of these sources on or attached to
the official file or record copy.
Sec. 2.3. Classification Guides. (a) Agencies with
original classification authority shall prepare classification
guides to facilitate the proper and uniform derivative
classification of information. These guides shall conform to
standards contained in directives issued under this order.
(b) Each guide shall be approved personally and in writing
by an official who:
(1) has program or supervisory responsibility
over the information or is the senior agency
(2) is authorized to classify information
originally at the highest level of
classification prescribed in the guide.
(c) Agencies shall establish procedures to assure that
classification guides are reviewed and updated as provided in
directives issued under this order.
Part 3 Declassification And Downgrading
Sec. 3.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a)
"Declassification" means the authorized change in the status of
information from classified information to unclassified
(b) "Automatic declassification" means the
declassification of information based solely upon:
(1) the occurrence of a specific date or event as
determined by the original classification authority; or
(2) the expiration of a maximum time frame for duration
of classification established under this order.
(c) "Declassification authority" means:
(1) the official who authorized the original
classification, if that official is still serving in the
(2) the originator's current successor in function;
(3) a supervisory official of either; or
(4) officials delegated declassification authority in
writing by the agency head or the senior agency
(d) "Mandatory declassification review" means the review
for declassification of classified information in response toa
request for declassification that meets the requirements under
section 3.6 of this order.
(e) "Systematic declassification review" means the review
for declassification of classified information contained in
records that have been determined by the Archivist of the United
States ("Archivist") to have permanent historical value in
accordance with chapter 33 of title 44, United States Code.
(f) "Declassification guide" means written instructions
issued by a declassification authority that describes the
elements of information regarding a specific subject that maybe
declassified and the elements that must remain classified.
(g) "Downgrading" means a determination by a
declassification authority that information classified and
safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and
safeguarded at a lower level.
(h) "File series" means documentary material, regardless
of its physical form or characteristics, that is arranged in
accordance with a filing system or maintained as a unit because
it pertains to the same function or activity.
Sec. 3.2. Authority for Declassification. (a)
Information shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets
the standards for classification under this order.
(b) It is presumed that information that continues to meet
the classification requirements under this order requires
continued protection. In some exceptional cases, however, the
need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public
interest in disclosure of the information, and in these cases
the information should be declassified. When such questions
arise, they shall be referred to the agency head or the senior
agency official. That official will determine, as an exercise
of discretion, whether the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably
be expected from disclosure. This provision does not:
(1) amplify or modify the substantive criteria or
procedures for classification; or
(2) create any substantive or procedural rights subject
to judicial review.
(c) If the Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office determines that information is classified in violationof
this order, the Director may require the information to be
declassified by the agency that originated the classification.
Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the
President through the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. The information shall remain classified
pending a prompt decision on the appeal.
(d) The provisions of this section shall also apply to
agencies that, under the terms of this order, do not have
original classification authority, but had such authority under
predecessor orders. Sec. 3.3. Transferred Information. (a)
In the case of classified information transferred in
conjunction with a transfer of functions, and not merely for
storage purposes, the receiving agency shall be deemed to be the
originating agency for purposes of this order.
(b) In the case of classified information that is not
officially transferred as described in paragraph (a), above, but
that originated in an agency that has ceased to exist and for
which there is no successor agency, each agency in possession
of such information shall be deemed to be the originating agency
for purposes of this order. Such information may be
declassified or downgraded by the agency in possession after
consultation with any other agency that has an interest in the
subject matter of the information.
(c) Classified information accessioned into the National
Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives") as of
the effective date of this order shall be declassified or
downgraded by the Archivist in accordance with this order, the
directives issued pursuant to this order, agency
declassification guides, and any existing procedural agreement
between the Archivist and the relevant agency head.
(d) The originating agency shall take all reasonable steps
to declassify classified information contained in records
determined to have permanent historical value before they are
accessioned into the National Archives. However, the Archivist
may require that records containing classified information be
accessioned into the National Archives when necessary to comply
with the provisions of the Federal Records Act. This provision
does not apply to information being transferred to the Archivist
pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code, or
information for which the National Archives and Records
Administration serves as the custodian of the records of an
agency or organization that goes out of existence.
(e) To the extent practicable, agencies shall adopt a
system of records management that will facilitate the public
release of documents at the time such documents are declassified
pursuant to the provisions for automatic declassification in
sections 1.6 and 3.4 of this order.
Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to
paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this
order, all classified information contained in records that (1)
are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have
permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code,
shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records
have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified informationin
such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than
25 years from the date of its original classification, except
as provided in paragraph (b), below.
(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic
declassification under paragraph (a), above, specific
information, the release of which should be expected to:
(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source,
or reveal information about the application of an
intelligence source or method, or reveal the identityof
a human intelligence source when the unauthorized
disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably
damage the national security interests of the United
(2) reveal information that would assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(3) reveal information that would impair U.S.
cryptologic systems or activities;
(4) reveal information that would impair the
application of state of the art technology within a U.S.
(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain
(6) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair relations between the United States
and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably
undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United
(7) reveal information that would clearly and
demonstrably impair the current ability of United States
Government officials to protect the President, Vice
President, and other officials for whom protection
services, in the interest of national security, are
(8) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair current national security emergency
preparedness plans; or
(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international
(c) No later than the effective date of this order, an
agency head shall notify the President through the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs of any specific file
series of records for which a review or assessment has
determined that the information within those file series almost
invariably falls within one or more of the exemption categories
listed in paragraph (b), above, and which the agency proposesto
exempt from automatic declassification. The notification shall
(1) a description of the file series;
(2) an explanation of why the information within the
file series is almost invariably exempt from automatic
declassification and why the information must remain
classified for a longer period of time; and
(3) except for the identity of a confidential human
source or a human intelligence source, as provided in
paragraph (b), above, a specific date or event for
declassification of the information.
The President may direct the agency head not to exempt the file
series or to declassify the information within that series atan
earlier date than recommended.
(d) At least 180 days before information is automatically
declassified under this section, an agency head or senior agency
official shall notify the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office, serving as Executive Secretary of the
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, of any
specific information beyond that included in a notification to
the President under paragraph (c), above, that the agency
proposes to exempt from automatic declassification. The
notification shall include:
(1) a description of the information;
(2) an explanation of why the information is exempt
from automatic declassification and must remain
classified for a longer period of time; and
(3) except for the identity of a confidential human
source or a human intelligence source, as provided in
paragraph (b), above, a specific date or event for
declassification of the information. The Panel may
direct the agency not to exempt the information or to
declassify it at an earlier date than recommended. The
agency head may appeal such a decision to the President
through the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. The information will remain
classified while such an appeal is pending.
(e) No later than the effective date of this order, the
agency head or senior agency official shall provide the Director
of the Information Security Oversight Office with a plan for
compliance with the requirements of this section, including the
establishment of interim target dates. Each such plan shall
include the requirement that the agency declassify at least 15
percent of the records affected by this section no later than1
year from the effective date of this order, and similar
commitments for subsequent years until the effective date for
(f) Information exempted from automatic declassification
under this section shall remain subject to the mandatory and
systematic declassification review provisions of this order.
(g) The Secretary of State shall determine when the United
States should commence negotiations with the appropriate
officials of a foreign government or international organization
of governments to modify any treaty or international agreement
that requires the classification of information contained in
records affected by this section for a period longer than 25
years from the date of its creation, unless the treaty or
international agreement pertains to information that may
otherwise remain classified beyond 25 years under this section.
Sec. 3.5. Systematic Declassification Review. (a) Each
agency that has originated classified information under this
order or its predecessors shall establish and conduct a program
for systematic declassification review. This program shall
apply to historically valuable records exempted from automatic
declassification under section 3.4 of this order. Agencies
shall prioritize the systematic review of records based upon:
(1) recommendations of the Information Security Policy
Advisory Council, established in section 5.5 of this
order, on specific subject areas for systematic review
(2) the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood
of declassification upon review.
(b) The Archivist shall conduct a systematic
declassification review program for classified information: (1)
accessioned into the National Archives as of the effective date
of this order; (2) information transferred to the Archivist
pursuant to section 2203 of title 44, United States Code; and
(3) information for which the National Archives and Records
Administration serves as the custodian of the records of an
agency or organization that has gone out of existence. This
program shall apply to pertinent records no later than 25 years
from the date of their creation. The Archivist shall establish
priorities for the systematic review of these records based upon
the recommendations of the Information Security Policy Advisory
Council; or the degree of researcher interest and the likelihood
of declassification upon review. These records shall be
reviewed in accordance with the standards of this order, its
implementing directives, and declassification guides providedto
the Archivist by each agency that originated the records. The
Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall
assure that agencies provide the Archivist with adequate and
current declassification guides.
(c) After consultation with affected agencies, the
Secretary of Defense may establish special procedures for
systematic review for declassification of classified cryptologic
information, and the Director of Central Intelligence may
establish special procedures for systematic review for
declassification of classified information pertaining to
intelligence activities (including special activities), or
intelligence sources or methods.
Sec. 3.6. Mandatory Declassification Review. (a) Except
as provided in paragraph (b), below, all information classified
under this order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a
review for declassification by the originating agency if:
(1) the request for a review describes the document or
material containing the information with sufficient
specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a
reasonable amount of effort;
(2) the information is not exempted from search and
review under the Central Intelligence Agency Information
(3) the information has not been reviewed for
declassification within the past 2 years. If the agency
has reviewed the information within the past 2 years,or
the information is the subject of pending litigation,
the agency shall inform the requester of this fact and
of the requester's appeal rights.
(b) Information originated by:
(1) the incumbent President;
(2) the incumbent President's White House Staff;
(3) committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the
incumbent President; or
(4) other entities within the Executive Office of the
President that solely advise and assist the incumbent
President is exempted from the provisions of paragraph
(a), above. However, the Archivist shall have the
authority to review, downgrade, and declassify
information of former Presidents under the control of
the Archivist pursuant to sections 2107, 2111, 2111
note, or 2203 of title 44, United States Code. Review
procedures developed by the Archivist shall provide for
consultation with agencies having primary subject matter
interest and shall be consistent with the provisions of
applicable laws or lawful agreements that pertain to the
respective Presidential papers or records. Agencies
with primary subject matter interest shall be notified
promptly of the Archivist's decision. Any final
decision by the Archivist may be appealed by the
requester or an agency to the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel. The information shall
remain classified pending a prompt decision on the
(c) Agencies conducting a mandatory review for
declassification shall declassify information that no longer
meets the standards for classification under this order. They
shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise
authorized and warranted under applicable law.
(d) In accordance with directives issued pursuant to this
order, agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests
for the mandatory review of classified information. These
procedures shall apply to information classified under this or
predecessor orders. They also shall provide a means for
administratively appealing a denial of a mandatory review
request, and for notifying the requester of the right to appeal
a final agency decision to the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel.
(e) After consultation with affected agencies, the
Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the
review of cryptologic information, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall develop special procedures for the review of
information pertaining to intelligence activities (including
special activities), or intelligence sources or methods, and the
Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of
information accessioned into the National Archives.
Sec. 3.7. Processing Requests and Reviews. In responseto
a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act,
the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of
this order, or pursuant to the automatic declassification or
systematic review provisions of this order:
(a) An agency may refuse to confirm or deny the existence
or nonexistence of requested information whenever the fact of
its existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this
(b) When an agency receives any request for documents in
its custody that contain information that was originally
classified by another agency, or comes across such documents in
the process of the automatic declassification or systematic
review provisions of this order, it shall refer copies of any
request and the pertinent documents to the originating agency
for processing, and may, after consultation with the originating
agency, inform any requester of the referral unless such
association is itself classified under this order. In cases in
which the originating agency determines in writing that a
response under paragraph (a), above, is required, the referring
agency shall respond to the requester in accordance with that
Sec. 3.8. Declassification Database. (a) The Archivist
in conjunction with the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office and those agencies that originate classified
information, shall establish a Governmentwide database of
information that has been declassified. The Archivist shall
also explore other possible uses of technology to facilitate
the declassification process.
(b) Agency heads shall fully cooperate with the Archivist
in these efforts.
(c) Except as otherwise authorized and warranted by law,
all declassified information contained within the database
established under paragraph (a), above, shall be available to
Part 4 Safeguarding
Sec. 4.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a)
"Safeguarding" means measures and controls that are prescribed
to protect classified information.
(b) "Access" means the ability or opportunity to gain
knowledge of classified information.
(c) "Need-to-know" means a determination made by an
authorized holder of classified information that a prospective
recipient requires access to specific classified information in
order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized
(d) "Automated information system" means an assembly of
computer hardware, software, or firmware configured to collect,
create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store, or
control data or information.
(e) "Integrity" means the state that exists when
information is unchanged from its source and has not been
accidentally or intentionally modified, altered, or destroyed.
(f) "Network" means a system of two or more computers that
can exchange data or information.
(g) "Telecommunications" means the preparation,
transmission, or communication of information by electronic
(h) "Special access program" means a program established
for a specific class of classified information that imposes
safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally
required for information at the same classification level.
Sec. 4.2. General Restrictions on Access. (a) A person
may have access to classified information provided that:
(1) a favorable determination of eligibility for access
has been made by an agency head or the agency head's
(2) the person has signed an approved nondisclosure
(3) the person has a need-to-know the information.
(b) Classified information shall remain under the control
of the originating agency or its successor in function. An
agency shall not disclose information originally classified by
another agency without its authorization. An official or
employee leaving agency service may not remove classified
information from the agency's control.
(c) Classified information may not be removed from
official premises without proper authorization.
(d) Persons authorized to disseminate classified
information outside the executive branch shall assure the
protection of the information in a manner equivalent to that
provided within the executive branch.
(e) Consistent with law, directives, and regulation, an
agency head or senior agency official shall establish uniform
procedures to ensure that automated information systems,
including networks and telecommunications systems, that collect,
create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, or store
classified information have controls that:
(1) prevent access by unauthorized persons; and
(2) ensure the integrity of the information.
(f) Consistent with law, directives, and regulation, each
agency head or senior agency official shall establish controls
to ensure that classified information is used, processed,
stored, reproduced, transmitted, and destroyed under conditions
that provide adequate protection and prevent access by
(g) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this
order, an agency shall safeguard foreign government information
under standards that provide a degree of protection at least
equivalent to that required by the government or international
organization of governments that furnished the information.
When adequate to achieve equivalency, these standards may be
less restrictive than the safeguarding standards that ordinarily
apply to United States "Confidential" information, including
allowing access to individuals with a need-to-know who have not
otherwise been cleared for access to classified information or
executed an approved nondisclosure agreement.
(h) Except as provided by statute or directives issued
pursuant to this order, classified information originating in
one agency may not be disseminated outside any other agency to
which it has been made available without the consent of the
originating agency. An agency head or senior agency official
may waive this requirement for specific information originated
within that agency. For purposes of this section, the
Department of Defense shall be considered one agency.
Sec. 4.3. Distribution Controls. (a) Each agency shall
establish controls over the distribution of classified
information to assure that it is distributed only to
organizations or individuals eligible for access who also have a
need-to-know the information.
(b) Each agency shall update, at least annually, the
automatic, routine, or recurring distribution of classified
information that they distribute. Recipients shall cooperate
fully with distributors who are updating distribution lists and
shall notify distributors whenever a relevant change in status
Sec. 4.4. Special Access Programs. (a) Establishment of
special access programs. Unless otherwise authorized by the
President, only the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, or the principal
deputy of each, may create a special access program. For
special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities
(including special activities, but not including military
operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence
sources or methods, this function will be exercised by the
Director of Central Intelligence. These officials shall keep
the number of these programs at an absolute minimum, and shall
establish them only upon a specific finding that:
(1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific
information is exceptional; and
(2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for
access applicable to information classified at the same
level are not deemed sufficient to protect the
information from unauthorized disclosure; or
(3) the program is required by statute.
(b) Requirements and Limitations. (1) Special access
programs shall be limited to programs in which the number of
persons who will have access ordinarily will be reasonably small
and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced
protection for the information involved.
(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a
system of accounting for special access programs
consistent with directives issued pursuant to this
(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the
oversight program established under section 5.6(c) of
this order. In addition, the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded
access to these programs, in accordance with the
security requirements of each program, in order to
perform the functions assigned to the Information
Security Oversight Office under this order. An agency
head may limit access to a special access program to the
Director and no more than one other employee of the
Information Security Oversight Office; or, for special
access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and
vulnerable, to the Director only.
(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review
annually each special access program to determine
whether it continues to meet the requirements of this
(5) Upon request, an agency shall brief the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, or his
or her designee, on any or all of the agency's special
(c) Within 180 days after the effective date of this
order, each agency head or principal deputy shall review all
existing special access programs under the agency's
jurisdiction. These officials shall terminate any special
access programs that do not clearly meet the provisions of this
order. Each existing special access program that an agency head
or principal deputy validates shall be treated as if it were
established on the effective date of this order.
(d) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement
made by or under 10 U.S.C. 119.
Sec. 4.5. Access by Historical Researchers and Former
Presidential Appointees. (a) The requirement in section
4.2(a)(3) of this order that access to classified information
may be granted only to individuals who have a need-to-know the
information may be waived for persons who:
(1) are engaged in historical research projects; or
(2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to
which they were appointed by the President.
(b) Waivers under this section may be granted only if the
agency head or senior agency official of the originating agency:
(1) determines in writing that access is consistent
with the interest of national security;
(2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified
information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise,
and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a
manner consistent with this order; and
(3) limits the access granted to former Presidential
appointees to items that the person originated,
reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a
Part 5 Implementation And Review
Sec. 5.1. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a)
"Self-inspection" means the internal review and evaluation of
individual agency activities and the agency as a whole with
respect to the implementation of the program established under
this order and its implementing directives.
(b) "Violation" means:
(1) any knowing, willful, or negligent action that
could reasonably be expected to result in an
unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
(2) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to
classify or continue the classification of information
contrary to the requirements of this order or its
implementing directives; or
(3) any knowing, willful, or negligent action to create
or continue a special access program contrary to the
requirements of this order.
(c) "Infraction" means any knowing, willful, or negligent
action contrary to the requirements of this order or its
implementing directives that does not comprise a "violation,"as
Sec. 5.2. Program Direction. (a) The Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the
co-chairs of the Security Policy Board, shall issue such
directives as are necessary to implement this order. These
directives shall be binding upon the agencies. Directives
issued by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall establish standards for:
(1) classification and marking principles;
(2) agency security education and training programs;
(3) agency self-inspection programs; and
(4) classification and declassification guides.
(b) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall delegate the implementation and monitorship functions of
this program to the Director of the Information Security
(c) The Security Policy Board, established by a
Presidential Decision Directive, shall make a recommendation to
the President through the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs with respect to the issuance of a
Presidential directive on safeguarding classified information.
The Presidential directive shall pertain to the handling,
storage, distribution, transmittal, and destruction of and
accounting for classified information.
Sec. 5.3. Information Security Oversight Office. (a)
There is established within the Office of Management and Budget
an Information Security Oversight Office. The Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall appoint the Director of
the Information Security Oversight Office, subject to the
approval of the President.
(b) Under the direction of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget acting in consultation with the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of
the Information Security Oversight Office shall:
(1) develop directives for the implementation of this
(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with
this order and its implementing directives;
(3) review and approve agency implementing regulations
and agency guides for systematic declassification review
prior to their issuance by the agency;
(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of
each agency's program established under this order, and
to require of each agency those reports, information,
and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill
its responsibilities. If granting access to specific
categories of classified information would pose an
exceptional national security risk, the affected agency
head or the senior agency official shall submit a
written justification recommending the denial of access
to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
within 60 days of the request for access. Access shall
be denied pending a prompt decision by the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, who shall consult
on this decision with the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs;
(5) review requests for original classification
authority from agencies or officials not granted
original classification authority and, if deemed
appropriate, recommend Presidential approval through the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
(6) consider and take action on complaints and
suggestions from persons within or outside the
Government with respect to the administration of the
program established under this order;
(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation
with affected agencies, standardization of forms or
procedures that will promote the implementation of the
program established under this order;
(8) report at least annually to the President on the
implementation of this order; and
(9) convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss
matters pertaining to the program established by this
Sec. 5.4. Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel. (a) Establishment and Administration.
(1) There is established an Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel ("Panel"). The Secretaries
of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United
States, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs shall each appoint a senior level
representative to serve as a member of the Panel. The
President shall select the Chair of the Panel from among
the Panel members.
(2) A vacancy on the Panel shall be filled as quickly
as possible as provided in paragraph (1), above.
(3) The Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary. The
staff of the Information Security Oversight Office shall
provide program and administrative support for the
(4) The members and staff of the Panel shall be
required to meet eligibility for access standards in
order to fulfill the Panel's functions.
(5) The Panel shall meet at the call of the Chair. The
Chair shall schedule meetings as may be necessary for
the Panel to fulfill its functions in a timely manner.
(6) The Information Security Oversight Office shall
include in its reports to the President a summary of the
(b) Functions. The Panel shall:
(1) decide on appeals by persons who have filed
classification challenges under section 1.9 of this
(2) approve, deny, or amend agency exemptions from
automatic declassification as provided in section 3.4of
this order; and
(3) decide on appeals by persons or entities who have
filed requests for mandatory declassification review
under section 3.6 of this order.
(c) Rules and Procedures. The Panel shall issue bylaws,
which shall be published in the Federal Register no later than
120 days from the effective date of this order. The bylaws
shall establish the rules and procedures that the Panel will
follow in accepting, considering, and issuing decisions on
appeals. The rules and procedures of the Panel shall provide
that the Panel will consider appeals only on actions in which:
(1) the appellant has exhausted his or her administrative
remedies within the responsible agency; (2) there is no current
action pending on the issue within the federal courts; and (3)
the information has not been the subject of review by the
federal courts or the Panel within the past 2 years.
(d) Agency heads will cooperate fully with the Panel so
that it can fulfill its functions in a timely and fully informed
manner. An agency head may appeal a decision of the Panel to
the President through the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The Panel will report to the
President through the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs any instance in which it believes that an
agency head is not cooperating fully with the Panel.
(e) The Appeals Panel is established for the sole purpose
of advising and assisting the President in the discharge of his
constitutional and discretionary authority to protect the
national security of the United States. Panel decisions are
committed to the discretion of the Panel, unless reversed by the
Sec. 5.5. Information Security Policy Advisory Council.
(a) Establishment. There is established an Information
Security Policy Advisory Council ("Council"). The Council shall
be composed of seven members appointed by the President for
staggered terms not to exceed 4 years, from among persons who
have demonstrated interest and expertise in an area related to
the subject matter of this order and are not otherwise employees
of the Federal Government. The President shall appoint the
Council Chair from among the members. The Council shall comply
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
(b) Functions. The Council shall:
(1) advise the President, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Directorof
the Office of Management and Budget, or such other
executive branch officials as it deems appropriate, on
policies established under this order or its
implementing directives, including recommended
changes to those policies;
(2) provide recommendations to agency heads for
specific subject areas for systematic declassification
(3) serve as a forum to discuss policy issues in
(c) Meetings. The Council shall meet at least twice each
calendar year, and as determined by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs or the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget.
(1) Each Council member may be compensated at a rate of
pay not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual
rate of basic pay in effect for grade Gs-18 of the
general schedule under section 5376 of title 5, United
States Code, for each day during which that member is
engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the
(2) While away from their homes or regular place of
business in the actual performance of the duties of the
Council, members may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized
by law for persons serving intermittently in the
Government service (5 U.S.C. 5703(b)).
(3) To the extent permitted by law and subject to the
availability of funds, the Information Security
Oversight Office shall provide the Council with
administrative services, facilities, staff, and other
support services necessary for the performance of its
(4) Notwithstanding any other Executive order, the
functions of the President under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, as amended, that are applicable
to the Council, except that of reporting to the
Congress, shall be performed by the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office in accordance
with the guidelines and procedures established by the
General Services Administration.
Sec. 5.6. General Responsibilities. Heads of agencies
that originate or handle classified information shall: (a)
demonstrate personal commitment and commit senior management to
the successful implementation of the program established under
(b) commit necessary resources to the effective
implementation of the program established under this order; and
(c) designate a senior agency official to direct and
administer the program, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) overseeing the agency's program established under
this order, provided, an agency head may designate a
separate official to oversee special access programs
authorized under this order. This official shall
provide a full accounting of the agency's special access
programs at least annually;
(2) promulgating implementing regulations, which shall
be published in the Federal Register to the extent that
they affect members of the public;
(3) establishing and maintaining security education and
(4) establishing and maintaining an ongoing
self-inspection program, which shall include the
periodic review and assessment of the agency's
(5) establishing procedures to prevent unnecessary
access to classified information, including procedures
that: (i) require that a need for access to
classified information is established before initiating
administrative clearance procedures; and (ii)
ensure that the number of persons granted access to
classified information is limited to the minimum
consistent with operational and security requirements
(6) developing special contingency plans for the
safeguarding of classified information used in or near
hostile or potentially hostile areas;
(7) assuring that the performance contract or other
system used to rate civilian or military personnel
performance includes the management of classified
information as a critical element or item to be
evaluated in the rating of: (i) original classification
authorities; (ii) security managers or security
specialists; and (iii) all other personnel whose duties
significantly involve the creation or handling of
(8) accounting for the costs associated with the
implementation of this order, which shall be reportedto
the Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office for publication; and
(9) assigning in a prompt manner agency personnel to
respond to any request, appeal, challenge, complaint,or
suggestion arising out of this order that pertains to
classified information that originated in a componentof
the agency that no longer exists and for which there is
no clear successor in function.
Sec. 5.7. Sanctions. (a) If the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office finds that a violation of
this order or its implementing directives may have occurred, the
Director shall make a report to the head of the agency or to the
senior agency official so that corrective steps, if
appropriate, may be taken.
(b) Officers and employees of the United States
Government, and its contractors, licensees, certificate holders,
and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they
knowingly, willfully, or negligently:
(1) disclose to unauthorized persons information
properly classified under this order or predecessor
(2) classify or continue the classification of
information in violation of this order or any
(3) create or continue a special access program
contrary to the requirements of this order; or
(4) contravene any other provision of this order or its
(c) Sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without
pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or
denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions
in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation.
(d) The agency head, senior agency official, or other
supervisory official shall, at a minimum, promptly remove the
classification authority of any individual who demonstrates
reckless disregard or a pattern of error in applying the
classification standards of this order.
(e) The agency head or senior agency official shall:
(1) take appropriate and prompt corrective action when
a violation or infraction under paragraph (b), above,
(2) notify the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office when a violation under paragraph
(b)(1), (2) or (3), above, occurs.
Part 6 General Provisions
Sec. 6.1. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the National Security Act of
1947, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted
Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and
declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under
(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an
agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office, shall render an interpretation of this order with
respect to any question arising in the course of its
(c) Nothing in this order limits the protection afforded
any information by other provisions of law, including the
exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act,
and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This order
is not intended, and should not be construed, to create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by a party against the United States, its agencies, its
officers, or its employees. The foregoing is in addition to the
specific provisos set forth in sections 1.2(b), 3.2(b) and
5.4(e) of this order.
(d) Executive Order No. 12356 of April 6, 1982, is revoked
as of the effective date of this order.
Sec. 6.2. Effective Date. This order shall become
effective 180 days from the date of this order.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
April 17, 1995.
# # #
Los Angeles, California, USA
272 posts, Aug 2003
posted 08-19-2003 07:55 PM
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